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ABSTRACT 
Corporate governance in the context of the UK's National Health Service is not 
well defined or understood. I he theoretical basis for how the service operates is 
unclear and there is little guidance on what practitioners should really focus. 
This thesis takes the corporate governance failure of the Wessex Regional Health 
Authority and explores the causes to generate key concepts. Literature is 
reviewed for evidence that the generated concepts have been recognised by other 
writers and commentators. The identification of a theoretical basis of corporate 
governance in the NHS examines agency theory, then investigates what 
stakeholder theory can offer on stakeholders, and results in discussing the main 
NHS stakeholders within an agency environment. A developed conceptual 
framework is used to analyse three further cases of recognised corporate 
governance failure from the NHS, local government and the private sector. The 
four significant corporate governance initiatives of the 1990s, Cadbury, 
Greenbury, Hampel and Nolan, and the NHS response to corporate governance, 
are examined to see whether the generated concepts have been identified and 
thereby test their consistency. 
The outcome has four distinct products. Firstly, a definition of corporate 
governa; ice in the NHS. Secondly, the acknowledgement of theory around the 
relationship of agent and principal. Thirdly, the identification of the key elements 
of corporate governance in the NHS; accountability, directors and management 
control, audit committees,, and conflict of interests. Finally, practical advice for 
practitioners in the NHS on how to put the key elements into operation 
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GLOSSARY 
Abbey Business Consultants (ABC) - private sector consultancy firm 
Area Health Authority (AHA) - pre- 1974 NHS organisation covering a county 
or significant part of a metropolitan area 
Arthur Andersen - international management consultancy firm 
Bank Arabe et Internationale d' Investissement (BAII) - investment bank 
based in Paris 
Bank of America - international bank which was an investor in BCCI in the 
early years 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) - international bank 
Bank of England - UK central bank responsible for monetary policy 
Cipfa Services Limited (CSL) - consultancy arm of professional accountancy 
body 
College of Supervisors - group of financial regulators from Luxembourg, UK, 
Switzerland, Spain, Hong Kong, Cayman Islands, UAE and France who aimed to 
monitor the activities of BCCI 
Community Health Council (CHQ - independent patient watchdog for an area 
Credit and Commerce American Holdings (CCAH) - secret BCCl subsidiary 
Credit and Commerce American Investment (CCAI) - secret BCCl subsidiary 
Deloitte, Haskins and Sells (DHS) - private sector consultancy 
Department of Environment (DOE) - UK Government department for 
regulating Local Authorities 
Department of Health (DoH) - UK Government department responsible for 
health from the late 1980s onwards 
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) - UK Government 
department responsible for health and social security until the late 1980s 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) - UK Government department 
responsible for regulating business 
District Auditor - external auditor appointed, by the Audit Commission on 
behalf of the UK Goverm-nent, to scrutinise the work of Local Government. In 
the case of Westminster it was the major audit firm Deloitte Touche 
V 
District Health Authority (DHA) - NHS organisation responsible for services 
in a given area post 1984 
District Management Team (DMT) - NHS management team responsible for 
services in a given location and accountable to their host AHA 
Family Practitioner Committee (FPC) - NHS organisation responsible for 
administering payment to GPs, dentists, pharmacists and opticians between 1974 
and 1991 
Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) - US central bank responsible for monetary policy 
Finance Directorate Letter (FDL) - NHS written mechanism for issuing 
instructions to finance departments 
Financial General Bankshares (FGB) - American bank 
General Practitioner (GP) - UK self-employed doctor providing primary care 
Gulf Group - major customer of BCCI throughout its existence. Run by the 
Gokal brothers debts of $2 billion were amassed over 18 years 
Health Advisory Service (HAS) - NHS organisation responsible for offering 
advice and spreading good practice to elderly care, mental health and learning 
disabilities services 
Health Service Circular (HSC) - NHS mechanism for issuing instructions to 
NHS bodies 
Health Service Guidance (HSG) - NHS mechanism for issuing advice to NHS 
bodies 
Hospital Information System (HIS) - integrated hospital computer system 
which incorporates all the key functions and departments 
Hospital Management Committee (HMQ - NHS body responsible for the 
management of a hospital or group of hospitals between 1948 and 1974 
Inland Revenue Service (IRS) - US tax authority 
International Credit and Investment Company Holdings (ICIC) - the BCCI 
bank within the bank based in the Cayman Islands 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - international organisation offering help 
and support to countries with struggling economies 
Luxembourg Monetary Institute (LMI) 
Luxembourg 
- the financial regulator of 
vi 
Management Services Division (MSD) - supplied internal business consultancy 
to the NHS in the West Midlands and was part of West Midlands Regional 
Health Authority 
National Bank of Georgia (NBG) - US bank in the state of Georgia 
National Health Service (NHS) - UK publicly funded healthcare system 
National Health Service Trust (NHS Trust) - NHS organisation responsible 
for the delivery of a range of services to a given area 
Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) - UK Government controlled 
organisations which can carry out executive, advisory or judicial functions 
Office of the Controller of the Currency (OCC) - US financial regulator 
PA Cambridge Economic Consultants (PA CEC) - private sector consultancy 
firm 
Price Waterhouse - audit firm who became sole external auditor for BCCI from 
1987 
Primary Care Group (PCG) - NHS organisation responsible for primary care 
and community services for a locality, as a sub-division of a health authority 
Primary Care Trust (PCT) - NHS statutory organisation responsible for 
primary care and community services for a locality 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) - select committee of UK House of 
Commons and responsible for scrutinising expenditure of public funds 
Quality Assured Business Services (QaBS) - management buyout organisation 
of the Management Services Division of West Midlands Regional Health 
Authority 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) - US regulator for share trading 
and stock exchanges 
Regional Health Authority (RHA) - NHS organisation, established in 1974, 
responsible for overseeing the running of the NHS for a large geographical area 
for 3-6m people 
Regional Hospital Board (RHB) - created in 1948 these NHS organisations 
were the forerunner to RHAs 
Regional Information Group (RIG) -a user group of chief officers from NHS 
organisations in the Wessex region to agree priorities and policies for RISP 
vii 
Regional Information Systems Plan (RISP) - the Wessex Regional Health 
Authority project for connecting up, through information technology, all NHS 
organisations in the Wessex region 
Regionally Managed Services (RMS) - part of West Midlands Regional Health 
Authority responsible for providing non-clinical services to NHS organisations in 
the West Midlands region 
Regional Supplies Division (RSD) - an arm of RMS with the role of 
procurement and provision of supplies to NHS organisations in the region 
United Research Group (URG) - US management consultancy firm 
Wessex Integrated Systems Limited (WIS) - company set up by CSL to 
provide Wessex Regional Health Authority with computing and information 
services 
Wessex Regional Health Authority (WRHA) - RHA for Wiltshire, Dorset, 
Hampshire and the Isle of Wight 
West Midlands Regional Health Authority (WMRHA) - RHA for 
Herefordshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire, Warwickshire and Worcestershire 
Vill 
Chapter 1. 
A PATHOLOGY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FAILURE: WESSEX REGIONAL HEALTH AUTHORITY 
REGIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS PLAN 
The reason behind the existence of this thesis has its roots in my appointment to 
my first chief executive appointment in 1995. On the commencement of my new 
responsibilities I was faced with a variety of corporate governance initiatives 
which required understanding and action on a personal basis. Whilst I was aware 
vaguely of two major corporate governance failures in the National Health 
Service (NHS), my knowledge and comprehension of the underlying concept was 
non-existent, and the ability to turn corporate governance into a meaningful, 
practical reality within a NHS organisation had not been developed. The 
undertaking of a thesis was aimed at the examination of the pathology of 
corporate governance so that a coherent concept could be developed, and, as a 
practitioner, useful actions could be identified to assist managers in the NHS in 
the delivery of corporate governance in the workplace. 
The beginning of this thesis is the examination of a recognised corporate 
governance failure within the United Kingdom (UK) public sector, but in 
particular, the NHS. The story of Wessex Regional Health Authority allows the 
research question to be defined and provides the setting for the subsequent three 
sections. The first develops the conceptual framework; the second takes the 
framework and uses it to understand three further cases of significant, recognised 
corporate governance failure; the third section investigates the public responses 
from the private sector, Government and the NHS, that have taken place as a 
reaction to corporate governance failure. 
As a practitioner of many years my perspective of organisational behaviour is 
grounded in significant experience. When options for the methodology of 
research to be employed for this thesis were considered, acknowledgement had to 
be made that no practitioner can examine the subject of corporate governance in a 
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value free environment. The orthodox approach of devising a hypothesis which is 
then tested would not work for this thesis as the reality of the practitioner world 
cannot be ignored and therefore an alternative methodology has been chosen. 
My research began with specific goals in mind; to define corporate governance in 
the context of the NHS, to examine the underpinning theoretical context of 
corporate governance and to identify the position which it occupies within the 
field of organisational theory, to identify the key elements of corporate 
governance in the NHS, and to offer practical advice for use by practitioners so 
that corporate governance can be realised in organisational settings. 
This practitioner needed to begin his research by the exploration of theory which 
flows from a practical problem. The starting point is the journey of a study of 
Wessex which is a well documented case that came to the attention of the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) (1993a) of the House of Commons and resulted in 
the publication of a comprehensive report. In addition the scandal attracted the 
media so that as well as the numerous written articles, there is a complete 
Panorama television programme on this subject. From this case the reasons for 
what took place are analysed to identify the main characteristics which could be 
examined in academic literature. The outcome is the development of a possible 
conceptual framework but further theoretical exploration is required. 
This chapter introduces a common approach to the four case studies within the 
thesis. The rationale is twofold. Firstly to allow comparability between four 
different scenarios which span three organisational cultural backgrounds. 
Secondly to facilitate analysis of the underlying causes of corporate governance 
failure and thereby allow the identification, if any, of similar issues. 
The aim of the Wessex case is to investigate what took place and to determine a 
set of elements which may serve as a basis for further conceptual, theoretical and 
empirical investigations. The context is important and to appreciate how a 
corporate governance failure of significant magnitude occurred it is necessary to 
understand, in broad terms, the historical development of the NHS. From that 
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point Wessex can be examined in detail as the basis for a broad investigation of 
corporate govemance. 
1-1. History of the National Health Service 
The Wessex scandal took place in the NHS and part of its causation was due to 
the evolution of the public sector healthcare system of the United Kingdom (UK). 
The establishment of the NHS on 5 th July 1948 was regarded by the population as 
a symbol of a new dawn following the tragedies of World War 11. Until that time 
health care was delivered in a fragmented way through a variety of means. 
Hospitals were run by Local Authorities or voluntary agencies on the basis of 
charging whilst General Practitioners (GPs) operated usually on the small 
shopkeeper principle of working single-handed. The common view that emerged 
following the end of the Second World War was that change was required which 
coincided with the election of a Labour Government. Klein (1995 p. 1) 
comments: 
at the time of its creation it was a unique example of the 
collectivist provision of health care in a market society. 
The NHS Act saw the establishment of Regional Hospital Boards (RHB) with 
chairmen and members appointed by the Minister. Within a Region there were a 
number of Hospital Management Committees (HMC) with their membership 
appointed by the RHB, however teaching hospitals were given Boards of 
Governors appointed by the Minister and with a funding stream direct from the 
Ministry. In addition GPs remained as independent practitioners, though 
Executive Councils were established to administer payments to GPs, dentists, 
pharmacists and opticians (Watkin 1978). Again Klein (p. 29) offers an 
interesting observation: 
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the depoliticisation of the NHS after 1948 can thus be seen simply 
as the re-emergence of organisational routines anchored in the 
British tradition of government; in particular the emphasis on 
resolving disagreement by the incorporation of interest groups in 
the process of decision-making. 
There were two key issues in the early years. Firstly the creation of a single 
national health service required a massive administrative effort and secondly the 
required level of funding began to escalate as citizens took advantage of the new, 
free service. The result was the establishment of the Guillabaud Committee in 
May 1953 which was asked to review the financing of the NHS. The Report was 
published in 1956 and concluded no drastic action was required, though better 
financial management was needed. This led to the introduction of departmental 
costing and the creation of a career structure and training for hospital 
administrators. 
The service reached its tenth birthday and onwards for another ten years with 
little deviation from the culture that had been set. Whilst the Minister was 
accountable to Parliament for the NHS, great latitude was given to the various 
RHA, HMC and Boards of Governors on policy interpretation, however on detail 
of buildings instructions could be prescriptive. There is no evidence at all during 
the first twenty years of its existence that the NHS had any significant debate or 
interest in the area of corporate governance and this changed only marginally 
following the Ely Hospital scandal. 
In 1967 allegations were made in the News of the World newspaper by a member 
of staff about the conditions at Ely Hospital, a mental health institution in 
Cardiff. The subsequent Committee of Inquiry published its findings in 1969 and 
was critical of conditions at the hospital and poor standards of treatment. Watkin 
(p. 78) comments that the Report criticised members of staff, the HMC, the Welsh 
Hospital Board and the lack of supervision and inspection of such facilities. The 
inquiry and Report was the first occasion on which the NHS was held to account 
publicly for its actions. The response from the Government was to establish the 
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Health Advisory Service (HAS) as an independent body from the Department of 
Health and Social Security (DHSS) with the remit to visit chronic hospitals and 
offer constructive advice and spread good practice. It was stressed that HAS was 
not an inspectorate however in reality that is how the NFIS viewed this 
organisation. 
Ely brought little change in NHS culture towards corporate governance issues 
such as public accountability, openness and transparency. At the end of 1968 
there was a police investigation at Farleigh Hospital near Bristol where ill 
treatment of mentally handicapped patients led to criminal proceedings. Two 
years later, a further inquiry was needed into problems at Whittingham Hospital 
in Lancashire. The Payne Report found administration by labyrinth. Other 
problems at Coldharbour Hospital in Dorset and Napsbury Hospital near St. 
Alban's followed. 
The first twenty five years of the NHS saw significant advances in medicine. 
New drugs helped control diseases such as tuberculosis and new technologies, 
e. g. renal dialysis in 1963, allowed new treatments to save lives. However 
organisational culture did not make the same progress. Before 1948 the key figure 
in Local Authority hospitals was the medical superintendent who was in charge 
and to whom the matron and administrator reported. In voluntary hospitals the 
person at the top was the chief administrator, however he derived much of his 
influence because he played a major role in fund raising. The creation of the NHS 
saw an amalgamation of the two cultures but in reality the prominence of the 
medical profession remained. Klein (p. 75) summarises the position: 
while central government controlled the budget, doctors controlled 
what happened within that budget. Financial power was 
concentrated at the centre, clinical power was concentrated at the 
periphery. 
Also nothing had changed in the original set-up of the NHS whereby hospital, 
general practitioner and local authority health services remained separate. The 
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outcome of twenty five years experience demonstrated these factors combined so 
that central government seemed unable to implement its policies unifonnly 
across the whole of the country and rational planning was hampered by the 
fragmented administrative system. The first major reorganisation of the NHS 
was announced in 1974. 
The government decided that it needed a new body to achieve effective 
management of policy implementation and rational planning. England saw the 
creation of a new tier of administration through 90 Area Health Authorities 
(AHA) which were designed to be coterminous with Local Authority boundaries. 
The link with the DHSS would be through 15 Regional Health Authorities 
(RHA). Below AHAs there would be District Management Teams (DMT) who 
would operate local services on the basis of consensus management. In addition 
AHAs would manage the new Family Practitioner Committees (FPC) who would 
administer the payment systems for GPs. Finally the government introduced 
Community Health Councils (CHC), one each for the 200 districts. CHCs were to 
represent the views of the public and were not accountable to AHAs. 
This new system was very bureaucratic and led to a proliferation of committees. 
In addition the consensus management approach required by the DMT meant that 
the doctor and nurse representative had the power of veto. Two years later the 
DHSS unveiled a new planning system which meant health authorities were 
required to produce strategic plans in line with Priorities for Health and Personal 
Social Services in England. 
The 1970s were extremely difficult years for the UK economy with high inflation, 
high public sector borrowing, very high interest rates and severe industrial 
relations problems. Allsop (1984 p. 37) argues that there was a post-war 
consensus in health policy for the first thirty years of the NHS existence. This 
had given a lack of political conflict unlike education and "the principles on 
which the NHS was based ...... were not seriously challenged and commanded 
widespread respect and affection". 
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The year of the thirtieth birthday of the NFIS saw yet another report of a major 
scandal. The publication of the Committee of Inquiry into Normansfield Hospital 
in 1978 illustrated mismanagement of a mental handicapped facility. The Report 
criticised different levels of organisation, DHSS, RHA and AHA and various 
senior officers of the AHA, because the problems had been well known of for a 
number of years and despite CHC complaints, no action had been taken. In a 
scathing commentary in the British Medical Journal in December 1978, Klein 
(1978) voices the view: 
...... a breakdown in the NHS's system of management. The 
vocabulary of management - with its emphasis on monitoring and 
accountability - is shown to have been empty, incantatory rhetoric 
devoid of substance. 
At the same time field research by Bevan and colleagues (1980 p. 235) for the 
Royal Commission found ...... the NHS is so backward in developing finance and 
other management disciplines" and 
as regards fallback sanctions for avoidable and unjustified 
overspending ..... we ourselves 
have encountered no case that went 
so far as to involve dismissal or other heavy penalties. 
Around the same time Elcock and Haywood (1979 p. 105) completed some 
research which concludes ".... Health Authorities have demonstrated that they can 
resist and even thwart central instructions which they find unwelcome or 
unacceptable". 
1979 saw the election of a new government that quickly realised changes were 
required and published Patients First (DHSS 1979) which was a consultative 
document on reorganisation. It argued for decisions to be made at a local level, 
with effective local management and minimal interference from central 
government or region. 
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1982 saw the second major reorganisation of the NHS with an emphasis on 
making decisions as close to the point of delivery of services as possible. The 90 
AHAs were abolished and the DMTs were enhanced to become District Health 
Authorities (DHAs). FPCs had in fact remained relatively independent of AHAs 
since 1974 and therefore in 1982 they became separate from DHAs with linkage 
direct to the regional level. In general the reorganisation was welcomed for 
stripping away a needless tier of bureaucracy and for the move to local autonomy, 
however the conflict with central accountability remained. 
The economic situation in the early 1980s was a major concern for the 
government. In particular there was a need to control public expenditure at a time 
when NHS spending was escalating. Efficiency was seen as the key to produce 
more health care for less money. The result was a number of initiatives. 
Firstly, in 1982 the DHSS introduced the Annual Performance Review between 
Ministers and regions which were accountability meetings to review progress 
towards targets. These reviews were to occur further down the management 
hierarchy between RHA and DHAs and DHAs and operational units. Secondly, 
in 1983 under the Financial Management Initiative there was the mass publication 
of Performance Indicators (Pls) for the public sector. The aim was to introduce a 
means of accountability to Ministers for a hospital's performance. Thirdly in 1983 
there was the publication of the Griffiths Report. 
Over only six months of 1983, the Managing Director of Sainsbury's, Roy 
Griffiths, was brought in to lead the NHS Management Inquiry. He concluded 
that the NHS was suffering from institutional stagnation and he used a phrase 
that was repeated many times in the media, " if Florence Nightingale was 
carrying her lamp through the corridors of the NHS today she would almost 
certainly be searching for the people in charge". His recommendations were for 
the implementation of a general management structure from top to bottom. The 
Secretary of State was to chair a Supervisory Board to set direction and monitor 
performance. Within the DHSS a Chief Executive would implement policy, 
provide leadership and control performance and he would have a Management 
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Board to assist him. Finally there would be general managers at regional, district 
and unit level. Consensus management was dead as decisions had to be made as 
general management was expected to deliver. 
On a practical level the new appointments did not take place for most posts until 
1985 and in reality the majority of jobs were filled from existing administrator 
ranks with a smattering of high profile external appointments from Industry and 
the Armed Forces. For many NHS individuals the new managerialism was 
uncomfortable and in some cases abhorrent. The traditional administrator was a 
diplomat who exercised influencing skills over long time spans rather than the 
more direct active manager. The result was that as the end of the 1980s 
approached progress was slow (Pollitt et al 1991). 
The NHS passed its fortieth birthday having undergone some change but it is 
arguable how much the fundamental culture had altered. The dominant feature of 
this time was the primacy of the medical profession with central government 
having limited influence on effecting change. The administrators of the service 
did not see that their role was to challenge the status quo or else the various 
scandals would not have occurred. Review of literature for this forty years shows 
no real interest in the issues of corporate governance as we know them today. 
Accountability arrived in a real sense with the Griffiths Report which as we shall 
see was slow to deliver true embedded change. 
1.2. Regional Information Systems Plan - The Storv 
In the early 1980s Wessex Regional Health Authority (WRHA) covered a 
population of three million people in an area of southern England which 
encompassed Dorset, Hampshire, Wiltshire and the Isle of Wight. The revenue 
budget for which WRHA was responsible, was some f500m. The Public 
Accounts Committee Report (1993a) identifies in great detail what occurred in 
Wessex. 
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The Regional General Manager (RGM), John Hoare of WRHA had the vievý' that 
there was a need to take advantage of developments in Information Technology 
(IT) and thereby link every hospital and GP surgery within the region into an 
integrated network. This network would have five core systems of accountancy, 
manpower, hospital information, estates and community. The aim was to provide 
good quality information to assist staff to discharge the tasks of the NHS. In 
October 1982 the WRHA considered a report to pursue an integrated approach to 
IT within the region. The report was approved and the Regional Information 
Systems Plan (RISP) was born. 
The following 18 months was taken up with the identification of information 
needs of hospital and community services from which flowed the development of 
data models showing how the information needs could be met. The work on the 
former involved WRHA and two of the DHAs and led to the publication of the 
Regional Information Requirement in June, 1983. From then on the consultants 
Arthur Andersen became involved and undertook the data modelling work. 
In May 1984 RISP was adopted by the WRHA and proposed: 
* the development of five main systems, operating to common standards 
and operational in every district of the Region; 
9 development to be completed within five years; 
9a transitional strategy to make the most use of existing systems proved 
they worked well and could be integrated with RISP in due course; 
* any interim systems to make use of proven software and systems and 
packages elsewhere; 
9 the devolution of responsibility for the operational management of 
systems from region to district. 
The five year capital cost of the RISP was f-26m at 1984\5 prices with revenue 
costs of f 17.5m. It was recognised that 500 programming years of input was 
required over and above the efforts of 38 in-house staff who would work on the 
Project, which meant that the use of external consultants would be very high. 
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Commitment from DHAs to RISP was crucial and therefore a Regional 
Information Group (RIG) of District representatives at Chief Officer level was 
established to agree priorities and policies. The overall Project was the 
responsibility of the Regional Information Systems Manager (RISM) under the 
direction of the RGM with advice from the WRHA's Information Committee and 
the RIG. 
In June 1984 Arthur Andersen presented its development proposals to take RISP 
forward and identified the potential risks of cost control, time slippage, 
maintenance of relevance to users and achievement of a demanding 
implementation plan. Two months later WRHA signed its first contract with 
Abbey Business Consultants (ABC) for five staff. 
The turn of the new year saw the publication of Regional Information Service 
Planning and Control Procedures which set out the roles of region and districts. 
In May the WRHA Information Group (IG), which comprised of Members of the 
Authority, met and as did RIG. August 1985 saw the issue of Invitations to 
Tender (ITT) for the provision of the hospital information, personnel and 
accountancy core systems. Multi-disciplinary teams were established to evaluate 
submitted tenders. 
The IG considered the issue of single or mixed hardware solutions and decided 
on the former in February 1986. The hardware supplier DEC (now known as 
Digital) was chosen and in a letter of 27 th February 1986, the unsuccessful 
suppliers (Arthur Andersen, ICL, IBM and McDonald Douglas) were informed of 
the decision but also told that it did not mean that they had been excluded from 
the tendering process. WRHA made a public announcement at Easter that DEC 
had won a contract worth f2lm to supply the three core systems. During April, 
separate approaches were made to the Chairman and RGM of WRHA lobbying 
on behalf of the unsuccessful Arthur Andersen\IBM consortium. 
Detailed negotiations with DEC took place from May - August and included a 
visit to the USA to identify a suitable Hospital Information System (HIS), 
Chapter III 
together with searches in the UK. During these trips and at the debriefings Arthur 
Andersen representatives accompanied the WRHA team as advisors. On 29 th 
September 1986 the IG were told that negotiations with DEC had failed and that 
the evaluation group unanimously recommended a contract with the Arthur 
Andersen\IBM consortium. The contract was signed on November 14th. 
At the beginning of 1987 Robin Little was appointed as Regional Treasurer from 
which he resigned only nine months later in October to take up a post with Cipfa 
Services Limited (CSL) as a consultant. The following month CSL were 
appointed by WRHA to review a number of regional services including 
Information Services; the lead consultant was Robin Little. During the time of the 
review it became clear to the RISM that there were serious shortfalls in the 
funding of RISP. 
CSL's report was made in February 1988 and detailed problems with 
implementation of the Project. Mr. Little suggested that to overcome the staffing 
difficulties and to provide an alternative source of funding for RISP that CSL and 
WRHA should form a partnership. The following month CSL were given the task 
of developing the strategy, policies and plans to act as a specification for the 
tendering process. On 6 th April, eight firms were sent the Invitation to Tender and 
four firms responded. 
Evaluation took place during which time WRHA had a new Chairman, Robin 
Buchanan, take up post. In September a contract was signed with Wessex 
Integrated Systems Limited (WIS) to provide computing and information 
services; WIS was an external company formed by CSL. In October 1988 WRHA 
signed two subsidiary agreements with WIS for the provision of strategic 
management advice and the provision of IT staff. 
By January 1989 alarm bells were ringing at the Department of Health following a 
ministerial review of RISP. Of concern was the rising cost and the slow progress. 
A costed plan was requested from the RGM by 22 nd February but was never 
produced. At the same time following the resignation of the RISM, Dr. Roger 
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Chaddock in December 1988, Robin Little was seconded to WRHA to act as the 
RISM. In February he produced a three year Regional Development Plan for the 
full implementation of RISP. The plan was agreed by WRHA in February 1989 
In March 1989 without the knowledge of the IG, WRHA or the Chairman, an 
order worth 0.3m was placed with IBM for a mainframe computer. This month 
saw the appointment of Harry Tuffill as RISM on a secondment from IBM 
though the terms of his placement did not allow his involvement in IT 
acquisition. The Chairman did not become aware of the computer purchase for 
some months. In August he engaged consultants DeLoitte, Haskins and Sells 
(DHS) to report on WRHA's computing requirements, and IBM to undertake a 
capacity planning exercise for hardware needs. Around the same time, Robin 
Buchanan also met the RGM and made it clear that he could not continue in post. 
John Hoare resigned on 15 th September. 
October saw the presentation of two reports from DHS; one on computer 
hardware and accommodation, and one on WRHA's contractual position with 
WIS. In particular the latter was critical of uncompetitive terms to which WRHA 
were exposed. From the very start of RISP commitment from the DHAs was 
crucial. By this time only three of the nine DHAs were still committed to HIS 
alongside Winchester DHA which had been selected a few years earlier to be one 
of the national pilot sites for the Government's Resource Management Initiative. 
January 1990 brought Ken Jarrold into post as the new RGM. By April he 
recommended to WRHA, and it was agreed, that RISP should be abandoned. 
Two months later the new RGM called in the District Auditor to investigate RISP 
and the WIS contracts. The District Auditor's detailed reports became available 
in July 1992. On I oth February 1993 the Public Accounts Committee became 
aware of the issue and asked for information which the Comptroller and the 
Auditor General submitted in a memorandum dated 27 th April 1993. The 
Committee met on a number of occasions over the next 6 months and 
interviewed the Chairman and RGM of WRHA and the Chief Executive of the 
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NHS. The findings of the Committee were issued as the 63 rd Report on 3d 
November, 1993. 
The Failings of RISP 
The previous narrative identified the outline of what took place but to 
comprehend the magnitude of the corporate governance failure an understanding 
of detailed actions is necessary. The failings include control of contractors, 
tendering process, conflict of interest, and poor management control. 
1.3.1. Control of Contractors 
The first major problem was the confusion of roles between advisor to WRHA 
and bidder to provide goods and services. The former was the role for Arthur 
Andersen consultants in 1983 and 1984, however in 1985 the company teamed up 
with IBM to bid for the three core system tender. At this stage Andersen should 
have ceased to fulfil the advisor role but in visits to the USA in July 1985 and on 
return in the UK, the WR-HA negotiation group were accompanied by Andersen's 
representatives despite being in direct competition with DEC for the contract. 
Their involvement continued at debriefing meetings following the visits. 
Separately, ABC had undertaken some consultancy projects for WRHA 
previously and in 1985 they were commissioned with the development of a 
proposal for a statistical information system. No specification or implementation 
plan was agreed with WRHA neither was a formal contract signed. The system 
evolved into a general management information system which the DHAs 
amended to meet their needs. ABC took on this extra work and charged WRHA 
the cost. There was no separation of cost between RHA and DHAs which should 
have occurred. The total cost charged by ABC was f 1.08m with a further f-1.3m 
charged by Istel who acquired ABC. In 1989 Istel were themselves taken over by 
AT&T. Following the District Auditor's detailed examination two former RHA 
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managers, the former owner of ABC and a consultant were arrested for 
conspiracy to defraud WRHA- 
In August 1984 WRHA signed its first contract with ABC for the recruitment of 
five staff to support the STAMP project. The agreement gave the WRHA access 
to skilled staff and artificially reduced manpower figures in accordance with 
Government targets. The costs of this contract were: 
9 staff salaries and bonuses of up to 1\3 Id of Whitley Council rates; 
* 40% overhead and management cost; 
9 VAT; 
9 payment quarterly in advance. 
15 months later an additional eight staff were included and the management fee 
was reduced to 35%. Whilst WRHA achieved its objectives it was at a highly 
questionable cost and not Value for Money. 
One of the subsidiary agreements to the WIS contract was for the provision of 
strategic management advice to WREA. Under this heading WIS charged the 
WRHA for work which was nothing to do with the NFIS but the fori-nation of the 
company. In addition WIS was guaranteed a 15% profit above incurred expenses 
irrespective of performance. Other significant issues were that originally it was 
planned by WRHA to use man day rates for charging and two WRHA Members 
were to be unpaid Non-Executive Directors of the Company. The former was 
changed to a "cost plus" formula and the latter was abandoned. Also the contract 
was prepared by WIS and not the WRHA. 
After the contract was signed WRHA officers attempted to implement controls 
through requirements for a Plan progress reporting, quality assurance and 
budgeting compliance. These attempts were thwarted by Robin Little, a director 
of WIS who saw the procedures as unnecessary bureaucracy. He proposed to the 
new RISM, IBM seconded Harry Tuffill, that sample checking of invoices would 
be adequate and that the RISM should control the contract against an overall 
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budget and leave detailed budgeting responsibility with Mr. Little. This proposal 
was agreed, which along with the specifics of the contract referred to above, 
meant that WRHA had no control over WIS on performance or charging. 
In the mid 1980s WRHA had a budgeted establishment of 104 staff for the IT 
Department. In reality due to a shortage of skilled staff which was exacerbated by 
higher private sector salaries, a number of posts were vacant and consultants 
were used to bridge the gap. The second subsidiary agreement to the main 
contract for WIS placed a number of responsibilities on the company. These 
included a requirement to offer jobs to existing WRHA staff and to recruit 
additional staff to deliver plans agreed between WRHA and WIS. On the latter 
issue WRHA was to write to WIS and identify the vacant posts to be filled. 
Not long after the establishment of this agreement in October 1988 the RISM post 
was occupied by three different individuals over a period of four months. The 
third person Harry Tuffill decided on his third day in post that he did not wish to 
review every WIS vacancy. He wrote to the company and stated that the 
establishment of the department transferred to WIS was 104 staff and therefore 
the company could recruit up to that level. At that point WRHA was assured a 
legal responsibility to pay WIS for the costs of 104 staff. The new RISM failed to 
understand before making this commitment that the duties of only 86 staff 
transferred to WIS whilst the other duties stayed at WRHA or ceased to be 
necessary. In fact at the time of the creation of WIS only 60 staff transferred but 
two months after the RISM's commitment WIS had employed another 60 staff 
which gave then a complement of 105 operational staff. Eight weeks later in 
August 1988 the Department of Health raised a number of concerns with the 
RISM and included a criticism of the imprecise nature of the WIS contract. 
External consultants DHS were asked to review the contract in September. In 
light of their report the WRHA Chairman decided to renegotiate with the 
company which was now called CFM Healthsystems and it is at this stage that 
the WRHA's solicitors Blake Lapthorpe were brought into play for the first time. 
Both the Chairman and solicitors believed that 104 former WRHA staff had 
Chapter 1 16 
transferred to the company. The agreement went through various drafts but the 
final document included the phase "the currently mutually agreed level of 104 
permanent staff'. Whilst the wording falls short of a guarantee the actual budget 
allowed for the costs of this staffing level. The budget was proposed by company 
employees and effectively guaranteed a set level of income for an unspecified 
service. The agreement was signed in February 1990 even though with effective 
management control it could be seen that WREA did not need the services of 104 
IT staff, the cost to the taxpayer was f 3,150,000 per annum. 
The WRHA\WIS staffing fiasco had another quite separate strand which requires 
comment. One of the major plans of the original contract was the avoidance of 
redundancy payments and therefore no provision was made for this purpose. 
However when WRHA began the renegotiation of the contract in the autumn of 
1989 CFM raised the issue of redundancy liability. Their argument was that the 
original three year contract would allow the company to develop sufficient 
external business to protect transferred staff from redundancy. However, as other 
RHAs were moving to five year contracts it was unlikely that staff would move 
without the support of redundancy if necessary. In December the RISM agreed 
that WRHA would underwrite redundancy payments to a level of f 100,000 for 
any redundancy on the date of the termination of the contract. This decision is 
quite extraordinary as staff transferred to CFM and were subject to the 
company's terms and conditions. No liability remained with WRHA and this 
point had been advised by the WRHA Legal Officer. The District Auditor formed 
the view that the payment could only be a subsidy to former employees and as 
such WRHA were acting ultra vires. 
The original WIS contract was flawed in that it had no clear performance criteria 
against which the contract could be judged. This issue was pressed by both the 
Department of Health (DoH) and the external auditors. Assurances were given 
by WRHA that the renegotiated contract would address the problem. However in 
November 1989 Blake Lapthome wrote to the WRHA Chairman with the first 
draft of the contract. The letter made it clear that the solicitors had followed the 
now knighted Sir Robin Buchanan's instructions so that there were no specific 
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penalty clauses for poor performance but some general clauses regarding the 
standard of work. Later when challenged as to the reasoning behind this action 
the WRHA Chairman argued that he aimed to give the former WRHA employees 
a "soft landing" for three years after which time a proper commercial contract 
would be signed and be enforced. The result was that the taxpayer effectively 
subsidised the operation of a private commercial organisation which meant that 
CFM was protected from the normal pressures of the market place. 
The WIS contract had one other related but separate failing which flourished 
because of poor control by WRHA. In addition the DoH had raised concerns at 
the over-reliance of WIS on work from WRHA. At a meeting on 4 th October 
1989 between DoH and WRHA it was stated that WRHA aimed to move from 
100% guaranteed business to nil over three years for WIS. In reality within a 
couple of weeks following discussions with CSL, Blake Lapthorne were 
instructed to include in the draft contract a sliding scale of dependence for 
WRHA work which would move from 90% to 75% to 50% over three years. By 
the time the contract was signed the reduction in reliance had dropped to 10% per 
year. These changes were approved by WRHA Chairman. This failing is another 
example of poor control of external consultants by WRHA. 
In March 1989 a decision was taken by senior officers of WRHA to buy a IBM 
3090 mainframe computer at a cost of f 3.3m. It was argued that the machine was 
needed to underpin the delivery of RISP. A sizing exercise had been completed 
by WIS who based the work on the Regional Development Plan adopted by 
WRHA in February 1989. This Plan was by this time already showing signs of 
being unrealistic. In April the manpower system was abandoned, followed in July 
by a re-estimation of HIS costs from fl2m to 00m and a growing 
disenchantment from DHAs to sign any commitment. Yet WIS did not inform 
WRHA of these problems and therefore query the need for the IBM 3090. 
When the purchase of the computer became known WRHA commissioned 
consultants DFIS to confirm whether the computer was required and then asked 
IBM to undertake another sizing exercise. The key issue at this time was for 
Chapter 1 18 
WRHA to form a view before the option to cancel the purchase expired at the 
end of September. DFIS advised that WRHA should seek an immediate upgrade 
from the IBM 3090\200E to model 3090\3005. Significantly DHS based this 
conclusion on the capacity planning exercises of WIS in April and the IBM 
assessment in September. Both of these reports used the Regional Development 
Plan which by September could be seen to be unrealistic. The IBM report argued 
for the upgrade of the computer based on every DHA implementing the Plan but 
the RISM knew that at least half of the DHAs were very sceptical of RISP and 
therefore unlikely to commit themselves. Also both external consultants used 
information provided by the RISM, Harry Tuffill, who was seconded from IBM 
in April of the same year. The outcome was that the IG were given the flawed 
reports and decided not to re-negotiate the IBM contract. By the time the 
computer was commissioned 18 months had passed since it had been ordered and 
it declined in value by f 2.3m. 
1.3.2. Tendering Proces 
The public sector has clearly defined tendering procedures for the purchase of 
services or items of significant value so as to ensure that the taxpayer receives 
best value for money and that no particular supplier can influence the outcome of 
the tendering process to their advantage. The RISP case is littered with examples 
of major breaches of process which should have resulted in action being taken 
against individuals and organisations. 
The original process for the tendering of the three core systems for RISP 
followed an expected pattern. However significant errors began to occur once the 
evaluation stage was concluded and the contract awarded to DEC. It is not 
uncommon with a large contract for negotiations to continue after the award has 
been made as the supplier may have offered a number of options on parts of its 
bid which require further discussion. In DEC's case it would appear that whilst 
WRHA wanted DEC's hardware there was some choices around the best 
software. Visits by the WREA team to view differing packages would be 
expected but the error by WRHA was to continue to use Andersen as their 
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advisers when Andersen had submitted a bid for the RISP contract as a partner 
with IBM. The error was compounded by the involvement of Andersen 
consultants in the post visit debriefings. This allowed Andersen access to 
privileged competitor information and as Andersen had been told that all bidders 
were still not excluded from the bidding process the consultants should not have 
been involved as this situation compounded the magnitude of the next error. 
Before the assessment of submitted tenders can begin an agreed evaluation 
process has to be established. This allows bids to be scored against key criteria 
which are necessary for the delivery of a service or preference of a piece of 
equipment. In a complex tender such as the three core systems for RISP there 
will also be a weighting between different elements of the requirement. 40% of 
the weighting in this tender was for the patient administration system. 
DEC won the contract and prepared its own software for accounting and 
manpower but McDonnell Douglas software for the hospital information system. 
Though McDonnell Douglas had the highest evaluated score there were concerns 
with the technical feasibility which is how WRHA came to explore other HIS 
options in the USA and UK. The last such visit occurred to a McDonnell Douglas 
site on 26 th September 1986 when at least two members of the WRHA Group 
expressed enthusiasm for the product but the RISM persuaded the Group that it 
was not a viable option. Three days later the IG was informed that negotiations 
with DEC had failed and Andersen\IBM should be given the contract. The IG 
was never given the report of the evaluation group nor the HIS group, but it was 
given the criteria against which bidders had been scored. The criteria had 
changed significantly in that there was no weightings between the attributes of 
the three different systems but subjective assessment was used. The outcome was 
that Andersen jumped from a ranking of 4 th out of 5, to I". 
A separate but disturbing issue arose during the period when WRHA was 
negotiating with DEC in the summer of 1986. The RGM was approached by a 
Member of WRHA to reconsider the decision to award the contract to DEC. The 
impropriety was twofold. Firstly, the decision to award the contract was made by 
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WRHA and therefore if there were good grounds to reconsider the decision a 
case should have been made to the Authority and not its senior executive. 
However, more worrying is the second aspect in that the Member was John 
Foster who also was the Director of Corporate Services at IBM. In addition the 
Chairman of WRHA at that time Sir Brian Thwaites received a telephone call 
from Patrick Jenkins, former Secretary of State at the DHSS, who was acting on 
behalf of Andersen and argued that the award of the contract to DEC was a bad 
decision. Either of the two approaches could be interpreted as an attempt to 
influence the outcome of a tendering process and should have led to 
disqualification of Andersen from any further involvement. 
Standing orders and standing financial instructions of WRHA throughout the 
period 1984-1990 clearly state that competitive tendering is required for the 
supply of goods and services and that the directives of the European Community 
(EC) on the awarding of contracts were to be followed. In March 1989 without 
reference to the IG or WRHA, officers decided to purchase an additional IBM 
mainframe computer at a cost of 0.3m. Clearly this is a major breach of 
Standing Orders as no tendering process was undertaken. Also the potential size 
of the contract meant that an advert should have been placed in the European 
Journal so as to inform computer supplies in the EC of the business opportunity; 
EC law was therefore broken exposing WRHA to the possibility of a large fine 
and public censure. In addition standing orders stated that the award of contracts 
over f 100,000 in value should be reported to the Authority, but it was many 
months before Members were informed. 
1.3.3. Conflict of Interest 
The RISP case study is littered with conflicts of interests which are worthy of 
explicit identification. 
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o Arthur Andersen 
This firm was originally employed as consultants at the start of RISP. Then they 
were invited to become a bidder for the three core system contract. Whilst their 
bid was still on the table as WRHA sought to complete negotiations with its 
identified preferred provider, Andersen acted as advisers to the Authority which 
appears to have given them inside information on a competitor and influence on 
the final award of the contract. Finally the company became a bidder again as the 
DEC negotiations failed and the Andersen\IBM consortium was awarded the 
contract. 
9 John Foster 
This individual was both a senior employee of IBM and a Member of WRHA. 
The normal practice when the organisation who employs you is bidding for NHS 
work, is for the Member to declare a potential conflict of interest and to ensure 
that he\she has no involvement in the decision making process of the Authority. 
Mr. Foster ignored this protocol and deliberately sought to influence the most 
senior officer of WRHA with a view to furthering his company's position. 
9 Patrick Jenkins 
This politician was a former Secretary of State for Health who had been retained 
by Arthur Andersen to act as an adviser. In a note to the PAC he admitted that he 
knew the Chairman of WRHA both as a Health Authority Chairman in Brent and 
had selected him to be the Regional Chairman in Wessex; in addition they had 
worked together at Westfield College, London University. His telephone 
conversation with Brian Thwaites was an attempted use of the old boys network 
to influence a major decision of a public body which as the former senior 
politician for the NHS, he should have known was unethical. 
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9 CSL 
The first problem with this organisation occurred in 1987 when only the month 
after the Regional Treasurer, Robin Little, resigned he returned to lead a team 
from CSL which had been asked to review a number of services. This contract 
was awarded on a non-competitive basis and the wisdom of allowing a very 
recent senior officer back into the organisation as a contractor must be regarded 
as a doubtful decision. Whilst this work was in hand the funding problems of 
RISP became apparent. Mr. Little suggested the idea of partnership between 
WRHA and CSL and when agreed, was asked to prepare the policies and plans to 
underpin the tendering process. Up to this point there was no real conflict of 
interest. However CSL were allowed to bid for the contract despite detailed 
inside information and were awarded the contract. 
For the period of two months at the start of 1989 Robin Little was seconded from 
CSL to act as the RISM. This meant he had the responsibility of overseeing the 
WIS contract and the most appropriate analogy is that a poacher is asked to act as 
the game-keeper. The issue of the second agreement and the level of staffing 
enshrined in the contract has been covered in detail. This is yet another example 
where CSL in the form of WIS confused their own and their client's interests. As 
advisors to WRHA, WIS should have raised the unrealistic nature of the 
Development Plan, however the company put its own profits ahead of the needs 
of WRHA. 
9 IBM 
IBM allowed the secondment of Harry Tuffill to the post of RISM at a time when 
it was a significant provider of services to WRHA. Again this meant that the 
duties of the RISM were severely compromised as Mr. Tuffill should have been 
monitoring the performance of IBM and taking action for any deficiencies. 
Whilst the terms of his secondment precluded his direct involvement in the 
purchase of equipment, it was documents made available by him which external 
consultants used to confirm the need to purchase the IBM computer. 
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o ABC 
The conflict of interest was so great that the Police successfully prosecuted four 
individuals for fraud. Two people were former IT staff of the Authority and 
should have been controlling the work and payment of ABC. Unfortunately one 
of the others was the former owner of ABC which meant that a conspiracy rather 
than a proper commercial contractual relationship existed. 
1.3.4. Poor Management Control 
Two of the fundamental roles of Members of health authorities were to monitor 
the performance of officers and to ensure that systems were in place to protect the 
public purse. Levels of authority are key to any organisation, yet with RISP there 
are examples of major decisions being made by individuals when they did not 
have the authority to do so. The most striking example is the purchase of a 0.3m 
computer which was authorised by the RGM and Regional Treasurer without 
recourse to WRHA. 
Next, decision making committees can be empowered to act on behalf of the 
corporate body within defined terms of reference, membership and the attendance 
of members which constitutes a quorum. The IG was such a committee 
empowered by WRHA. Unfortunately the key decision to replace DEC with 
IBM\Andersen was taken when the IG was inquorate and therefore the decision 
was invalid. 
Availability of information is vital for Members to discharge their function, 
RISP had many examples of information being withheld. Firstly the reports of the 
evaluation group and HIS group were not made available to WRHA or the IG to 
demonstrate why the contract was moved to IBM\Andersen. Secondly the District 
Auditor's investigation uncovered the fact that the cost of RISP was not f29m as 
told to WRHA but f 80m. Thirdly because good information was not made 
available to the Regional Chairman at the time of the contract renegotiation with 
Wis at the end of 1989, the fiasco of the staffing level ensued. 
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These issues could have been avoided if before embarking on this visionarý' 
project, the Authority had insisted on a detailed project plan which was based on 
a tried and tested project management methodology. This would have laid down 
the key decisions that would have been necessary, who was to make them, 
monitoring of implementation and cost control to name but a few key 
components. 
The final failing under poor management control is the lack of use of Internal 
Audit. Even with hindsight it would have been reasonable to assume that around 
1986-87 that Internal Audit should have examined the progress of RISP 
particularly when it represented such a large cost and volume of effort. Sadly the 
PAC Report states: 
throughout the history of the RISP, Intemal Audit failed to 
provide management with an adequate level of independent 
assurance as to the propriety of expenditure on the plan. 
1.4. Wessex Man 
In 1993 in the aftermath of the RISP fiasco the BBC's premier current affairs 
programme, Panorama, pointed its spotlight at RISP. Interviews with the key 
players involved in the Project shed valuable insight into what transpired. It is 
clear from the comments of John Hoare that he believed Wessex RHA was right 
at the front of the Information Technology revolution and he talked of creating "a 
living network of clata". 
Robert Sheldon MP, who chaired the Public Accounts Committee investigation 
into RISP, identified the three issues of fraud, probity and standards as at the 
heart of the matter. He stated that the activities of John Foster were a "division of 
loyalties ....... muddying of 
differences between his two roles". Tony Rees, who 
was a Member of the RHA from 1976-90, stated 11 the public sector is not terribly 
geared to taking strolls in the jungle" which he argued was one lesson, whilst 
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another was "big projects are dangerous". It was during his tenure as chairman of 
the RHA's IG that the inquorate meeting awarded the first major contract to 
IBM\Andersen. John Hoare's response to any suggestion of any 
maladministration brought forward the following quote: 
I think that the Authority, Members of the Authority, Chairman 
and indeed myself, behaved with total integrity ....... and would not 
have thought otherwise. Any mistakes were of ignorance and 
certainly not underhand about any part of the project. 
In 1987 when an elected representative, David Martin MP for Portsmouth, sought 
answers from the RGM and Chairman of the RHA, he was treated as "a naughty 
schoolboy". When he went to the Government, the Minister Tony Newton 
implied that the Department was monitoring the situation and therefore Mr 
Martin should not become involved. Hoare's justification of the deliberate 
underestimate of RISP by some f61 rn was dismissed by the statement: 
when you are doing something totally new, which no-one has 
done before, estimates of cost are difficult, you can put all the 
expertise you like into it. 
At the PAC hearings the second RHA Chairman, Sir Robin Buchanan, was 
challenged as to why he had sought a secondment from IBM to the key role of 
RISM. He responded "he was the only hope I had to provide the grip that the then 
Minister of Health was requiring me to provide". 
The Panorama programme finished with two key segments of interviews. Firstly 
in conversation with the senior manager who had the task of clearing up the RISP 
mess, Ken Jarrold. He made 3 summary quotes: 
what we discovered was that the public sector really has to be well 
informed and rigorous in its management procedures if it Is to 
avoid being taken advantage of 
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there is no question that being a public servant in the new world is 
particularly challenging because on the one hand as public 
servants we have to learn new disciplines of commercial 
relationships and competitive tendering and so on, and at the same 
time we have to remember the very important traditional public 
service values, and that is not an easy combination. 
I think it is very important that whilst we seek to apply the private 
sector disciplines, we never forget we constantly revisit public 
sector values. 
The final word went to the PAC Chairman who said "standards are higher in the 
public sector than in private, we must ensure that transferred services have 
standards transferred as well" 
Summa 
It has been said that we cannot forget our history and with RISP this comment is 
apt. The first 20 years of the NHS saw a concentration on the establishment of a 
national service and its development. The strong middle class value of public 
service pervaded the Service and no-one found the need to discuss corporate 
governance as it exists in 2002. The early 1980s saw a fundamental change in 
British society. The election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 led to the defeat of the 
Trades Union and the rise of the entrepreneur. Perceived needless red tape was 
stripped away and businessmen were encouraged to be innovative to revitalise 
the British economy after the hyperinflation years of the 1970s. 
Within the NHS at this time the culture was one of consensus and of long term 
relationships built on a diplomatic, civil service approach. Along came Griffiths 
who effectively threw a bomb under this method of operation. However the 
majority of the senior personnel who were expected to act in general management 
mode, were the same individuals that were incalcated in the old ways of 
Chapter 1 27 
operating. Such a fundamental culture shift in an organisation as large and 
widespread, required a number of years to pass before significant changes could 
be achieved. 
In the same period came the start of the information Technology revolution. For 
the first time it was possible to give individuals desk top computers such as the 
Apple 11. The attraction to the labour intensive and information hungry 
environment of the NHS, was immediate. Unfortunately the development of 
entrepreneurship, managerialism in the NHS and the IT revolution happened at 
different speeds with the NHS evolving the slowest. 
Until this time any significant development in the NHS had been under the 
control of the Service as invariably they were clinical in nature. A former Chief 
Medical Officer at the DHSS, Sir George Godber, wrote in 1975 (p. 45): 
look at the last twenty-five years. The greatest priority tends to 
have been given to areas of greatest scientific interest. New 
developments like kidney transplantation, cardiac surgery, super- 
voltage radiotherapy and intermittent haemodialysis. 
Now for the first time there was an exciting new world but it was so specialised 
that the NHS required significant external assistance to understand and use the 
new technology. The problem for all organisations in this situation is that you 
don't know what you don't know, The result was that the NHS was not in a 
position to recognise when it received poor advice from its advisors. Neither did 
the Service heed lessons that were already around. In a Social Policy Paper 
published in 1985 Ellie Scrivens points out that the PAC had published a Report 
in the previous year titled "Management and Control of the Development of 
Administrative Computing in Government Departments" which had been highly 
critical of the DHSS and its track record. 
if culture is the first major cause of the RISP failure then the second is Big Idea 
Blindness. There is no doubt that even at the start of the 21" century the vision 
behind RISP is still valid today. Within the NHS at the present time each health 
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authority is working with its local hospitals and general practices to create an 
area wide network which will allow all health organisations to communicate 
electronically with each other. This goal is still exciting and has real patient 
benefits if achieved. RISP led to the generation of excitement about new 
technology, the wish to be at the leading edge of the revolution, and the desire to 
put Wessex on the national if not international map. These drivers compelled 
senior public servants to allow actions and processes which at a more reflective 
and objective time would have been recognised as unsound and against public 
service standards of conduct. The result was a breakdown in the various 
components of the Triangle of Dependences which Sauer (1993) defines as the 
structure needed to deliver a successful information systems project. The Project 
Organisation innovates the System which serves the Supporters who support the 
Project Organisation. RISP is littered with numerous examples of failings 
between different parts of the triangle. 
The failure of RISP lay with these two fundamental drivers from which issues 
such as Poor process were derived. Because there was no culture of overt 
corporate governance for over 40 years of the life of the NHS, as the Service 
expanded and became infinitely more complex there was a very strong likelihood 
that a fiasco would have occurred somewhere. Sadly for Wessex it happened to 
them. 
The Wessex study identifies the fundamental issue of accountability which will 
require examination, whilst the emerging elements appear to be directors and 
management control, audit committees, and conflict of interest. 
1-6- Conclusion 
Examination of Wessex allowed a possible conceptual framework to emerge. 
However further elaboration is required, in particular, the organisational 
theoretical underpinning for the framework. Academic literature identifies agency 
theory as the predominant approach. The strengths and weaknesses of the theory 
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are explored for the light that they shine on corporate governance. In addition, the 
growing importance within the NHS of stakeholders means that they must be 
examined within the agency environment 
At this stage my exploration of corporate governance was to generate a possible 
theoretical view of the subject. The Wessex case threw up the concept of 
accountability and indicated a number of significant themes which are important; 
directors and management control, audit committees, and conflict of interest. The 
focus of the thesis switches from development of theory to the testing of those 
generated ideas with the aim to find supporting evidence to corroborate the 
conceptual framework. 
Three further acknowledged case studies of corporate governance failure are 
scrutinised. Different contexts are chosen to allow common subjects, if any, to 
emerge. It will be seen that Wessex was primarily an issue of managerial 
ineptness. The second NHS case has been selected to have a different underlying 
theme. The West Midlands Regional Health Authority was founded on bad 
intentions. A third case has been chosen from the wider public sector, local 
government. Investigation of the Westminster City Council "Votes for Homes" 
debacle allows a further testing of common threads but against a different culture 
than that of the NHS. Finally a fourth case has been picked from the private 
sector so as to complete a range of examples of corporate governance failure 
from various organisational perspectives and environments. 
The sources of information for all the cases are from well researched, 
authoritative reviews. In two studies the core information is derived from formal 
reports of the Public Accounts Committee. The third case uses the published, 
multi-volume District Audit report whilst the fourth utilises two non-fiction 
books dedicated to that particular scandal and cross-references between the books 
to check for the validity of the descriptions of events. Each case study chapter has 
the purpose of identifying what took place and why. 
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The second part of the testing process is to comprehend the range of national 
initiatives which occurred in the United Kingdom (UK) in the 1990s, Cadbury, 
Hampel, Greenbury and Nolan, and understand whether there is any commonality 
with the provisional framework postulated by this research. At the same time the 
NHS produced numerous documents and instructions on corporate governance, a 
review of these publications will allow a similar exercise to take place. 
Finally from the development of the theoretical framework and its testing, this 
thesis will offer a conclusion and an epilogue of a reflective practitioner's 
thoughts, which together creates the four products identified earlier in the 
introduction. 
Chapter 1 31 
Section A 
Development of a Conceptual Framework of 
Corporate Governance 
Chanter 2. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY 
At the start of the 21" century the term corporate governance is now in common 
use, both in the academic world and also in the everyday media. However only as 
recently as 10- 15 years ago this was not the case, even in academic literature. To 
understand the arrival of the term, corporate governance, it is necessary to 
comprehend the origins of the most common corporate body, the company and, 
the parallel evolution of two factors: the changes in society that inevitably had an 
impact on the way people behaved and the regulatory and legal framework that 
developed as a consequence of social progress. This chapter will examine the 
46corporate" element of corporate governance whilst the subsequent chapter will 
address "governance". 
From Roman to Medieval times the economy of the country of England was 
based on agriculture and sheep (Tevelyan 1944). Society had a small number of 
very powerful, rich landowners whose primary assets were worked by their 
peasants. Also there existed a number of ancillary trades, such as pottery and 
forges, which supported this work. Any trade that was present was based in the 
towns. 
The 12 th and 13 th centuries saw the consolidation of the French influence on the 
country following William the Conqueror's victory at Hastings in the II 
th 
century. One of the results was increased traffic between England and the 
Continent, and the consequent increase in trade both nationally and 
internationally. English wool was in great demand and was exported in large 
quantities to the Flemish society which was regarded as one of the premier 
trading communities in Europe. An organised structure to trade started to evolve 
through craft guilds. 
Producers and traders worked together under the auspices of a particular guild, 
e. g. fishmongers, grocers, saddlers, tailors and goldsmiths, but these 
organisations did not trade in their own right. Trevelyan (p. 35) argues that these 
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arrangements were "the beginnings of the capitalist as organiser of industry". A 
guild's fundamental purpose was to regulate and control local markets. It: 
enforced collective monopoly; 
ensured standards of workmanship; 
ensured product quality; 
regulated entry to the guild e. g. long apprenticeships; 
enforced a fair share of the market to each member so that one trader 
could not grow at another's expense. 
This theme of self-regulation remained unaltered for hundreds of years. Every 
now and then a new group of like minded individuals would be recognised by the 
Crown and be allowed incorporation. For example the Company of Merchant 
Adventurers was chartered which meant that they controlled the import and 
export of goods. Similar to guilds this Company was a regulatory structure to 
protect members' interests rather than a corporate body seeking to make a profit. 
In fact the great merchant Companies became very powerful such that during the 
War of the Roses in the 15 th century they governed London and effectively 
ensured peace through neutrality (Trevelyan). In Europe the position was 
different as corporate organisations had developed where their aim was to 
generate profit and growth, in particular, impressive mercantile and financial 
concerns developed in Italy and Germany. England did not follow this route as 
the national culture had been greatly influenced by Magna Carta in 1215. It 
enshrined the rights of the individual and the principle of personal ownership of 
property with power based on such ownership. This meant that in England self- 
regulation based on the individual was the approach whereas on the Continent the 
Roman influence means that the State had a bigger part to play. 
The 16 th and 17 th centuries saw major changes to English and European society. 
Science began to have a major influence as Gallileo proved that ships would not 
fall off the edge of the world if they set out on voyages of exploration. The 
influence of the Church underwent a dramatic shift as in England Henry VIII 
broke with the Roman Catholic faith and established the Church of England. The 
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New World was discovered and sailors of the calibre of Drake and Raleigh 
uncovered new trade routes that were waiting to be developed. Even in the newly 
competitive expansionist environment the collegiate, self-regulatory and 
protective form of company survived (Tricker 1984). New organisations 
continued to be chartered. In 1540 the Company of Barber-Surgeons was created 
and the Apothecaries became a City Company in 1606. 
The growth in opportunities did not bring about the establishment of a culture of 
corporate organisations. Joint ventures were common but existed for a defined, 
relatively short period of time as partners shared investment, profit and debts for 
specific voyages. However some businesses did pursue a corporate approach with 
profits and losses divided amongst shareholders. They were created by the Crown 
and continued through the appointment of Chartered companies to pursue trade 
in far away lands. One of the most famous was the East India Company which 
was still in existence in the 1 9th century. The Crown appointed the boards of 
these companies and exercised its authority through this mechanism. 
Some 500 years after Magna Carta trade and commerce in England was run 
mainly by individual proprietors. However the early 1700 saw an ever increasing 
set of business opportunities, e. g. the expansion in North America, which 
required new capital. The outcome was the development of unincorporated 
companies that were co-partnerships where some members ran the venture whilst 
others only contributed finance. As the number of new organisations grew, so did 
the possibilities for dubious entrepreneurs to persuade individuals to invest in 
companies where the outlook for a return was poor. It would appear that self- 
regulation had now failed and the result was the first piece of legislation to be 
introduced to control business. The Bubble Act of 1720 was a criminal statute 
aimed to protect investors through the prevention of the establishment of a large 
stock of easily transferable shares in these new bodies. The end of the 1700s saw 
a growing wish to limit the liability of company members for debts. At that time 
such limitation required incorporation under a charter from the Crown or by a 
specific Parliamentary Act, and therefore the aspirations of companies remained 
unfulfilled. Whilst there were some further small changes to commercial law, the 
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end of the 18 th century did not see any major alteration to the process of trade and 
commerce. 
The 19t" century was the era that saw significant change in the framework for 
business creation and governance. In 1825 the Bubble Act was repealed as it 
proved to be easy to sidestep. In the same year the Crown passed responsibility to 
the Board of Trade for chartering companies through the issue of Letters Patent. 
This alteration meant that companies could sue and be sued, however liability 
was still not limited. In 1844 a significant piece of legislation was introduced 
which over time encouraged a key change in the configuration of business. 
Before the enactment of the Joint-Stock Companies Act business had not moved 
on from single proprietors and unincorporated companies. The statute was 
introduced to protect investors and was a move away from self-regulation to 
Government intervention. The law required the registration and regulation of all 
unincorporated companies and specifically called for: 
directors to manage the company; 
the appointment of a secretary, clerks and servants; 
periodic meetings of members of the company; 
the appointment of a chairman; 
accounts to be kept; 
balance sheet to be produces for shareholders; 
the appointment of auditors; 
registration of the company with the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies; 
the maintenance of a register of shareholders. 
From public knowledge of business in 2002 it can be seen that the 1844 Act laid 
the groundwork for the establishment and governance of companies that is in 
existence some 160 years later. The outcome was that approximately 1000 
companies were obliged to register and within 15 years the number had doubled. 
In the age of the British Empire, many companies were in shipping and insurance 
as overseas trade flourished. Within the United Kingdom much advantage was 
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taken of modem science to develop gas, water and railway companies. Already in 
the first half of the century technology had had an impact on the nature of 
business. Hannah (1976) uses the cotton textile industry to illustrate this point. 
Up until the end of the 1700's it was a home based, craft industry. By 1830 there 
were large new mills which employed large numbers of staff and utilised new 
machinery and power equipment to gain large economies of scale. By 1871 over 
half the working population worked in factories. 
Further important change on the issue of limited liability followed relatively soon 
after the 1844 Act. There was much debate in the business and political 
communities which could not fail to be influenced by factors such as the failure 
between 1846 and 1857 of nearly 100 banks with liabilities approaching f50m 
(Trevelyan). A Royal Commission examined limited liability. The eventual 
outcome of all the discussion was to pass an Act in 1855 that limited liability for 
any company whose capital divided into shares of a nominal value of not less 
than f, 10. There followed two amending acts that led to a Consolidation Act in 
1862. This statute laid down the process for the establishment of a company and 
included: 
*7 or more people were required to subscribe to the Memorandum of 
Association; 
9 if liability was limited the company name must have the word "Limited" 
at the end; 
* the Memorandum must state the address of the Registered Office, the 
Objectives of the Company, and the amount of Capital which was to be 
Registered. 
This framework for incorporation exists still today. In addition the Act required: 
register of all members; 
the production of an annual list of members to be sent to the Registrar of 
Joint- Stock Companies; 
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" register of mortgages and charges; 
" register of managers and directors; 
" an Annual General Meeting to be held every year; 
" the Board of Trade to appoint inspectors to investigate the conduct of a 
company if requested by at least 20% of the members. 
The liberalisation of the business culture through the introduction of limited 
liability led to a major increase in the number of companies. Despite the 
governance measures that had been introduced, there were company collapses 
and fraudulent promotion. Tricker (p. 32) argues : 
within less than a decade English company law had moved from 
an essentially regulatory, interventionist stance to become the 
most permissive in urope. 
The fourth quarter of the I 9th century not only saw the growth in businesses but 
there were two significant social changes. The development of the North 
American prairies with its cheap methods of mass production, was the main 
cause in the fall of English agriculture (Trevelyan), whilst at the same time 
industrialisation continued at a pace. One of the results of these combined 
influences was the growth of companies. The expansion of Limited Liability 
Companies brought about the introduction of salaried managers who were needed 
to take advantage of new technologies and to ensure efficiency. Trevelyn (P. 572) 
argues that it was these changes which "'brought a step away from individual 
initiative towards collectivism, and municipal and State-managed business". 
One of the outcomes of the 1855 Act was the development of companies which 
did not seek public capital. They used proprietor's funds and profits from the 
business to grow the enterprise; these organisations tended to be family 
businesses. It can be argued that their development was the start of the private 
company whose existence was recognised by the 1907 Companies Act. This 
legislation stated that private companies must not have more than 50 members 
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and not seek public capital but they were exempt from most disclosure 
obligations of public companies. 
The end of the I 9th and the start of the 20th century saw the merger and 
acquisition of businesses to create large public companies. "Between 1888 and 
1914 an average of at least 67 firms disappeared in mergers each year" (Hannah 
p. 23). In the beginning it was the business that was absorbed into the larger 
organisation but as time went by these large companies began to buy holdings in 
companies that continued to trade and operate as corporate entities. As these 
relationships became more complex society saw the birth of what is now 
recognised as holding companies. The years before the First World War saw the 
establishment of many major firms which still exist today, e. g. Imperial Tobacco, 
GKN and Vickers (Hannah). 
Government intervention continued with a Companies Act in 1929 that 
eventually led to a Consolidating Act in 1948. This piece of law was the main 
plank of business regulation for the next 25-30 years and according to Charkham 
(1994 p. 26 1) "the 1948 Act was regarded at the time as a milestone". One of the 
interesting effects of the legislation was that the value of firms became more 
transparent and therefore allowed takeover bids to be put directly to shareholders. 
The consequence was that the vulnerability of quoted companies to merge, was 
increased and between 1948-63 no less than 20% of companies quoted on the 
London Stock Exchange were acquired by other quoted companies (Hannah). 
The 1948 statute was supported by five amending Acts that introduced small but 
significant legal changes. The exempt private company was abolished in the 1967 
statute that also required publication of : 
o information on subsidiary companies; 
0 directors' emoluments and the salaries of high paid workers; 
" profitability and turnover of different divisions of business; 
" the number and wages of employees; 
" political and charitable donations. 
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The amending Act of 1976 laid down a number of detailed requirements for 
company accounts, such as, contents of accounting records. A further Act in 1980 
introduced the public company as a formal type of organisation and stated that if 
a company wished to seek public capital, it had to be registered and to add the 
words "Public Limited Company" or PLC to their name. As with the Acts of 
1967 and 1976, the 1980 legislation also covered further detailed regulation, in 
particular, it prohibited loans to directors and made Insider Dealing a criminal 
offence. 
The fourth Act became law in the following year. It covered very detailed 
requirements on the form and contents of company accounts and their 
accompanying notes. The 1981 Act also covered issues such as allowing 
companies to buy their own shares and various aspects on registration, 
investigation and disclosure. 
The overall outcome of organisational evolution is that by the early 21" century 
the corporate entity is firmly established and whilst this chapter has chartered the 
rise of private sector organisations, the public sector to varying degrees has 
adapted private sector governance mechanisms. At the same time scandals began 
to emerge such as the Bank of Credit and Commerce International and Maxwell. 
By the early 1990s the names of Polly Peck and Blue arrow were added to the list 
of perceived corporate governance failures. They were joined by some high 
profile public sector cases which were also exposed; Wessex Regional Health 
Authority, West Midlands Regional Health Authority, and Westminster City 
Council. 
This chapter has focused on the development of the corporate entity so that its 
evolution can be appreciated before the concept of governance is explored in 
general and in particular, its application to the corporate entity. 
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Chapter 3. 
EMERGING CONCEPTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The aim of the Wessex study was to understand how a significant corporate 
governance failure occurred. The preceding text explored the development of the 
corporate organisation whereas this chapter will analysis the elements and 
concepts that exist in "governance". Academic literature was examined to 
explore what has come to the attention of researchers and commentators, and test 
the outcome for its robustness for more general application outside the specific 
case of RISP. The approach was to search electronic databases e. g. BIDS and 
HELMIS and generate lists of possible abstracts. These were downloaded, 
selection of appropriate material was made with copies of the source information 
obtained and entered on an electronic reference database. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether some or any of the issues 
identified in the Wessex case have attracted academic interest previously and 
allow judgements to be made as to their possible inclusion in a theoretical 
framework. A wide range of academic disciplines, e. g. law, organisational 
behaviour and finance, and a variety of countries, e. g. America, Australia and 
Canada, have been used to obtain a broad perspective. For each theme a specific 
examination of the field of healthcare is included. 
The first issue is to obtain an understanding of the fundamental concept of 
corporate governance. Secondly, the notion of accountability which appears to be 
a comer-stone of corporate governance, is discussed. Thirdly, Wessex 
highlighted the issue of management control and the importance of directors, so 
these two matters will be examined together. Fourthly, the lack of an effective 
audit committee was important in Wessex and therefore the principles of audit 
committees will be studied. Fifthly, there were numerous conflicts of interest 
within the Wessex case which means that this concept merits discussion. Finally 
a conclusion is drawn about the findings which will indicate whether the 
development of a theoretical framework is possible. 
Chapter 3 40 
Corporate Governance 
Examination of literature shows that the term corporate governance appears only 
relatively recently in the written observations and discussions of how 
organisations do and should work. In particular over the past twenty years, as 
communities in the developed world have taken a closer interest in both public 
and private organisations, the term corporate governance has moved from the 
academic environment to common place use in the media. 
To understand the concept there are three questions that need consideration. 
Firstly what is the definition of corporate governance ? Secondly what is its 
purpose ? Thirdly who are the implementers of corporate governance ? Following 
clarity on these issues a final question is does corporate governance apply equally 
to the public sector, in particular the NHS, as private companies ? 
3.1.1. The Definition of Corporate Govemance 
From the 1920s to the early 1970s increased government regulation, rapidly 
diffusing ownership structures and escalating public pressure moved the centre of 
gravity of corporate governance from the Boardroom into the public domain. 
Until World War I corporate governance was easy as it was essentially 
performance accountability. From 1918 onwards society began to be concerned 
with how organisations operated e. g. the use of sweatshop labour (Demb and 
Neubauer 1992). 
Hodges et al (1996) argue that there is no authoritative definition of corporate 
governance, but there appears to be a degree of agreement that it is concerned 
with the procedures associated with the decision-making, performance and 
control of organisations, with the provision of structures to give overall direction 
to the organisation and to satisfy reasonable expectations of accountability to 
external stakeholders. 
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Jackson and Carter (1995) approach the subject from a different tack. They argue 
that it is not possible to examine and monitor all aspects of corporate practice. 
Therefore corporate governance is a form of organisational chiaroscuro as light is 
shone on some elements of corporate workings but not all and subsequently it is 
not universal. The analogy that is drawn is Rembrandt's famous The Night 
Watch which uses light to draw attention to some sections within the total 
painting. 
Tremblay (1996 p. 670) on the other hand has a clear definition of corporate 
govemance: 
the total accountability of all organisational activity. In that regard 
governance is defined through control, containment, power and 
authority. 
Hodges and Starkey (1995) have a different view of the concept and argue that it 
embraces strategic issues which gives direction to the organisation and helps 
satisfy the legitimate expectations of those outside the organisation. A 
practitioner's opinion was expressed by MacDonald (1996), who as New 
Zealand's Auditor-General, stated that corporate governance is about the 
concepts of steering, direction, control, authority and stewardship. Banaga et al 
(1995) argue that corporate governance is often expressed too narrowly as 
conformance with a set of regulations. As fundamentally organisations exist to 
perform their set role, corporate governance must be about both conformance and 
performance. 
Gray (2001) has explored governance and brings another perspective on the 
subject. He concludes that the concept contains a number of elements such as 
authority, function and rights. However he argues: 
we may elucidate an initial working definition of governance as the 
relationships of authority and function through which policies and 
practices are effected and rights and obligations established and regulated. 
Chapter 3 42 
3.1.2. T porate Govemance 
A review of the literature shows that there are two broad schools of thought on 
this issue. Mitchell (1993) argues that the answer to the question "what is the 
nature and purpose of the Corporation T' depends critically upon whether the 
modem company is essentially a matter of public or of private concern; the 
response defines to which school the individual belongs. The American Law 
Institute has struggled with this issue. At first it argued that the purpose of the 
corporation was quite narrow i. e. to maximise stockholder wealth. However it 
can also be inferred that the corporation can pursue ethical and responsible 
conduct even if contrary to stockholders' interests. Clearly this in turn would 
mean a broader perspective for the role of the company. Mitchell defines the 
debate as enhanced efficiency for stockholders opposed by more explicit public- 
directed purpose. 
Arthur (1987) puts forward the argument that the legal doctrine governing the 
corporation is based upon the idea like any other organisation where people 
associate together to undertake some common action. Individual rights have to be 
limited to some degree and this leads to the establishment of the corporation as a 
legal entity separate from its shareholders. In United States (US) law historically 
the notion has been that only people can be subject to rights and duties. To treat a 
company as a person presents problems and therefore Arthur explores two 
theories. 
Fiction theory states that the company is a legal person as a matter of 
convenience. Effectively the rights of persons are aggregated and looked upon as 
a single person. Therefore using this theory it has been argued that the duty of the 
board is to protect the interests of shareholders, and the way that the aggregated 
person exercises any power is through the board. This artificial person imposes 
duties on directors such as a return on investment, management of the enterprise 
in the interests of this fictional person, observance of the law and philanthropic 
contributions should be reasonable. Fiction theory holds to the accepted norms of 
corporate governance with regard to the function of a board. However to operate 
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properly there needs to be some independence from management so that the 
board is not dominated by management. In practice it has been that management 
should be in the minority of board membership. 
Difficulties exist with fiction theory because of the pre-eminence given to 
shareholders who may be quite transitory and short term, exercising no 
responsibilities of ownership. Arthur argues that other constituencies e. g. 
customers, suppliers, the public and government should be considered as 
stakeholders. To focus purely on profit is not borne out in practice by the best 
corporations in the Fortune List in the US. With these organisations issues such 
as quality or consumer service come first. Arthur further puts forward the view 
that on a societal level a focus on profits leads to legal challenge and calls for 
regulation. The generation of financial wealth should not be at the expense of 
public gain. In the 1980s in the US there was a moratorium on take-overs in the 
oil industry. This resulted from the artificial wealth creation caused by take-overs 
where the share price would rise but was not supported by any increase in the 
asset base or productivity to account for the valuation increase. 
The second theory is an alternative view of the company. Organic theory states 
that the company is a real and not an artificial person. It exists separate from the 
aggregate rights of its members. The company has rights and duties of its own 
and is responsible for its own actions. The basis of the theory is that the existence 
of a distinctive informed will and a capacity to act reasonably, constitutes the 
foundation of rights and duties. Therefore if a group of people come together for 
a common purpose to achieve a definite goal, they have a distinctive will and act 
on their own, they are in fact a corporate person. Globally successful companies 
such as Hewlett Packard and J&J are often quoted in this context as corporate 
culture is key to their success and underpinning this culture there are guiding 
beliefs. These are statements about what the company stands for, its identity, its 
vision and ethos. Culture is key for corporate governance as it allows the 
organisation to exercise its responsibilities clearly. Bain and Bend (1996 p. 173) 
support this general approach: 
Chapter 3 44 
... we hold the view that Corporate Governance is very much 
about adding value. Companies and other enterprises with a 
professional and positive attitude to Governance are stronger and 
have a greater record of achievement. 
Demb and Neubauer (p. 14) argue that the legalistic definition of corporate 
governance is too narrow for the complexities of the late 20th century. The scale 
of resources controlled by individual companies has brought them into an explicit 
contract that defines accountability more broadly. Their model is that the various 
stakeholders define a 'lifespace' in which the company must conduct its business 
and where the parameters are defined by stakeholders' expectations. 
Mintzberg (1984 p. 90) is even more forthright in his view on which school of 
thought he belongs: 
the strategic direction of large organisations inevitably involve 
social, as well as economic consequences that are inextricably 
intertwined ...... there 
is no such thing as pure economic decisions 
in big business. Only a conceptual ostrich, with its head deeply 
buried in the abstractions of economic theory, could possibly use 
the distinction between economic and social goals to dismiss 
social responsibilities. 
Argenti (1993) has a diametrically opposing view to the previous discussion. He 
is of the definite opinion that shareholders are the sole beneficiaries of the efforts 
of the company and therefore corporate governance exists to protect their 
interests. Stakeholders should be seen as interest groups whose concerns should 
be examined and needs met not as a right but as largesse. This view is supported 
by Lord Wedderburn (1985) who argues that Britain has remained closer to the 
pure doctrine that the company exists to meet the interests of shareholders. 
Jackson and Carter (p. 884) are of the clear opinion that corporate governance is 
for the protection of ownership against its agents i. e. management. Whittingharn 
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(1994) entered the debate on who is corporate governance for, through an 
example from the pensions industry. Pension fund managers have to make 
decisions on where to invest large sums of money on behalf of their clients. 
Should they choose to dump a company's stock because they disagree with the 
product or philosophy of the company thereby potentially depriving the pension 
fund clients from accessing what may be excellent returns, and in the medium to 
long term, undermining the company so that it is destroyed ? The emotive 
example that comes to mind is tobacco. 
3.1.3. The Implementers of CoKporate Governance 
Many scholars in this field have taken Berle and Means (1932) as the starting 
point for discussion of corporate governance. Their basic premise was that there 
is separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. Because of the 
dispersed nature of ownership of companies, stockholders do not control 
corporate management effectively and subsequently managers often act in their 
own rather than owners' interests. Bainbridge (1995 p. 674) points out that: 
insofar as statutory corporate law is concerned, separation of 
ownership and control is in fact an inherent feature of the 
Corporate Governance system. 
However he notes that the vast majority of corporate decisions are made by 
boards of directors as shareholders have no power to initiate corporate action. 
Butler and Ribstein (1995) take this position on further. They argue that the 
presence of rationally ignorant shareholders presents managers with opportunities 
to engage in activities that are not necessarily in the shareholders' best interests. 
This is a dilemma for owners who have to endure agency costs i. e. payment by 
the company to individuals to manage the organisation. Agency theory, which 
will be examined in detail in chapter 4, suggests that costs are minimised by 
competitive forces that align managers with shareholders' interests. Flowing 
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from this point Butler and Ribstein put forward two broad theories of how an 
organisation can be controlled. 
Firstly there is contractual theory which has three fundamental concepts: 
e no-one has to use the corporate form of organisation; 
e market forces are ubiquitous in publicly traded companies because 
efficient capital markets are constantly evaluating the impact of corporate 
governance arrangements; 
0 it is important to trade off costs of delegating power to agents against the 
benefits of doing so 
Despite the first point, the modem corporation has been adopted widely and 
survives as a primary vehicle of capitalism. Contractual theory is a set of 
contracts among the participants in the business including shareholders, 
managers, creditors, employees and others. Regulatory theory states that 
corporate arrangements are different from ordinary contracts such that they 
should be subject to additional regulation by the State. Butler and Ribstein favour 
contractual theory as they believe that its basis presents a powerful case for 
investors and entrepreneurs to be left to their own devices in fashioning the 
governance arrangements that best suit their needs. 
Jackson and Carter argue that the self regulation approach to corporate 
governance is capitalism protecting itself as legislation would make fundamental 
change which companies would dislike. Much of what a company does is 
discretionary and whilst legally binding disclosure exists, management has the 
decision over what is and is not seen by the wider world. Demb and Neubauer (p. 
34-35) agree with this view and point out that the responsibility for choosing 
which stakeholders receive priority attention is at the core of corporate 
governance and beyond legal necessities there remains enormous discretion for 
management. These two commentators have a definite opinion over the role of 
boards: 
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although they play an integral role boards are no longer the 
primary mechanism for corporate governance. No group of 8,12 
or 20 individuals can sensibly carry the full responsibility for 
assuring corporate accountability to its stakeholders. Rather 
boards are one among a set of elements used by societies to make 
corporations responsive and accountable. 
Blair (1995) points out that the 1980s saw shareholders attempt to assert more 
control through hostile take-overs, leveraged buyouts and boardroom coups. In 
most cases shareholders' interests were seen as to increase the value of the 
company's stock. Shareholders' rights advocates believe that share value and 
control are an extension of the benefits of private property. Legal scholars 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) argue that shareholders have the moral and legal 
standing to be treated as 'owners' of the corporation and thereby given control 
rights. The outcome is that the social role played by the company, the interests 
served and who has control rights is derived from who receives the economic 
residual generated by the company and therefore who bears the economic risk. 
Blair (p. 14) believes this model does not fit most companies: 
any time there are parties other than shareholders who make 
investments specific to a given corporation - employees with 
specialised knowledge or skills to cite perhaps the most prominent 
example - shareholders are no longer the only residual claimants 
in that corporation. 
Wherever firm-specific investments exist the employees share of the rents can 
always be increased at the expense of the shareholders and vice versa. 
Nations use various mechanisms to keep business activity and societal objectives 
congruent argue Demb and Neubauer. Firstly, there is the use of regulations, both 
governmental and non-governmental. Secondly, through the definition of 
ownership patterns for public and private sectors. Thirdly, the use of societal 
habits to apply direct pressure on corporations e. g. the judicial system and a free 
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press. Finally, there is the corporate board. They conducted some research into the 
final mechanism across different countries. They concluded that irrespective of 
structure and legal framework the board has a consistent list of tasks: 
" strategic direction; 
" securing top management succession; 
" controlling\monitoring\supervi sing management; 
" caring for shareholders; 
" allocating resources. 
Demb and Neubauer (p. 39) state that it is the board's role to take a comprehensive 
view of organisational activity with responsibility for understanding social, 
economic and stakeholder demands for performance accountability. The dilemma 
is, though legally the board has the ultimate responsibility, in practice 
management has the expertise, infrastructure and time to run and control the 
company. 
As a highly successful businessman O'Reilly (1998) who is both Chairman and 
Chief Executive of the major multinational company Heinz which has a turn-over 
of $10 billion, is in a good position to offer a view on corporate governance. He 
argues that there is no magic formula which fits all sizes and types of company. 
O'Reilly states: 
the best protection for shareholders remains in complete reporting 
each year. It tells you all you ever wanted to know about your 
company, its directors, its officers, their pay, and perquisites, their 
future pensions, any material contracts they have with the 
company, their stock options and the number of shares they own 
beneficially or in trust. Short of their sex life you can learn almost 
everything that you need to know about the company's directors 
and officers from the annual report. And as if this is not enough, 
then the combined statutory filings will ftirther inform your 
fireside reading. Now that is what I call corporate governance and 
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that is why we should continue to insist on shareholder value as 
the primary test of good corporate govemance 
Johnson et al (1996) note that many companies are under management control 
because they have taken charge of the proxy machinery. Most shareholders do not 
attend annual general meetings and instead they sign proxy cards granting 
management the right to cast their votes. This mechanism is of key importance to 
major corporate decision making e. g. the election of directors. 
Walsh (1998) records a practical example of this power. A significant proportion 
of the shareholders of Granada, a large leisure industry based company, expressed 
their discontent at the annual general meeting. They were unhappy with regard to 
the large financial payouts to directors that had been made as compensation for 
reduced service contracts. Despite 19% of shareholders opposing the 
reappointment of a particular non-executive director who sat on the Remuneration 
Committee, and 12% of shareholders abstaining, the proxy votes given to the 
management carried the day and the director was reappointed. 
3.1.4. Relevance to the NHS 
Before examination of the NFIS there is first a need to focus on health care 
organisations, both public and private organisations. 
In the US Pointer (1995) defines the core responsibility of a hospital board as: 
9 to assume responsibility for the affairs of the organisation; 
* represent owners i. e. stakeholders and shareholders; 
9 ensure those at interest e. g. management or medical staff, deliver the 
mission and goals of the organisation. 
This list is not dissimilar from what many commentators have described corporate 
governance to be when applied to pure businesses. He argues that responsibilities 
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are the 'what' aspects of govemance while roles are the 'how'. Together they 
define the work of the board. There are five responsibilities: 
e ends - define mission, vision, goals and development of appropriate 
strategies; 
9 management performance - predominantly focused on recruitment, 
selection, objective setting, appraisal, remuneration and termination of the 
chief executive; 
9 quality of patient care - ensure systems are in place to deliver and 
monitor; 
finance health - establish financial objectives and monitor performance; 
itself - examine board effectiveness and efficiency. 
With regard to roles Pointer suggests: 
* policy formulation - encompass statements of board responsibility, policy 
and operating policy; 
e decision making - must be based on policy; 
* oversight - closes the loop and entails monitoring, assessment and 
feedback. 
Umbdenstock et al (1990) articulated five critical areas for corporate governance 
for not-for-profit hospitals in the US: 
common working definition of governance; 
clearly defined mission with specific goals and objectives; 
well planned decision making process; 
board structure tailored to the priorities at hand; 
information, reporting and communication system that keeps the priorities 
in focus. 
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In the UK Ferlie et al (1995) identified that the scandals which hit the private 
sector, such as Maxwell, BCCI and Polly Peck, were mirrored with similarities in 
the public sector and in the NHS. The Wessex and West Midlands Regional 
Health Authority debacles meant that corporate governance became a key agenda 
item for the Government. In particular as the structure of the NHS under the 
Working for Patients (1989) reforms meant that business like structures and 
processes were adopted. Therefore it followed that the principles of corporate 
governance should apply also. With the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992 
which proposed changes to the corporate governance mechanisms of the private 
sector, the Government decided that a similar approach was appropriate for the 
public sector. In the NHS the result was the publication of a Code of Conduct and 
Accountability for NHS Boards of Directors (Department of Health 1994). It 
articulates six key functions: 
i) to set strategic direction of the organisation within the overall policies and 
priorities of the Government and the NFIS, define its annual and longer 
term objectives and agree plans to achieve them; 
ii) to oversee the delivery of planned results by monitoring performance 
against objectives and ensuring corrective action is taken when necessary; 
iii) to ensure effective financial stewardship through value for money, 
financial control and financial planning and strategy; 
iv) to ensure high standards of corporate governance and personal behaviour 
are maintained in the conduct of the business of the whole organisation; 
V) to appoint, appraise and remunerate senior executives; 
vi) to ensure that there is effective dialogue between the organisation and the 
local community on its plans and performance and that these are 
responsive to the community's needs. 
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3.2. Accountabilitv 
Writings on corporate governance invariably use the term accountability 
somewhere in the discussion. The writers quoted as references in the preceding 
section are no exception. From a historical perspective the common view is that 
many notions of democracy and its associated concepts such as accountability 
stem from the Athenian State. Here individuals from the society were given 
responsibility for undertaking leadership tasks on behalf of their fellow citizens 
who had the right to ask such individuals to account for their actions. 
Day and Klein (1987 p. 5) define accountability as: 
to account is to answer for the discharge of a duty or for conduct. 
It is to provide a reckoning. It is to give a satisfactory reason for 
or to explain. It is to acknowledge responsibility for one's actions. 
Gray and Jenkins (1993 p. 55) use a definition which has a similar basis: 
accountability is the obligation to present an account of and 
answer for the execution of responsibilities. On this obligation 
depends the allocation of praise and blame, reward and sanction 
so often seen as the hallmarks of accountability in action'. 
Both sets of writers agree that the heart of the concept is about stewardship which 
historically stems from the management of an estate. The owner of the estate, the 
principal or accountee, would often be absent so entrusted responsibility for 
running the estate to a steward or accounter. Many commentators stop at this 
point in their definition of stewardship but Gray and Jenkins believe that there is 
an important third component, the code or codes which govern the establishment, 
execution and adjudication of the stewardship. They (p. 55) state: 
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a code of accountability is thus a system of signals, meanings and 
customs which binds the Principal and Steward in the 
establishment, execution and adjudication of their relationship. 
In the modem world codes have evolved into two types. External codes are 
established for general categories of relationship as in professional ethics. 
Whereas internal codes have been devised to deal with specific relationships and 
therefore are made explicit. The theme of principal and agent is explored in 
greater detail in the next chapter as it forms the basis of one of the organisational 
theories that are explored in this thesis. 
In Australia Mulgan (1997 p. 26) believes that to understand the concept of 
accountability, the broader concept of responsibility should be used as a reference 
and states: 
responsibility has a number of connotations, including freedom to 
act, liability for praise or blame, and proper behaviour on the part 
of the person responsible. It may also, but need not, imply a 
relationship between two persons (or groups) where one has 
entrusted the other with the performance of certain duties or 
'responsibilities ...... this aspect of relational responsibility, the 
responsibility of one person to another, is also referred to as 
accountability. 
Tricker (1984) argues that accountability is more than simply reporting what has 
been done. It requires an explanation of why particular actions have been 
undertaken and then acceptance of any consequences that may follow. 
Furthermore he states that accountability means that an individual has to 
participate in the process and recognise the existence of power that can demand 
compliance. The result is that accountability is not discretionary and involves 
rights and duties not interests and options. 
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Accountability expressed as stewardship is developed by Block (1993 p. 5) who 
states: 
stewardship is the willingness to be accountable for the well-being 
of the larger organisation by operating in service, rather than in 
control, of those around us. 
He believes that stewardship is a set of principles and practices which have the 
potential to make dramatic changes in the governance system. It is concerned 
with creating a way of governing ourselves that creates a strong sense of 
ownership and responsibility for actions at the bottom of the organisation. Block 
has a clear view that stewardship is the choice for service which is best served 
through partnership rather than patriarchy. He believes that dependency is the 
antithesis of stewardship and so empowerment becomes essential. 
Hoskin (1996) argues that responsibility implies stewardship whereas 
accountability is in its operation and scope more total and insistent with most 
issues specified in advance. Therefore it goes further than responsibility. 
Day and Klein (p. 9) have the opinion that: 
the ability to call people to account defines the locus of authority 
in any given society. The notion of authority involves the "right" 
to call people to account but must involve the notion of power as 
the "ability" to call people to account. 
They put forward the view that in the second half of the 20th century there is a 
growing perception of inadequacies in the existing system of accountability. The 
result, they argue, is that there has been a move away from seeing accountability 
in terms of being answerable to the people towards being accountable for proper 
conduct which is defined not by "demos", nor by political processes but by 
unalterable laws. 
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Accountability is real as Boyd recounts the tragedies of the London Underground 
Kings' Cross Fire (1992a) and the Zeebrugge Car Ferry Disaster (1992b). In the 
former it was shown that management had failed in its responsibilities and the 
result was the dismissal or resignation of a number of senior executives. The 
latter saw an explicit criticism of the board with the result that some directors 
faced criminal charges and although they were thrown out by the Courts, 
accountability as an issue had been brought into sharp focus for all managers in 
the UK. 
Paul (1991 p. 2) defines accountability in general terms as holding individuals and 
organisations responsible for performance measured as objectively as possible. 
However with regard to public accountability he broadens the definition: 
a spectrum of approaches, mechanisms and practices used by 
governments to ensure that their activities and outputs meet the 
intended goals and standards. 
He sees that the stakeholders who include the public, political leaders, civil 
servants and service providers, will influence the effectiveness of accountability 
dependent on whether their concerns and needs are reflected in the monitoring 
and incentive systems of service providers. 
Day and Klein (1987) suggest that financial accountability is quite different from 
political accountability. The former is a neutral, technical exercise whereas the 
latter involves judgements where there is a difference of opinion over subjective 
issues e. g. success criteria for a given policy. The State Auditor subsequently 
evolved separately and apolitically e. g. in the UK Gladstone's Exchequer and 
Audit Department Act 1866 created the office of Comptroller and Auditor- 
General. 
Harman (1994) in Australia is of the view that public accountability requires 
autonomous accountability. This means that an external trigger mechanism on an 
automatic timer is established so that specific requirements such as annual 
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reports are produced. She states that few of us justify our actions unless NA-e are 
asked to, particularly if our performance has been flawed. Without built-in timers 
accountability remains ad hoc and imperfect, and reliant on aggrieved parties, the 
media, opposition politicians etc to pursue public service officials and agencies. 
She also supports the views of Gray and Jenkins that codes are important such 
that Harman believes autonomous accountability can be achieved by nurturing 
codes of ethics and practice. 
A similar view of accountability is taken by Medawar (1982 p. 156) who says that 
it can be perceived in a negative light: 
accountability is something learned in childhood and it is probably 
closely related to the childhood experience of being found out. 
The viewpoint has merit in that when accountability is seen in action it is often 
an uncomfortable experience for an individual or organisation. Expressions such 
as the day of judgement or reckoning engender a feeling that accountability is an 
ordeal rather than a positive process. This impression is reinforced further when 
terms such as whistleblower are used. Rather than applaud the action of the 
individual in highlighting the failure of accountability the term has connotations 
of disloyalty by the individual to the employing organisation. 
Stone (1994) takes an opposing tack to Harman in that he has argued for 
autonomous public sector accountability which is achieved through satisfaction 
of a number of objectives and public tests of good performance. 
Longley (1993) has examined accountability as it applies specifically to the 
public sector. She states (p. 6): 
accountabilities within the public arena have always been 
perplexing, often comprising a complex, heterogeneous mix of 
fiscal, managerial, professional and public forms. 
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In Australia in the State of Victoria, Sinclair (1995) undertook some research 
amongst public sector chief executives and found five forms of accountabilitv 
which is not that dissimilar from Longley. He classified political, public. 
managerial, professional and personal accountabilities. 
A different approach is taken by Romzek and Dubnick (1987 p. 228) who define 
public administration accountability as 
the means by which public agencies and their workers manage the 
diverse expectations generated within and outside the 
organis ion. 
Day and Klein argue that managerial accountability is about making those with 
delegated authority answerable for carrying out agreed tasks according to agreed 
criteria of performance. They split this form of accountability into three 
dimensions: 
9 fiscal/regularity - concerned with the proper use of money within the 
rules, legal accountability is a counterpart to ensure procedures and rules 
are used; 
e process/efficiency - assurance that action has been taken and value for 
money obtained; 
e programme/effectiveness - assurance that action or investment has 
achieved its intended result. 
These dimensions can be summarised as input, output and outcome. 
Loughlin (1992) puts forward the concept of administrative accountability. He 
states that citizens, consumers, elected representatives have expectations that 
decisions are properly made through a fair and equitable system, and that the 
decision makers are fully accountable for the implications of their decisions. 
Efficiency and propriety rather than policy are seen as the forms of administrative 
accountability which is achieved through three routes. 
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Firstly there is financial probity which comes from the historical basis of 
stewardship and reflects an economic ethic. Compliance is checked through 
audit. Secondly there is accountability of public bodies to the courts for the 
process of decision making rather than the merits of the decision. This 
administrative propriety has a legal ethic at its heart and is a form of natural 
justice. It is overseen by judicial super-vision. Administrative rationality is the 
third route and involves efficiency which is reflected through the promotion of 
professionalism. It is based on a professional ethic and uses inspection as its 
monitoring vehicle. 
Longley supports Loughlin's view in that she believes that effectiveness and 
efficiency are closely linked to the question of accountability. However she 
argues (p. 13) that: 
traditional processes of accountability are often inadequate to 
meet the needs of Public management because they were designed 
long before complex issues as quality, effectiveness and efficiency 
developed as legitimate concerns of modem public organisations. 
This point is endorsed fully by Day and Klein (1987) who more simply put the 
view that our ideas of accountability were developed in relatively simple 
societies whereas the 21" century is a far more complex environment. Plummer 
(1994) undertook research into the accountability of public bodies in the UK. He 
found great variety of accountability requirements between different types of 
organisations. For example directors of Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) 
carry personal fiduciary liability whereas NHS Trust directors do not. TEC 
members are appointed by the Company but Trust non-executive directors are 
appointed by the Secretary of State for Health. TECs are controlled through the 
contract mechanism however Trusts operate under statutory control. Plummer 
(p. 10) concluded: 
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the research has clearly shown that the current arrangements for 
accountability are so confused and contradictory as to be probably 
unsustainable. 
Despite this pessimism Weeks (1995a) indicated that recognition of the need for 
accountability was not constrained to obvious public sector organisations or large 
businesses. Universities, which traditionally regard themselves as part of the 
public sector, have begun to look at mechanisms for better accountability. A 
committee of university chairmen published a Guide for members of governing 
bodies of universities and colleges in June 1995 following the scandal at 
Huddersfield University. 
Within healthcare there was an explosion in the number of people employed in 
the public sector through the creation of the Welfare State which included the 
establishment of the NHS. However accountability was complicated by parallel 
establishment of the Professional State. Experts derive their authority from their 
knowledge and experience and not from delegation from the community. Core to 
the concept of professionalism is that the individual is accountable to his\her 
peers, e. g. Medicine. The dilemma is that professional accountability is not 
integrated into the system of political or managerial accountability. These 
difficulties with existing systems has meant that the Athenian concept of 
answering to the people for your actions has been replaced by answering to the 
people for proper conduct which until recently has remained an unwritten set of 
values. 
At the beginning of the 1990s of all the major public services such as Education, 
Social Services, and Police, Day and Klein highlight the fact that only the NHS 
had a hierarchy of accountability running from the delivery of individual patient 
care to Parliament. From the birth of the NHS through to the reorganisation of the 
NHS in 1982,, it was emphasised in many government documents that DHA and 
RHA members were agents of the Minister. The Permanent Secretary at the 
DHSS, Sir Patrick Nalme stated to the PAC (198 1): 
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the DHAs are fonnally accountable for the exercise of their 
responsibilities through the RHAs to the Department and to the 
Secretary of State; in short they are accountable upwards. 
Interestingly an occasional paper by Rees (1990) sets the context of the NHS in 
the 1980s. The post 1974 NHS reorganisation was the era of consensus 
management and despite the reorganisation of 1982 and the introduction of 
general management in the following year, his research found "health authorities 
were unaltered in the shake-up". Haywood and Ramade (1985) carried out 
research into the work of DHA members which is equally applicable to other 
NHS bodies (p. 99): 
our evidence suggests that members are influential only through 
the commitment and support of chairmen and\or chief officers 
who believed strongly in the legitimacy of member involvement 
and design mechanisms to ensure that it occurs. 
The publication of the Cadbury Report (1992) had a profound effect on the issue 
of corporate governance in the private sector and was picked up by the 
Government as applicable to the public sector. The Code of Accountability for 
NHS Boards is an example of how the clarification of accountability has been 
tackled in the NHS in the 1990s. Ryle (1994) indicated that the wider public 
sector was involved as well with the publication by the Treasury of a Code of 
Best Practice for Board Members of Public Bodies. This Code encompasses 
some 350 bodies from a wide field of operation which included housing 
associations, museums, ACAS, the Audit Commission and the Commission for 
Racial Equality. 
The final word on accountability is left to Gamm (1996) who though writing 
about not-for-profit health care in the US, seems to encapsulate the current mood 
of accountability in the NHS in the UK. He notes (p. 75): 
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whilst responsiveness to organisational superiors and to society at 
large are central elements of accountability, the notion of 'moral 
obligation' to the public is frequently cited. 
He argues that there are four dimensions of accountability: 
e political which establishes the boundaries of legitimate structure and 
behaviour through government regulation and standards; 
e commercial which participates in outcome assessment, demonstrates 
value for money and collaborates with other providers; 
* clinical\patient which is concerned with intrinsic value (such as 
appropriateness, accessibility and quality) of service and extrinsic value 
based judgements by service recipients; 
e community which is concerned with the relationship with the local 
community. 
Gamm's views strike a remarkable chord with the contents of the NHS White 
Paper (Department of Health 1997) which talks about accountability in exactly 
these terms. 
3.3. Directors and Management Control 
Much has been written about directors regarding the make-up of the board 
between insiders and outsiders, and about their function. Jemison and Oakley 
(1983) reviewed corporate governance arrangements in the mutual insurance 
industry in the US. They found that there had been a significant move towards a 
majority of outsiders on the board. Of 1839 board directors in the participating 
companies 1352 (74%) were from outside the company. 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) reviewed the existing research findings of the time and 
proposed an integrated model on board roles which is underpinned by four 
attributes - composition, characteristics, structure and process. These attributes 
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have a direct effect on company performance but interestingly their literature 
review found mixed results on the matter of board composition. 
In Canada Brown (1994) writes about the responsibilities of directors and points 
out that the director of the 1990s has a much broader burden of responsibilities 
than in the 1980s. This encompasses the numerous stakeholders in addition to 
shareholders and the need for a sharper emphasis on business ethics. He uses 
Italy to illustrate the point that corporate ethics is more than doing what 
everybody else is doing. Italy used to be a country where companies kept two sets 
of books and where bribery of politicians and officials was regarded as a normal 
part of business life. This culture changed dramatically when the Government 
cracked down. Three well known CEOs committed suicide and hundreds of 
senior executives are either in jail or facing charges, or have had their careers 
destroyed even if they avoided criminal proceedings. Directors exist to prevent 
such scenarios and to inculcate a corporate culture which is open and honest. 
Brown states therefore directors should be regarded as watchdogs rather than 
bloodhounds. 
A key responsibility of directors is to appoint the chief executive of the 
organisation. Borokhovich et al (1996) undertook research to examine whether 
there is a relationship between the make-up of directors, i. e. the balance of the 
insider and outsider appointees, and the appointment of the chief executive from 
inside or outside the company. The research examined nearly 1000 appointments 
made over 18 years at just under 600 large businesses. The conclusion was that 
there is evidence of a positive relation between the proportion of outsider 
directors and the likelihood of an outside candidate being appointed as chief 
executive. In addition when the sitting CEO is forced out, the Market responds 
more favourably to an external rather than an internal appointment as it is viewed 
as more beneficial to shareholders. The study also showed that over the time 
period of the research the percentage of outsider directors on boards increased. 
Zajac and Westphal (1996) completed research into the issue of the politics of 
director appointments dependent on whether the organisation was board or CEO- 
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controlled. They examined 491 director appointments and found some robust 
conclusions. In general where a director had been involved in changes at a 
company that led to increased board control over executives, the individual 
director was attractive to companies with high board control. Similarly the 
findings confirmed that the opposite was true as well. Chief Executives who 
wished for passive directors, looked to CEO-controlled companies for 
recruitment. 
Beasley (1996) approached his research into board composition from a different 
angle. He looked at the variation in the proportion of insider to outsider directors 
and the occurrence of financial statement fraud. He examined 75 firms where no 
fraud existed and compared them with 75 firms where fraud had been discovered. 
The empirical results confirm that the proportion of external directors of the 
board is lower in the firms which experienced financial statement fraud compared 
to no-fraud companies. Also Beasley argues that the research indicates that it is 
board composition rather than audit committee presence, that is more important 
for reducing the likelihood of financial statement fraud. 
Fiduciary responsibility is a major accountability issue for directors to 
shareholders. The courts evaluate directors' fiduciary responsibility on the basis 
of the business judgement rule (Johnson et al 1996). This rule identifies 
directors' obligations to the company but offers protection from liability when 
directors have made decisions on an informed basis, in good faith, with the best 
interests of the company in mind, and have acted in a disinterested and 
independent manner. Two specific elements are used in applying the business 
judgement rule. Firstly, the directors must exercise a duty of care that an 
ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the same scenario. The second is that 
of loyalty which effectively means that there must be no conflict of interest 
between the director and company. This can be a problem in a take-over situation 
where directors reject a beneficial bid for shareholders to maintain their own 
employment. 
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In health care Gautam (1996) studied 335 hospitals in California during the mid 
1980s with a view to examining the proportion of insider and outsider directors, 
and the issue of strategic change. The particular time period was chosen because 
new legislation came into effect in 1982. The findings concluded that boards iN-ho 
had high proportion of outsider directors from a business background and insider 
directors with specific health care expertise, made more strategic changes in 
response to the legislative reform. In the UK the publication of Working for 
Patients (Department of Health 1989) came to a similar conclusion with regard to 
board composition. This White Paper introduced corporate style boards to the 
NHS for the very first time. Ferlie et al (1996) examined their impact through a 
formal study between 1990-1993. They found that around two-thirds of all 
outsider directors or non-executive directors as they are known in the UK, were 
from the private sector but less than half were involved in voluntary service work 
which had been the dominant background before the White Paper. Also as the 
immature boards of directors began to operate, the non-executive directors 
became more and more involved in strategic decision making as opposed to 
rubber stamping decisions of executives. 
Academic investigation of NHS boards proved to be a busy preoccupation in the 
early 1990s. Ashburner and Caimcross (1992) reported on the findings of a 
Warwick University study into the first year of Trust boards. The role of non- 
executive directors was perceived as firstly selecting, rewarding and if necessary, 
replacing the chief executive. Secondly ensuring ethical and legal conduct, and 
thirdly providing expertise and advise to senior managers. 
The Audit Commission followed with its own research into the role of non- 
executive directors and published a report Taken On Board (1995). It 
surnmarised the role of boards as steering, monitoring performance and 
accountability. Nicklen (1996) records that following the Report external auditors 
went into all NHS Trusts to examine current practice. The results were that a 
wide variation existed in the involvement of non-executive directors in the 
decision-making process. The spectrum ran from rubber stamping of executives' 
decisions through to genuine involvement in the development of policy and 
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strategy. Clearly this conclusion conflicts with the early work of Ferlie and 
implies that development of boards had not been as fast as first thought. 
The attitudes of NHS board directors were examined by Sheaff and West (1997) 
around the same time as the other studies. Their findings showed that probity was 
seen to be the key issue. This involved a requirement for transparency, 
accountability and avoidance of illicit self-enrichment in decision-making. This 
view has additional support when the issues of honesty, conflicts of interest, 
financial honesty, and interactions with suppliers were taken together as they 
accounted for nearly 50 % of mentions in the survey. 
Tremblay (1996) points out that the board is about final accountability and 
therefore to mix governance and management causes confusion for senior 
executives who sit on the governing body. He argues that to separate managerial 
and board responsibilities puts unnecessary pressure on executives and reduces 
the effectiveness of non-executive directors. The dilemma is to prevent the board 
concentrating on operational issues but on the matter of governance. Tremblay 
indicates that in the private sector some organisations exclude executives from 
discussions and use the chief executive as the conduit for their involvement. This 
approach addresses the issue of board focus but hinders the non-executive 
directors from evaluating the performance of senior executives, and the absence 
of involvement from these individuals can lead to a lack of ownership of key 
organisational decisions. 
In the private sector the chief executive has always been a member of the board 
of the organisation. Until 1991 in the NHS the position was the exact opposite in 
that the senior executive was answerable to the governing body but not a 
member. Dixon (1993) argues passionately that the move to mirror the private 
sector is wrong for the NHS. She believes that for executives to be members of 
the board causes confusion of accountability and relationships. She goes further 
(p. 23) and states: 
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all the important checks and balances, both within and between 
the corporate governance system and the management hierarchy, 
are suppressed. 
Williamson (1995) writes as a commentator on the NHS and as a non-executive 
director about her role at a Trust board. She argues that there are three 
fundamental roles. Contribution of ideas, knowledge, skills, contacts and 
experience is the first. Evaluation and analysis of executives' plans, proposals 
and ideas, and of the organisation's performance is the second. Monitoring 
against agreed objectives and criteria of executives' and the organisation's 
performance is the third role. 
A similar understanding of roles is provided by Deffenbaugh (1996) who lists the 
provision of independent judgement and critical detachment, and the undertaking 
of specific functions such as a functional interest like finance, are his three roles. 
He argues that it is the approach to the third role which requires thought. If non- 
executive directors play to their strengths then it is likely that someone from a 
financial background will shadow the director of finance. Deffenbaugh questions 
whether this enhances independent judgement and critical detachment or does it 
turn an area of interest into a sphere of influence. 
3.4. Audit Committee 
Williams (1977), as the incumbent Chainnan of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the US financial regulator, argued that audit committees 
were a fact of life in the US for the publicly owned company, however there was 
no clear definition of their duties and responsibilities. He stated (p. 72-73): 
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the audit committee can delineate the corporation's financial and 
accounting controls, its financial reporting requirements. 
alternative accounting principles that could be applied and the 
quality and effectiveness of services provided by the independent 
auditors. Provided with this in-depth review, the directors are then 
far better able to meet their responsibility to maintain and preserve 
the propriety of the company's financial policies. 
Birkett (1986) supports the view that the SEC was a major influence in the 
development of audit committees. 
Eichenseher and Shields (1985) suggest that, in general, external audit firms have 
an incentive to encourage the formation of an audit committee as it enhances the 
independence of the auditor from management and protects the auditor from 
allegations of fraud. Their view (p. 14) of audit committees is to: 
provide a convenient means of documenting board compliance 
with regulations and demonstrating the exercise of due care in 
discharging its duties. 
In the US Pincus et al (1989) undertook research into why some companies 
voluntarily formed audit committees while others did not. They used data from a 
random sample of 100 NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation System) over-the-counter firms. Their findings were that 
where voluntarily formation of audit committees existed there was: 
lower managerial ownership of the company; the incentives for formation 
of the Committee increases with agency cost of equity; 
" larger firm size; 
" higher proportion of outside Directors; 
"a Big Eight external auditor was employed. 
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Research by DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) examined the incidence and 
circumstances of accounting errors revealed by prior period adjustments for forty- 
one companies in comparison with a control group of another forty-one firms. 
The adjustments were for overstatement errors. The findings suggest that 
companies with this type of error have diffuse ownership and are less likely to 
have audit committees. 
Menon and Williams (1994) took a different approach and studied the issue of 
the formation of audit committees in companies where their existence was not 
mandatory but recommended by the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting (Treadway Commission). Their Report (1987 p. 40-41) 
recommended that all public companies be required to have audit committees and 
to maintain them as the primary vehicle to ensure integrity of financial reporting 
and the audit process. At that time some Exchanges required audit committees 
e. g. New York Stock Exchange, whereas others such as the American Stock 
Exchange did not. Menon and Williams outline their view of the responsibilities 
of the audit committee which include selecting the independent auditor, 
overseeing the audit process and ensuring the integrity of financial reporting. 
This can be achieved because the audit committee has delegated responsibility 
from the board of the company, and because there are two potential monitoring 
advantages. Firstly, independence, because insider directors are not members of 
the committee as their performance may be examined by auditors. Secondly, the 
audit committee aids board efficiency as it is not possible to carry out the detailed 
work that is required in the main board meeting. Both Jemison and Oakley 
(1983) and Zahra and Pearce (1989) argue that audit committees are an important 
mechanism by which the board exercises its oversight responsibilities. 
These two writers go on to point out that the formation of an audit committee 
does not mean that the board uses it to undertake the role as outlined. They 
suggest that indicators of whether a company is serious about its audit committee, 
are the frequency of meetings and its composition. A study was conducted of 200 
randomly selected companies for which data on audit committees existed in 
1986-87. They chose over-the-counter firms as they were not required to form 
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audit committees. The researchers concluded that whilst most companies had 
voluntarily formed committees, many did not appear to rely on them (p. 13 7). 57 
committees did not meet at all or only once in the year, and 19 were comprised of 
insider directors. Menon and Williams support Bradbury's (1990) opinion that 
audit committees are often used as window dressing rather than for any real 
purpose. The study demonstrates that board composition is important in the 
effective use of audit committees. The greater the number of outside directors, 
the more likely that insiders will not be on the committee and the audit 
committee meets more frequently. Also as McMullen points out the expertise of 
audit committee members is crucial. A survey by the US Government 
Accounting Office in 1991 found that 35% of banks surveyed, had no accounting 
experience on their audit committees. This resulted in new regulations which 
insisted that at least two members of audit committees must have financial or 
banking experience 
McMullen (1996) pursued research into the issue of audit committees. She states 
(p. 88): 
as part of their oversight function, audit committees ask questions 
of both auditors and management and this may reduce the risk of 
material errors in the financial statements by providing an 
information flow among the board of directors, external auditors, 
internal auditors and company management. 
She undertook a study which examined if the presence of an audit committee is 
associated with financial reporting reliability. Five potential consequences of 
audit committees are identified and involve the occurrence of errors, irregularities 
and illegal acts. The study uses five variables as measures of these consequences; 
shareholder litigation alleging management fraud, quarterly earning restatements, 
regulator actions, illegal actions, and auditor tum-over involving an accounting 
disagreement. The findings of the study of 219 companies indicate that audit 
committees are associated with fewer incidences of the five variables. The results 
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suggest that companies with errors,, irregularities and other indicators of 
unreliable financial reporting are less likely to have audit committees. 
In New Zealand Bradbury (1990) agrees with McMullen that audit committees 
establish a formal communication mechanism between key players. He 
articulates the purpose of the committee as firstly to increase the credibility of 
annual audited financial statements. Secondly to assist directors in meeting their 
responsibilities, and thirdly to enhance audit independence. He used an agency 
theory framework to study the incentives for voluntary formation of audit 
committees. Bradbury examined 135 companies listed on the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange and found that both the number of directors on the board and 
intercorporate ownership were the more important determinants of voluntary 
audit committee formation. 
Despite the obvious benefits of an audit committee for an organisation it cannot 
be seen as the panacea for financial probity. MacErlean (1993) records the large 
increase in company fraud. Maxwell, Polly Peck and the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI) have been the global headline grabbing 
examples. However the article notes the results of the Society of Practitioners of 
Insolvency research into company failures. They found that five percent had 
fraud as a principal factor. The outcome of the rise in company fraud has been the 
development of specialist fraud accountants, particularly in the major audit firms. 
MacErlean (p. 9) quotes David Sherwin of Ernst and Young who said "often you 
go in and you uncover a catalogue of disasters which have been going on for a 
long time". This suggests that audit committees should only be seen as one, albeit 
very important, part of the control machinery of corporate governance. 
Vanasco (1994) studied audit committees from an international perspective. He 
concluded that there was a consensus among researchers and various national and 
international organisations that audit committees provide significant benefit to 
the company, public, investors and regulators. He states (p. 38) that the most cited 
functions of the audit committee are: 
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" strengthening the internal and external audit functions; 
" co-ordinating the work of the external and internal auditors; 
" strengthening the position of non-executive directors; 
assisting the board of directors to fulfil their legal responsibilities. 
3.5. Conflict of Interest 
Atkinson and Mancuso (199 1) examined the differences between Britain and the 
United States with regard to conflict of interest for politicians. They state that a 
conflict of interest arises when considerations of personal gain influence or 
appear to influence the exercise of public duties (p. 471). They suggest that 
conflicts of interest often present themselves as problems of discretion. 
In the US Roberts and Doss (1992) believe that there has been a proliferation of 
rules, regulations and other controls by both State and Federal authorities on the 
issue of conflict of interest for public officials. Official-act rules are common and 
are designed to prevent public servants from receiving anything of value for or 
because of their public function. In addition there are supplementation-of- salary 
prohibitions which are aimed specifically at the prevention of extra salary from 
non-public sources for the performance of a public service. The third type of 
control is the interested-source prohibition. This requires public officials to 
inquire into whether the source of a gift has an interest in actions taken by the 
official or their agency. Roberts and Doss argue that this myriad of external 
restraints has become the dominant feature of ethics in public service; yet public 
confidence has not risen with the new controls. The writers question the value of 
even further external rules and regulations particularly when they seem to 
reinforce the perception that the normal democratic systems cannot be relied 
upon. 
0' Connor (1993) points out that in the US there are a variety of State statutes on 
the issue of conflict of interest. However as case law interpreting these laws is 
sparse, confusion can exist on whether a transaction between a director and their 
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company is valid. 0' Connor believes that the American Law Institute's (ALI) 
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations. brings 
clarification to the area of director conflict of interest and fiduciary obligation 
(p. 955). ALI leans towards the business judgement rule to review conflict of 
interest transactions by disinterested directors. The shareholder has the burden of 
proof to show that the director could not reasonably have concluded that the 
transaction was fair to the corporation at the time of the agreement. 0' Connor 
goes on to argue that fiduciary law has a socialising role to promote ethical 
behaviour and that the language used around the subject of conflict of interest is 
important. She points out that "fiduciary" is derived from the Latin word fiducia 
meaning trust. Therefore the word fiduciary is associated with the morality of the 
duty of loyalty. 
In 1994 Carson wrote an extensive article on conflict of interest which takes a 
broader view of the issue. Firstly he argued that all too often conflict of interest is 
defined too narrowly and uses the following example (p. 388): 
a conflict of interest exists in any situation in which and individual 
(1) has difficulty discharging the official (fiduciary) duties 
attaching to a position or office she holds because either: (1) there 
is (or I believes that there is) an actual or potential conflict 
between her own personal interests and the interests of the party 
(P) to whom she owes those duties (her employer, client or 
organisation), or (ii) there is (or I believes that there is) an actual 
or potential conflict between the interests of her friends, family, or 
other clients and the interests of the party to whom she owes these 
duties. 
He is of the opinion that conflict of interest do not have to involve a conflict 
between Is own self interest and P. Carson uses the example of hiring a man 
who once saved his father's life. Under the definition it does not count as a 
conflict of interest but Carson believes that it is. Therefore he proposes this 
definition (p. 388): 
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a conflict of interest exists in any situation which an individual (1) 
has difficulty discharging the official (conventional/fiduciary) 
duties attaching to a position or office she holds because either: (i) 
there is (or I believes that there is) an actual or potential conflict 
between her own personal interests and the interests of the party 
(P) to whom she owes those duties, or (ii) I has a desire to 
promote (or thwart) the interests of (X) (where X is an entity 
which has interests) and there is (or I believes that there is) an 
actual or potential conflict between promoting (or thwarting) X's 
interests and the interests of P. 
Carson argues that there is a pervasiveness of conflict of interest. The interests of 
employees are routinely opposed to those of their employers. He cites 
bureaucracies as examples of self-interest in growth and self perpetuation, 
irrespective of organisational need. With regard to hiring staff he suggests that 
sometimes people are hired so that the individual doing the hiring, looks good by 
comparison but the organisation wants the best people for the job. Similarly 
Carson accuses the self-regulation of professions as a rich environment for 
conflict of interest when peer review, promotion and rewards are at stake. He also 
suggests that when payment is involved between a professional and a client, there 
is a possibility of conflict of interest because the professional can supply more 
services than is really required because of the incentive of income generation. 
Carson goes on to give example under the headings of technological change and 
intangible interests to further support his view. 
Margolis (1979) appears to have similar views to Carson but stresses the 
importance of not confusing conflict of interest with conflicting interests. The 
latter occurs when two legitimate stances are at odds, for example trying to 
reconcile the conflicting interests of peace and security in the Middle East. He 
states that a conflict of interest is where one of the interests is not legitimate. He 
suggests (p. 362): 
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in a conflict of interest it is ...... the relationship of the putative 
interests that is essential; in conflicting interests the conflict is a 
mere contingency arising to relate independently legitimate 
interests. 
Kay (1994) reviewed director conflict of interest in the US and started by quoting 
from Black's Law Dictionary (p. 208): 
corporate director conflicts of interest arise when directors' 
personal or financial interests conflict with their fiduciary 
responsibilities to the corporation and shareholders. 
He notes that there are three common director conflict of interest. Firstly, direct 
or indirect ownership of property leased to the company. Secondly, sales to or 
purchases from organisations in which the director has an interest. Thirdly, 
ownership of a portion of the minority equity in a subsidiary. 
Historically in the US the law governing conflict of interest has developed from 
an approach based on common law at the turn of the 20th century to that of a 
statutory approach. The American Bar Association decided that updated statute 
was needed and introduced subchapter F to the Model Business Corporation Act 
which encompasses definitions of conflicts of interest, preclusions of judicial 
review, director transaction approval provisions and shareholder approval 
provisions. Once the presence of a transaction is established the statute places 
possible conflicts of interest into one of two categories dependent on the 
director's involvement in the transaction. 
Firstly, there is a conflict of interest if the director knows that he\she or a "related 
person" is a party to the transaction or has such a significant "beneficial financial 
interest" in or so closely linked to the transaction that it would influence the 
director in an approval vote. Secondly, if a transaction of significance which 
normally comes to the board, and the director knows that he\she has a 
relationship with the other party or would have a significant beneficial financial 
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interest in or linked to the transaction that it would influence a vote, then a 
conflict of interest exists. 
The statute defines "related persons". Whilst parents or siblings of the director 
are classed as related, grandparents and children of siblings are not. The spouse, 
his\her parents, and children of the director are related as are the spouse's siblings 
but not their spouse or children. 
3.6. Conclusion 
Whilst there is no agreed definition of the term corporate governance it does 
appear that there is general agreement that the concept is principally about the 
decision-making processes of the organisation at its higher levels. 
Similarly the majority of commentators now have strong arguments that in a 
complex world, the narrow view that companies exist purely for the benefit of 
shareholders is incorrect. On balance corporate behaviour seems to indicate that 
stakeholders are recognised, albeit with a graded response dependent on the 
perceived significance of any particular entity. 
The views of who should undertake corporate governance are more mixed but the 
comment of Demb and Neubauer, which questions the ability of any group to be 
in complete control, does intuitively ring true. However it would appear that the 
board of directors fulfil the significant role in the pursuit of corporate 
govemance. 
The relevance of corporate governance to the NHS does seem clear. The 
similarity between the NHS Code of Conduct and Accountability for NHS 
Boards and the myriad references from writers on the private sector, is striking. 
The obvious difference is that the public sector does not have shareholders in the 
sense of the private sector but if it is accepted that government act as a form of 
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shareholders, the difference is immaterial and therefore corporate governance js 
very relevant to the NHS. 
It can be seen that there are many opinions of accountability, most of which 
encompass the notion of stewardship. Whether it is public, financial, managerial 
or general accountability, the concept involves a person or persons giving 
account to an individual or group for the performance of a set of responsibilities 
and justifying their actions. 
With regard to directors and management control, publications are clear that 
directors are fundamental to good management control. It is also evident that 
better control is exercised when the board has a significant input of external or 
non-executive directors. 
The literature shows that the use of audit committees has grown over the past 
twenty-five years. It is now recognised that audit committees are a key 
component of corporate governance but require active support and usage by the 
board 
Conflict of interest articles indicate that there is general agreement on the nature 
of the concept. Margolis and, in particular, Carson argue that conflict of interest 
covers a much broader range of activity. The examples that he quotes are in a 
pure sense conflicts of interest however they are also the every day organisational. 
politics which are part of the fabric of organisations. As such Carson may have 
an exact concept but it has no practical application in daily life. 
In summary the issues that were extracted from the Wessex case appear to be 
well supported by academic literature as important issues which, if addressed, 
should prevent organisations from following Wessex's path, particularly in the 
public sector. The Australian Public Service Commissioner, Peter Shergold 
(1997 p. 119) reminds us of the different nature of public service: 
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the public service is held to an ethical standard not demanded of 
others. It must recognise the distinctive nature of its contribution 
to the public good and meet a demanding accountability regime. 
The elements of governance extracted from RISP do appear to have a 
resonance on a wider scale but are they just random issues or is there a 
theoretical connection. The next chapter will allow this question to be 
answered. 
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Chapter 4. 
AGENCY THEORY: ?A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE NHS 
During the previous chapter the concept of accountability was discussed and 
through writers such as Gray and Jenkins, Day and Klein, Tricker, and Block the 
idea of principals and agents was introduced in different ways. This chapter 
investigates further the main theory in which principals and agents appear. It will 
be through this exploration that the question, posed at the end of chapter 3, can 
be answered. Agency theory will be discussed by reference to its academic 
supporters and opponents. This theory gained credibility over the past twenty-five 
years and is probably the most widely quoted theoretical explanation of medium- 
large organisations' behaviour. The aim of the chapter is to examine this theory 
which might explain organisational behaviour for corporate governance in the 
NHS, and provide the theoretical basis of a conceptual framework. In addition 
the issue of stakeholders within a principal-agent environment will be examined. 
This approach is discussed in four parts. Firstly, by a discussion of agency 
theory. Secondly, by an examination of agency theory in the NHS environment 
of 2003. Thirdly, an investigation of stakeholder theory to see what can be 
offered with regard to stakeholders, and finally a broad identification of NHS 
stakeholders and the challenges that they bring to an agency theory background. 
4.1. Agency Theory 
Most academic literature over the past twenty years has given credit to Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen(1980) and Jensen (1983) as the principal 
agency theorists who explained agency theory. Jensen and Meckling wrote 
(p. 30 8): 
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we define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) 
to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent' 
Davis et al (1977) explain that agency theory assumes that in modem companies 
agents and principals are motivated by opportunities for personal gain. Both 
parties seek to receive maximum utility with the least expenditure and therefore 
the rational principal or agent will select the option that increases his/her 
individual utility. Agency costs are incurred because of this possible divergence 
of interests. It is difficult to know ex ante whether an agent will pursue individual 
utility maximisation, the result is that principals aim to impose internal controls 
to restrict agency costs and to focus an agent's behaviour to align with the 
interests of the principal. The two main internal mechanisms are executive 
compensation and governance structures. Failure of this approach will lead 
normally to more expensive external control mechanisms such as acquisitions, 
divestitures and changes in ownership. 
Jensen and Meckling point out that there are three components of agency costs. 
Firstly, there is the expenditure incurred by the principal in monitoring the agent 
and includes remuneration policies, operating rules and budget restrictions. 
Secondly, there are "Bonding Costs" which occur when the agent expends 
resources to guarantee that he will not take actions which harm the principal or to 
ensure that the principal receives compensation if he does so. Thirdly, there is 
"Residual Loss" which is the money equivalent of the reduction in welfare 
experienced by the principal due to the divergence of interests. Clearly the level 
of agency costs will vary between companies but will depend upon: 
o the cost of measuring and evaluating the agent's performance; 
9 the cost of devising and applying an index for compensating the agent 
which correlates with the principal's welfare; 
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* the cost of devising and enforcing specific behavioural rules and policies. 
In addition the employment market for agents will have an influence as well as 
the company's position in the capital market. With regard to the latter, the 
principal can choose to divest himself of the company if he believes that the 
value of the company is higher to others than himself. The existence of agency 
costs suggests that the preferable model of ownership for companies is that of 
owner-manager and thereby avoid divergence of principal - agent interests and 
the subsequent need for agency costs. Jensen and Meckling explain that the 
modem use of Limited Liability has meant that shareholders are not exposed to 
the full impact of debt. Shareholders incur lower costs of monitoring their agents 
than they would do if liability was unlimited. If an owner-manager attempted to 
purchase a company through debt and, possibly, personal wealth, Limited 
Liability would inhibit potential creditors. They would be unwilling to lend 
substantial sums of money to an owner-manager who has a small personal 
investment but may take large risks with the company's money. Failure would 
leave most of the liability with the creditors whilst success would see the 
majority of the gain captured by the owner-manager. Even if there were willing 
creditors available, such bondholders would be likely to impose constraints on 
the owner-manager's behaviour through the prescription of provisions which 
would incur costs in monitoring and thereby reduce profits. Also bondholders 
would be aware that in the situation of a bankruptcy, debt does not have primacy 
over the assets of the company with the result that they would see a reduction in 
payoffs because of the existence of other claimants. The outcome of these 
scenarios is that at the start of the 21't century, the most common form of 
organisation separates ownership and management which creates a principal- 
agent relationship. 
This fundamental point is picked up by Fama and Jensen (1983) who state 
(p. 301): 
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we contend that separation of decision and risk bearing functions 
survives in these organisations in part because of the benefits of 
specialisation of management and risk bearing but also because of 
an effective common approach to controlling the agency problem 
caused by separation of decision and risk bearing functions. 
They proceed to illustrate that contracts will specify the decision process for 
agents, and suggest four steps. Firstly, there is "initiation" when proposals are 
created for consideration for resource allocation. Secondly, "ratification" when 
specific choices are made for action. Step 3 is "implementation" when decisions 
are executed whilst Step 4 involves "monitoring" when measurement of 
performance and implementation of reward\sanction takes place. The first and 
third steps are decision management functions undertaken by agents, whereas 
steps 2 and 4 are decision control tasks taken by principals. 
Eisenhardt (1988) picks up the importance of the contract and states (p. 58): 
the focus of the theory is on determining the most efficient 
contract governing the principal-agent relationship given 
assumptions about people (e. g. self-interest, bounded rationality, 
risk aversion), organisations (e. g., goal conflict among members) 
and information (e. g., information is a commodity which can be 
purchased). Specifically the question becomes, "is a behaviour 
orientated contract (e. g., salaries, hierarchical governance) more 
efficient than an outcome-oriented contract (e. g., commissions, 
stock options, transfer of property rights, market governance) ? ". 
She explores the two main strands of agency theory in attempting to answer this 
question. Positivism has concentrated on governance mechanisms in large public 
companies to solve the agency problem and is achieved by two approaches. 
Firstly, the use of outcome based contracts. Agents will usually have better 
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information than principals so it is argued that principals should concentrate on 
the outcome that they desire which align with their aspirations. A number of 
different measures are used, examples include specific rise in the share price or 
market growth. The second approach is the installation of information systems 
which allow principals to verify agents behaviour. The existence of such 
information is likely to influence the agent to behave in the interest of the 
principal. 
The principal-agent stream focus on determining the optimal contract under 
various variables, e. g. risk aversion and, information and outcome uncertainty. 
The theory suggests that the use of information systems are positively related to 
behaviour based contracts and negatively related to outcome based contracts. 
Over time the principal has clear insight into the working of the agent and 
therefore can more accurately predict behaviour. This explains why outcome- 
uncertainty is positively related to behaviour based contracts and negatively 
related to outcome based contracts. Similarly, the length of the agency 
relationship is linked to whether an outcome or behaviour based contract is used 
with the latter supporting longer principal-agent working. 
To enact an effective contractual arrangement there are two impediments to 
overcome (Nilakant and Rao 1994). The first is moral hazard which is defined by 
Holmstrom (1979 p. 14) as: 
............. when 
individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions 
such that privately taken actions affect the probability distribution 
of the outcome. 
Eisenhardt (p. 61) defines moral hazard more succinctly as "the lack of effort on 
the part of the agent, i. e. shirking". The second impediment is adverse selection 
or misrepresentation of ability by the agent. Both issues require the principal to 
configure the contract to ensure that expectations are clear to ensure his/her 
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interests are met. Kren and Kerr (1993) explain the dilemma faced by the 
principal. An agent cannot diversify employment risk as easily as the principal 
can diversify investment risk. This means that as a significant proportion of the 
agent's compensation is based on performance the agent bears a greater risk and 
therefore expects a higher total compensation as a risk premium. Because the 
nature of information asymmetry places the principal at a disadvantage, he/she 
bears the problem that the agent will avoid the compensation risk to the 
disbenefit of the principal. Kren and Kerr undertook a study that involved 150 
managers employed in various Fortune 500 manufacturing companies. They 
found that a clear negative relationship existed between behaviour monitoring 
and the use of performance related pay. In organisations that used little 
monitoring and focused on outcomes, higher levels of uncertainty were 
associated with increased use of performance related pay. The opposite was also 
found in firms with high monitoring, decreased use of performance related pay 
was associated with large amounts of turbulence. 
Weir (1997) illustrates the point that agency theory is not only about the possible 
non alignment of agents. His research demonstrates that boards with non- 
executive directors in a clear majority, but of a poor quality and with combined 
chairmen\chief executive posts were more likely to be acquired as their 
companies are poor performers. In these circumstances the principals are in a 
position to put in place effective checks and balances but failed to do so. 
Other researchers have demonstrated the validity of agency theory as a concept. 
Gomez-Mejia et al (1987) studied 71 large manufacturers. They found that in 
companies with dominant shareholders, chief executive compensation was geared 
to performance rather than the scale of the operation. These principals were 
focused on aligning their agents' output with their goal which was to generate a 
return on investment. The opposite held true in companies with no dominant 
shareholders where compensation was based on scale of operation and not 
performance. Abrahamson and Park (1994) examined 1,000 different company 
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annual reports. They found concealment of negative organisational outcomes. 
They argue that agency theory was being enacted in their study. Independent 
agents, i. e. with no personal gain involved, such as outside directors, major 
institutional investors and accountants,, limited the concealment. However, small 
institutional investors and outside directors who were shareholders encouraged 
concealment. Also low rates of disclosure of poor performance were associated 
with subsequent selling of stock by top executives and outside directors. 
In the same year Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1987) studied monitoring and incentive 
alignment of chief executive compensation. They found that it was greater in 
owner controlled companies than management controlled firms. In the former 
there was more influence over chief executive pay by major shareholders and 
boards of directors whereas in the latter organisations this was not the case. 
In a separate piece of research Stroh et al (1996) found further support for agency 
theory. They studied middle managers across eight industries. They found that 
when organisations experienced increased uncertainty in their business 
environment, the proportion of compensation linked to performance increased. 
Also it was seen that companies who used forms of performance related pay 
routinely, had a negatively associated long term relationship with their managers. 
Similarly when there was a greater reliance on behaviour based pay, longer term 
relationships resulted. 
Frey (1993) agrees that monitoring does increase work effort as indicated by 
agency theory. However, he argues that when there is a personal relationship 
between principal and agent, monitoring is perceived as distrust and can lead to a 
reduction in work effort. 
However there are critics of the theory. Davis et al (p. 24) argue: 
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the limits and boundaries of agency theory are determined by its 
model of man. Where individualistic self-serving executive 
motivation is assumed, shareholders desirous of minimising the 
risks associated with perceived non alignment of principal-agent 
utility functions should implement agency prescriptions.... 
Additional theory is needed to explain other types of human 
behaviour. 
They suggest that stewardship theory is a more appropriate concept when an 
individual is in tune with organisational values and goals and operates in a 
cooperative manner. This view is supported by Donaldson and Davis (1994) and 
Donaldson and Hilmer (1998) who endorse the view that not every human being 
is self serving and therefore agency theory has its limitations. The choice it is 
suggested is between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Extrinsic rewards are 
tangible, exchangeable commodities that have a measurable market value. 
Intrinsic rewards include opportunities for growth, achievement, affiliation and 
self actualisation. 
Perrow (1986) undertook an analysis of agency theory and is quite scathing as a 
result. He believes that the principal-agent relationship has numerous problems 
which include cheating, limited information and bounded rationality. His writing 
argues that there are other models which view human behaviour as more 
complex, and have greater validity. However Perrow does view agency theory as 
useful because it does indicate that self-serving behaviour does occur in 
organisations but, he argues, what is more important is to understand the 
circumstances under which individuals will maximise their personal utility 
irrespective of others. He concludes (p. 235) : 
Chapter 4 86 
we are all agency theorists far more than we think ! Stated 
abstractly the theory sounds heartless, simplistic, and even 
pointless, as it assumes that organised social life is nothing more 
than a series of contracts between people with the resources to 
pick or choose the contracts they like. But if we reflect on our 
daily justifications for our actions, we can see that we use agency 
theory daily to appropriate the gains, and overlook the losses, that 
attend our efforts. 
Hanney (2000) recounts a practical example of personal gain at work in the real 
world of business. Greg Hutchings was a highly successful businessman who 
underwent his apprenticeship at the industrial conglomerate Hanson which at the 
time was one of the most successftil UK companies. Hutchings left in 1983 and 
acquired a small engineering business, FH Tompkins, which specialised in the 
manufacture of buckles and fasteners. Over the next 10 years he acquired many 
other businesses including Rank Hovis McDougal (RHM) in 1992 for f 958m. 
Many critics in The City believed that this particular acquisition was a poor deal. 
It was believed that Hutchings wanted to beat his former boss, Lord Hanson, who 
was also bidding for RHM. In addition the purchase had to be funded through a 
f 600m rights issue which caused problems with institutional investors who were 
of the view that a tight rein should be kept on cash resources due to the less than 
favourable economic environment. This non-alignment of agent and principals' 
goals finally came to a conclusion when Hutchings was forced to resign as chief 
executive because of a myriad allegations of corporate excesses. Hanney reports 
that these included the inclusion of both his wife and housekeeper on the 
company payroll, as well as concerns over the use of the four company jets and 
the two flats. 
It is clear that agency theory does have a sound basis. It must be seen as a general 
approach that can be used in various circumstances but is not suitable on all 
occasions. Eisenhardt (p. 64\65) surnmarises the position of the theory: 
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agency theory makes two specific contributions to organisational 
thinking. The first is the treatment of information. In agency 
theory, information is regarded as a commodity: it has a cost and 
can be purchased. This gives an important role to formal 
information systems such as budgeting, MBO, and Boards of 
Directors and informal ones such as managerial supervision ...... A 
second contribution of agency theory is its risk implications ..... 
The ramifications of outcome uncertainty to their implications for 
creating risk ..... The implication is that outcome uncertainty, 
coupled with differences in willingness to accept risk should 
influence contracts between principal and agent. 
This leaves the question, is agency theory of any relevance to the public sector in 
the UK. Shavell (1997, p. 55) believes that the principal-agent relationship is 
relevant to many different organisational settings. In addition to shareholders and 
management he gives examples as diverse as professional and client, insurer and 
insured and society and a polluting firm. When thought of in this wider 
framework principal-agent relationships do exist in the public sector in general 
and in the NHS specifically. Mayston (1993 p. 93) has given the issue some 
thought and states: 
greater credence can be given to the notion that the reforms are 
attempting to increase accountability to consumers of public 
services as the new principals for whom the devolved bodies 
should be acting as agents. However many difficulties remain ..... . 
4.2 The NHS in 2003 
The preceding discussion suggests that agency theory is applicable to the NHS so 
this section will explore further whether the theory exists within the NHS in 
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2003. Hoggett (1991) argues: 
the centre of the government retains control over key strategic 
questions such as the allocation of resources to operational units 
and the framework of financial and personnel rules and 
performance targets within which devolution over operational 
matters is allowed to occur. 
The legal framework in which the NFIS operates is set by the government. The 
organisational forms that exist have been created via statute at different times. 
NHS trusts were established in 1991 by the Thatcher administration, and primary 
care trusts (PCT) in 2000 and strategic health authorities (SHA) in 2002 by the 
present government. In all cases, statutes were required and defined the 
responsibilities and powers each organisation were to be given. Clear 
accountability lines were defined and always led to the DoH and central 
government. At the time of writing a new piece of legislation, the Health and 
Social Care Act, is making progress through parliament and will introduce a new 
organisational form, the foundation hospital. 
The use of statutes is much wider and is used for a variety of purposes when the 
government wishes to enact a policy change but legislation is required to change 
a relationship between a public body and other organisations, or may effect the 
rights of individual citizens. An example of the former is that the proposed new 
act will allow NHS organisations to bill local social services departments when 
they do not transfer out of hospital someone fit for discharge but not fit to return 
to their own home. For the latter there has been the creation of the National 
Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE). This agency decides which new drugs 
and treatment should be adopted by the NHS and has, on a number of occasions, 
excluded drugs and treatments which has denied them to individual patients via 
the free NHS. 
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The government has tax raising powers and decides how the gathered monies are 
to be distributed amongst government departments which in turn have the key 
responsibility of allocating these resources to various services. The DoH issues 
annual allocations to the NHS but has always held back monies which 
government tend to use for various initiatives. The result is that the financial 
resource, for both revenue and capital, of NHS trusts and PCTs is closely 
controlled by the government. 
Direction of the NHS has been exercised by all governments since the creation of 
the NHS in 1948 but over the past 20 years the direction has become more 
detailed and prescriptive. Working for Patients (Department of Health 1989) is an 
example of this process but has been surpassed by The New NHS, Modem - 
Dependable (Department of Health 1997) which introduced a new plan for the 
NHS and spawned many documents on direction so that the NHS is presently 
attempting to deliver some 400 different targets. Government has the ability to 
implement fundamental philosophical change as was seen by the 1989 and 1997 
documents. The Thatcher reforms introduced competition and an internal market 
to the NHS. The Blair administration scrapped these arrangements and 
emphasised cooperation and collaboration. Six years on this government is 
bringing back competition under the heading of patient choice, and is introducing 
plurality of provision of delivery of services which include the private sector but 
still under the NHS. 
As governments have made these major changes there has been a growth in 
monitoring. One of the recognised mechanisms of agency theory that can be used 
by the principal is to implement detailed performance management systems so as 
to attempt to align agents with the goals of the principal. Hoggett (1991) argues 
that performance management systems which include scrutiny, comparative 
tables of performance indicators including league tables, chartermarks, customer 
surveys, organisational performance reviews, and performance related pay 
contradict the notion that the public sector is moving to a more 'hands off form 
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of organisational control. The reality in the NHS is of monthly, and sometimes 
weekly, returns to the Doll in great detail. Most NHS organisations undergo 
numerous inspections every year by agencies empowered by the government to 
scrutinise the NHS. The performance management burden on the NHS has never 
been as intensive as it exists in 2003 and confirms the direction of travel noted by 
Stewart (1992) who talked about 'the growing burden of central accountability 5. 
It can be seen that the government controls the legal, financial, direction and 
monitoring levers of the NHS and is a command and control structure which fits 
with the principles of agency theory. Mayston (1993) is helpful in confirming 
who is the principal for the NHS ? He suggest three options. 
Firstly, there is the national electorate which uses the formal democratic 
processes. However even a cursory examination shows that the electorate is not 
the principal. The Thatcher reforms of the early 1990s were not requested by the 
electorate and were opposed fiercely by wide sections of society. Currently, the 
electorate has not asked for foundation hospitals and if the media and opinion 
polls are correct, many citizens fear the start of the break-up of the NHS. In both 
cases the government, involving both major political parties, have introduced 
unpopular policies and used their parliamentary majorities and party political 
machineries to force through what they believe is right for the country. 
Secondly, consumers of the NHS could be the principal. If this is true then the 
downgrading of Kidderminster Hospital would not have taken place as the local 
consumers objected strenuously to the proposals when they came forward. The 
government confirmed the decision with the result that at the 1997 general 
election the local consumers ousted the sitting member of parliament, who was of 
the party of the government, and elected an independent member who had 
campaigned solely on the hospital issue. 
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Thirdly, Mayston puts forward central government politicians who are in power, 
as the principal. Evidence from the current passage of the Health and Social Care 
Act through parliament confirms this suggestion. Opposition to the creation of 
foundation hospitals is quite strong and similar to the position in 1989 but 
ministers have used their parliamentary majority to force the proposed bill along 
the approval pathway and whilst their has been opposition from the government's 
own party, the government appears to be achieving its aims. 
The only conclusion that can be drawn is that ministers are the principal. 
However at the same time the same ministers are exhorting the NHS to become 
more accountable to stakeholders. Hoggett (1996 p. 17) suggest that there is a 
'paradox of a public sector which has apparently been subject both to more 
centralisation and decentralisation. '. Despite this paradox the NHS has to respond 
to ministerial exhortations and stakeholders will now be considered. 
4.3. Stakeholder Theory 
To understand how to address stakeholders an examination of stakeholder theory 
has been made to see whether it has anything to offer. Examination of the 
research literature points to Freeman (1984) as the acknowledged initial promoter 
of stakeholder theory. He argues (p. 46) that: 
a stakeholder in an organisation is (by definition) any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organisation's objectives. 
This definition was thought by some to be too broad and narrower views were 
published. Clarkson (1984: p. 5) said: 
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voluntary stakeholders bear some form of risk as a result of having 
invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of 
value, in a firm. Involuntary stakeholders are placed at risk as a 
result of a firm's activities but without the element of risk there is 
no stake. 
Rowley (1997) is of the view that whatever the differences of opinion over 
definition, there is a core which exists. Organisations are required to address a set 
of stakeholder expectations and therefore how management chooses to meet 
those expectations is a function of stakeholder influence. He suggests that this 
key factor can be analysed by examination of two variables. Firstly density which 
measures the number of ties in the network which link actors together. Low 
density is characterised by a bicycle wheel where the spokes, radiating out from 
the hub, have no direct linkage with each other. The result is that the various 
stakeholders,, represented by each individual spoke, have limited influence as 
their efforts are not aggregated. High density would see direct linkage between 
many of the spokes without going through the hub. In this case stakeholders can 
share information and there is a diffusion of norms across the network. The ease 
of coalition formation leads to strong unified stakeholder pressure which often 
leads to organisational conformity. Management is forced to be attentive to the 
needs and actions of stakeholders. The second variable is centrality which refers 
to an individual\organisation's position in the network relative to others. It can be 
thought of as a proxy measure of power and\or status. The number of ties to other 
players defines the degree of centrality. Rowley suggests that this variable can 
have two components. Closeness defines an actor's ability to access 
independently all other members of the network. Betweenness measures the 
frequency on which an actor falls on the path between pairs of other players and 
is good for assessing control of information across networks. High betweenness 
indicates a broker or gatekeeper. From these variables Rowley (P. 901) proposes a 
structural classification of stakeholder influences and the resulting organisational 
response to stakeholder influence. 
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Figure 1 
A Structural Classification of Stakeholder Influences: Organisational 
Responses to Stakeholder Pressures 
Centrality of the Focal Organisation 
High Low 
Density of 
Stakeholder High Compromiser Subordinate 
Network Low Commander Solitarian 
Source: Rowley 1977 
High density\high centrality results in a stand-off between a stakeholder network 
which can easily coordinate its efforts and a company which can control 
information flows. Rowley (p. 901) states the outcome is that: 
according to both institutional and resource dependence theories, 
they assert that firms often engage in negotiations with their 
exchange partners to reduce uncertainty. 
The organisation will appease stakeholder expectations and aim to achieve a 
predictable environment in which the organisation's actions are not opposed by 
stakeholders acting together; both parties will compromise. Low density\high 
centrality means that the organisation is in a strong position as stakeholders are 
fragmented and information flows are controlled by the organisation; it will 
command its environment. Rowley gives the Colombian drug cartel as an 
interesting illustration of this type of behaviour. High density\low centrality 
places the stakeholders in a powerful situation. The network will co-ordinate its 
activities but the focal organisation is unable to control information exchange. In 
this subordinate role the organisation has to acquiesce to stakeholder 
expectations. Finally low density\low centrality produces a position where 
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neither party is in control. Stakeholders are disjointed and the organisation masks 
its behaviour to the external environment. Rowley points out that organisations 
rarely stay in the solitarian stance for long as resources are usually obtained from 
a variety of external players. He offers NASA in the late 1960s as an example of 
an organisation that was allowed to focus on its lunar work whilst its reporting 
duties were removed and thereby NASA was relieved from dealing with 
demanding stakeholders. 
Mitchell et al (1997) developed an alternative method of interpreting the 
organisation\stakeholder interface. They suggested that defining stakeholder 
attributes would help in the understanding of relationships. The first attribute is 
power which has varying definitions but can be summarised as the ability to 
achieve the results that you want and is delivered by access to coercive, utilitarian 
or normative means. As such access is not a constant which means power is 
transitory and can be won and lost. The second attribute is legitimacy which 
broadly is a principle based on the actions of an individual or organisation that 
society regards as complying with accepted norms, values and beliefs. Urgency is 
the third attribute which Mitchell argues moves the organisation\stakeholder 
relationship from a static to dynamic posture. It only exists when two conditions 
apply. Firstly, when a relationship or claim is of a time-sensitive nature and, 
secondly, when that relationship or claim is important or critical to the 
stakeholder. Urgency is the degree to which stakeholders' claims require 
organisational. attention. These three attributes are variable and not constant, and 
exist as a matter of multiple perceptions with the result that they are a constructed 
reality rather than an objective one. Also an individual or organisation may not 
realise that they possess an attribute or even if they are aware, may not choose to 
exploit their position. Managers are central to Mitchell's thinking because their 
perceptions of stakeholder attributes is vital to the managers' view of stakeholder 
salience. This suggests that managerial characteristics are a moderator of the 
relationships presented by Mitchell and his colleagues. The outcome is that they 
propose different stakeholder types based on different combinations of the three 
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attributes; the greater the cumulative number of attributes perceived by managers 
to exist, greater is stakeholder salience. 
Latent stakeholders have only one attribute. Dormant stakeholders have power as 
the attribute but lack a legitimate relationship or an urgent claim. Examples 
include wealthy individuals or entities who have the power to commit large sums 
of money, or personalities who can influence the media. Managers have to be 
aware of this type of stakeholder as the acquisition of another attribute would 
change the position quickly. A good example is employees who are dormant but 
if fired or laid off, can acquire urgency and seek a variety of legal remedies for 
their claims. Discretionary stakeholders possess the attribute of legitimacy but 
have no power over the firm nor any urgent claim against it. Examples include 
most forms of corporate philanthropy. Demanding stakeholders have the attribute 
of urgency. With neither power nor legitimacy, these stakeholders can make a lot 
of noise but pose little threat to managers. Individual complainants are an 
example from this heading. 
The second category Mitchell calls expectant stakeholders who have a stepped 
change view of how they should be perceived. They expect to influence the 
organisation because they possess two attributes, and therefore the tone of the 
relationship has moved from passive to active. For managers salience has risen 
from low to moderate. Dominant stakeholders have both power and legitimacy, 
and will require attention from the firm. This group includes non-executive 
directors, significant creditors and community leaders. The dependent heading 
covers the attributes of urgency and legitimacy which means that power has to be 
accessed through others. This can be in the form of advocacy or guardianship. 
When the Exxon Valdez spilt its huge cargo of oil in Alaska many stakeholders 
had both urgent and legitimate claims but no power over the giant petrochemical 
company. This was provided by the state government and the courts. The third 
group have power and urgency but no legitimacy and are labelled dangerous 
stakeholders by Mitchell. Individuals or groups in this category are likely to use 
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coercion to achieve their demands. Lightening strikes, employee sabotage, 
environmentalists occupying sites to prevent construction, and terrorism are 
examples where dangerous stakeholders have occurred. 
Finally there are definitive stakeholders who have all three attributes. To 
managers there is high salience and will ensure that stakeholder needs are 
addressed ahead of both latent and expectant stakeholders. The most likely 
scenario will involve a dominant stakeholder moving to the definitive category. 
This could be a group of shareholders who see the value of their shares 
plummeting which generates an urgent claim. Their expectations will be to see 
the value of their investment reinstated or the managers will face the 
consequence of dismissal. Mitchell (p. 878) highlights actual examples of this 
situation from the US in 1993. The boards of IBM, General Motors, Kodak, 
Westinghouse and American Express were all dismissed because managers did 
not respond adequately or appropriately to their definitive stakeholders. It is 
possible to acquire the missing attribute and become definitive even if you are 
lacking power or legitimacy. For the former the example is the citizens of Alaska 
who received support and therefore power from the state government after the 
Exxon Valdez disaster. For the latter the African National Congress gained 
legitimacy by winning free national political elections. 
The "father" of stakeholder theory, Freeman (1984: p. 62) developed the 
Stakeholder Grid to analyse the different influences on a company. 
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Figure 2 
Stakeholder Grid 
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The idea behind the Grid was to allow mangers to assess the types of 
stakeholders with whom they had to interact and the nature of their power. 
4.4 Stakeholders and the NHS 
In 2003 the government has told the NFIS on a regular basis that it must take 
more notice of and become more accountable to its stakeholders. This section 
examines in turn eight specific stakeholders with whom all NHS organisations 
have a relationship whilst recognising that this list is not exhaustive. 
Chapter 4 98 
4.4.1. Patients and the Public 
The most common comment from government is that the NHS must become 
more accountable to patients and their local communities. These statements are 
made as if there is one collective group when in fact, there are two different 
groupings. The challenges of accountability to patients are to understand firstly 
the use of the word 'accountability', and secondly, how it can be applied to the 
hundreds of thousands of patients seen by the average district general hospital 
every year. 
The former operates on two levels. For an individual patient the issue is the 
provision of high quality services which meet the specific needs of each 
individual patient. It can be argued that such an approach is no different from any 
service industry organisation. If the patient has good access times for services, 
has choice about date,, time and, possibly, location of care/treatment, has good 
information about the options for care together with associated risks, and this 
takes place in good facilities with pleasant, professional staff, it is likely that the 
patient will be satisfied. At the collective level of patients the issue is about 
actively seeking out views of patients and then amending services to reflect their 
views. The context maybe the delivery of an ongoing service or the development 
of a new service. 
The second challenge is how to accommodate the vast number of patients seen by 
the average hospital. The NHS has begun to understand the various tools which 
are used by other service organisations, and range from surveys to a 
representative sample of patients through to focused working groups on specific 
subjects such as cancer. 
The public is not the same as patients as clearly it implies all individuals who live 
in the local community which is served by a particular NHS organisation.. For 
many people, particularly aged under 40 , they have had little or no usage of the 
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NHS as a patient. For others there maybe a significant involvement as a relative 
or carer of a relative or friend. The NHS needs to engage both groups as their 
perspective of the NHS will be different than patients.. The mechanisms that are 
used will be the same as described for patients. 
It can be seen that the use of the word 'accountability' by politicians in the 
context of the NHS and patients and the public is incorrect. Generally what is 
meant is meaningful involvement so that both groupings recognise that they have 
an influence. A major difficulty arises when a service or facility maybe lost in 
order to comply with national guidelines/standards but both patients and the 
public object. The formal accountability within the NHS will expect compliance 
but in addition ministers want local involvement and hopefully agreement. This 
challenge is relevant in many areas of the NHS as mangers and clinicians attempt 
to reconfigure services to meet the needs of the 2 Vt century. 
4.4.2 Communitv Health Council s/Patient Forums 
At the time of writing the demise of community health councils (CHC) is 
imminent. These organisations have existed in every locality to act as the 
patients' watchdog and have comprised of local councillors, nominations from 
the voluntary sector and interested individuals. CHCs have had the power to visit 
NFIS premises and produce reports with recommendations for action. 
Additionally CHCs have had the right to be consulted formally by the NHS on 
any proposed major service change, and a separate power to refer a change, to 
which the CHC objects, to ministers. The remit for monitoring the delivery of 
NFIS services transfers to newly established patient forums at the end of 2003. 
The difference will be that there will be a forum to monitor each NFIS 
organisation whereas CHCs have covered a geographical area. The challenge for 
NHS organisations is to develop a working relationship which is constructive. 
There is no formal accountability between CHC/patient forums and the NHS but 
the latter has responsibilities which it must discharge. These include access to 
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facilities and staff, the provision of information and the consideration of 
recommendations. If a forum believe that a NHS organisation is not responding 
appropriately it has mechanisms to engage the senior levels of the NHS and seek 
redress. 
4.4.3 Interest Groups 
Such groups come in two broad forms. Firstly, disease or condition based bodies 
which generally are driven by patients, former patients and carers. Examples 
include Diabetes UK, the British Heart Foundation, and the Alzheimers Society. 
Secondly, a response to a proposed closure of a facility or service, or to campaign 
for the creation locally of a service or facility which does not exist. The first 
group is relatively easy to engage and usually involves the relevant hospital 
service taking the lead, e. g. cardiology with the British Heart Foundation. The 
second group requires a more corporate approach as if common ground cannot be 
found the interest group will usually seek to involve politicians to support their 
cause. 
4.4.4 Voluntarv Sector 
In most localities there is a busy voluntary sector where individuals give their 
time and effort to support the needy in the community. These welfare activities 
interact frequently with the NHS and therefore the voluntary sector is another 
stakeholder which seeks to influence the NHS. Usually there is an umbrella 
organisation locally which attempts to coordinate input to and from the voluntary 
sector into public services. The key issue for the NHS is to recognise that this 
stakeholder has a large membership of carers who are a key source of information 
on the delivery of services. The voluntary sector's common pleas are to be heard 
and to be involved. 
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4.4.5 Local Govemment 
Health and social care are interdependent services which means that the NHS and 
social services need to work together. The challenge is to create a good working 
partnership when the cultures of the two types of organisation are very different. 
The NHS is managed by central government and has appointees on its boards 
whereas local government is locally controlled by individuals elected by local 
people through a democratic process. These differences can lead to non- 
alignment of objectives and priorities. An example has been the transfer of older 
people from hospitals to nursing homes. Whilst in hospital the costs fall to the 
NHS but once the individual is in a nursing home, apart from self-payers, the 
costs are a social services responsibility. This has caused friction over central 
versus local funding. Overall the issue is not one of accountability but of 
relationships between public bodies. 
A new potential tension has been introduced with the demise of the CHCs. The 
power to review proposed significant service changes has been passed by central 
government to local government. Each county or metropolitan council has 
established an overview and scrutiny committee (OSC) to undertake this role. In 
addition each OSC can review any element of the NFIS service in their area and 
call chief executives of local NHS organisations to appear before them. The 
government argues that this approach will bring some local democratic 
accountability to the NHS. OSCs can make recommendations to any NHS 
organisations and if not satisfied with their response, OSCs can refer issues to 
ministers. In pure accountability terms OSCs are a process for influence which 
has the fallback position of an appeal to the NFIS principal if necessary. 
4.4.6 Trades Union 
The NHS is the largest employer in the UK and is an unionised environment. 
NHS organisations require hannonious relationships with trades union otherwise 
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unhelpful industrial unrest would impact on the delivery of services. In general 
NES organisations are successful in the development of good relationships 
locally with unions. The difficulties arise when a national stance is adopted by a 
union which is at odds with government policy.. An example is the attitude of 
UNISON, the major public sector union, towards the government's private 
finance initiative (PFI). The opposition is because PFI allows the transfer of 
public sector workers into the private sector often with lower pay rates and worse 
terms and conditions than the NHS. In 2001 at Dudley Hospital the union's 
position led to industrial action over an extended period of time. When such 
positions occur the local NES organisation, i. e. the agent, is directed normally by 
the DoH,, the principal, as to what it can and cannot agree with the union. 
4.4.7 Other NHS Organisations 
The final core stakeholder is other NHS organisations. Within the service there 
are relationships between NHS organisations, NFIS trusts and PCTs but in 
accountability terms no formal links exist. Both type of organisation are 
accountable upwards to SHAs but a PCT and its local hospital need to work 
together to deliver NHS services. In fact there is a co-dependency as the PCT is 
the main source of funding for the hospital which is the key provider of 
secondary care services to the PCT's populations. This relationship is 
increasingly reinforced through common performance indicators so that if one 
organisation fails on an issue so does the other. 
4.3. Summa 
The purpose of the first three chapters of this thesis was to establish a conceptual 
framework of corporate governance. Wessex identified some elements which 
might be valid in a wider context. Their robustness has been confirmed by an 
examination of the academic literature but chapter 3 questioned whether there 
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was a theoretical connection linked with the elements. The exploration of agency 
theory confirms that such a connection exists and is the underpinning theory for 
the command and control structure that exists in the NHS The exploration of 
stakeholders show that none of them have a formal accountability function with 
NHS organisations but in every case they seek to have influence through 
participation. The key issue is that of working relationships which politicians 
inflate by talking of accountability. 
In summary the conceptual framework comprises of the elements of directors 
and management control, audit committees and conflict of interest, and a 
theoretical backdrop of agency or theory which is represented by a relationship 
between different parties including stakeholders. The following cases in section 
B will be used to confirm or deny the soundness of these elements and 
relationship and thereby validate or reject the conceptual framework. 
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Section B 
Using the Conceptual Framework to Understand 
Corporate Governance Failures 
Chapter 5. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FAILURE IN THE NHS: 
WEST MIDLANDS REGIONAL HEALTH AUTHORITY 
The aim of the second section of this thesis is to use the developed conceptual 
framework to explore more cases of corporate governance failure both within and 
outside the NHS. The purpose of stepping outside the NHS is to understand 
whether corporate governance is a generic concept with nuances that vary when 
applied to different situations, or does corporate governance in the NHS only 
apply within that specific environment and thereby mean that lessons cannot be 
learnt from the wider organisational spectrum. The second case study is another 
corporate governance failure from the NHS but in a different part of the country 
to Wessex. This study has been chosen as it appears to have at its heart a separate 
motivation by key players to that of Wessex and therefore allows a view to be 
taken as to whether causes of failure are similar or not. The purpose of this 
chapter is to describe what happened and analyse the causes. The two stage 
process outlined previously in Chapter I is used. 
The history and failings of the Regionally Managed Services (RMS) are 
identified in great detail in the Public Accounts Committee Fifty-seventh Report 
(1993b) which was published on 27thOctober 1993. The story contains three 
separate strands. Firstly a major consultancy contract for the Supplies Branch of 
RMS, secondly the management buy-out of RMS and thirdly the development of 
an Electronic Trading System for the Supplies Service. These three issues ran in 
parallel at the same time and therefore in establishing the chronological order of 
events it will be necessary to switch between the three as appropriate. 
5.1. The Storv 
The West Midlands Regional Health Authority (WMRHA) was responsible for 
the NHS at the heart of England. It encompassed the counties of Herefordshire, 
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Shropshire, Staffordshire, Warwickshire and Worcestershire, with a population 
of some 5.25m people. In 1994\95 the WMRHA had a revenue budget of 
approximately f2 billion. The story begins in 1983 when WMRHA established a 
Regional Supplies Council to improve effective procurement storage and 
distribution of supplies throughout the region. 
April 1986 saw the creation of a Members Panel of WMRHA to oversee the 
future of a new organisation which would undertake certain functions such as 
supplies, management services (including computers), blood transfusion and 
ambulance services. In 1991\92 expenditure was approximately f, 40m. Chris 
Watney took up post as Director of RMS in June 1986 and in November of the 
following year the Supplies Council was wound up and replaced by the RMS 
Board which was chaired by Mr. Watney. 
The mid 1980s was the time of the introduction of general management into the 
NHS and the need to become more business like. The establishment of RMS 
recognised that WMRHA operated a number of services which were not central 
to core activity, i. e. the delivery of patient care, and therefore should be put more 
at arms length to be run on commercial lines. The Director of Finance for the 
Regional Supplies Division (RSD) discussed the possible privatisation of the 
Division with the Regional Solicitor. Four months later Richard Armstrong 
produced a paper on the possible privatisation of RMS; he was a management 
consultant who had been brought in as a non-executive director on the RMS 
Board to coordinate RMS finances. The following month Mr. Armstrong wrote 
to Richard Branson (owner of the Virgin commercial empire) seeking investment 
as he stated that the RHA was actively planning to privatise the whole of RMS. 
In 1989 the RSD separately began to explore the development of an Electronic 
Trading System. The aim was to connect all NHS customers, e. g. individual 
wards\departments within the region to their potential suppliers. This approach 
was in line with national thinking in the late 1980s and was taking place at the 
same time as Wessex RHA's RISP. Later that year Chris Watney began a series 
of meetings with United Research Group (URG) who were a large US 
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management consultancy. Their discussion was about a contract to establish RSD 
as an independent and commercially viable operation so that if privatisation 
occurred then the Division would be in good shape. 
December 1989 saw the sale by WMRHA of its Management Services Division 
which was part of RMS. The deal was a management buy-out for f 750,000 and 
the new organisation was called Quality Assured Business Services (QaBS). The 
following month Mr. Watney sought commercial advice from a firm of solicitors, 
Wragges. Their subsequent paper discussed the creation of a separate legal entity 
such as a public or private company. 
URG were awarded a contract in April, 1990 and confirmed in a letter that the 
contract would cost f 1.7m plus expenses and VAT. Four weeks later there was a 
dinner on I Oth May between senior URG and WMRHA officials which included 
the WMRHA Chairman, Sir James Ackers. The purpose of the evening was to 
explain the project to the WMRHA Chairman. 
Meanwhile the Electronic Trading System had progressed to the point that the 
Chief Executive of RSD, Mike Winslow, entered into an arrangement in April 
1990 with a major computing company to undertake preparatory work on the 
system. Development started in May. 
The autumn of 1990 saw a revolt from the DHAs within the region. As customers 
of RMS they should have been made aware of the URG contract but were kept in 
the dark and only discovered the nature and cost of the contract in September. 
Following representation from DHA Chairmen, the WMRHA Chairman 
appointed Mr. Carver, Chairman of Wolverhampton DHA, in February 1991 to 
lead a Review Group on the operation of RSD. On II th March, 1991, Chris 
Watney was given an enhanced, new employment contract by WMRHA. Four 
days later the Carver Report was complete and reported serious failings in the 
management of the Supplies Service. On 25 th March 1991, Sir James Ackers 
made Christ Watney redundant on the grounds of organisational change. 
Executive responsibility for supplies was given to the WMRHA Director of 
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Finance, Martin Davies. On 25 th April, 1991, he approved a proposal from URG 
to provide ongoing assistance. The cost was an additional f44,000 plus expenses. 
In September 1991, QaBS went into Receivership. The outcome was that many 
staff lost their jobs, a month's pay and several months expenses. The following 
month QaBS was acquired after negotiation by AT&T Istel. The total cost of the 
WMRHA involvement was f928,000. On I 9th September, 1991 the WMRHA 
Board were informed of the Electronic Trading System Project but not that the 
scheme had been running for 15 months and had already cost 0.5m. The 
establishment of the national NHS Supplies Authority led to the halt of the 
project in January 1992 by which time the total cost was 0.3m. 
December 1991 saw a negotiated settlement of URG's bills but the overall cost 
was some f-2.5m and was followed in January 1992 by further expenditure for 
WMRHA which was not properly authorised, though it did not involve RMS; 
Martin Davies authorised a loan of f300,, 000 to Health Management Trust. The 
purpose was to help FIP Ltd which was owned by the Trust. FIP provided 
information services to WMRHA and was in financial difficulties. On 7 th 
September 1992, Martin Davies resigned as Director of Finance. The District 
Auditor became involved in mid 1992 and on 27th October 1992 the Comptroller 
and Auditor General commented on the various issues in his report of the use of 
NHS funds for 1991\92. This led to a formal review of WMRHA RMS by the 
Public Accounts Committee. 
5.2. Failines of West Midlands Regional Health Authority 
As with the Wessex case the same broad themes emerged and therefore the same 
headings will be used. 
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5.2.1. Control of Contractors 
The go ahead for URG was given on 4hApril. 1990 by Chris Watney and Mike 
Winslow. On 15 th May URG sent a letter to Chris Watney telling him how they 
would manage the project and what they would charge. The contractor identifies 
five key activity streams: executive vision development and organisation 
alignment, core business performance improvement, marketing and customer 
care development, information systems and best practices, and embedding and 
reinforcement. The letter went on to say that a joint project team was to be 
established and would involve four to six full time RSD staff, together with 10 
URG consultants. It would be the role of this team to develop the project plan 
which would define milestones, resource requirements and what is to be 
delivered (deliverables). Finally the letter laid down the cost structure including 
the fact that in the first 34 of the 52 week contract URG planned to bill for 
f 1.66m out of the total f 1.7m. The letter illustrates a fundamental failure to 
control URG. Firstly, WMRHA should have been the organisation to write and 
confirm the details of the contract as the employing authority. Secondly, a 
significant part of the proposed work of the project team should have been done 
before the contract was signed as clearly the deliverables and milestones need to 
be agreed before any contractor can put together a costed proposal. Thirdly, 
WMRHA should not have agreed to pay money against a payment schedule 
which was not dependent on achievement of specific objectives. Finally, there 
was no performance monitoring arrangements agreed by which the employer 
could satisfy itself that work was progressing as agreed at the start and if not, 
what corrective action would take place. 
The District Audit Service criticised the WMR-HA Director of Finance for failing 
to satisfy himself that payments to URG were reasonable or proper. Over a year 
WMRHA paid 057,000 in expenses, often without seeing the accounts. The 
Auditors found a number of areas of concern: 
9 expenses claimed by consultants included VAT, WMRHA therefore paid 
VAT on VAT. The result was an overpayment of some f 7,000; 
Chapter 5 109 
9 about f 8,000 of expenses were not reasonable and included: 
Li private charter of an aircraft (fl. 138); 
U overstated travel claims (f 5,000); 
LI drinks at a farewell party (f 195); 
LI gratuity for waiters (f 50); 
L) leasing of computers and computer operators in London and 
kept in hotels in Birmingham; 
zi leasing of houses in London for US Consultants and their 
wives in addition to hotels in Birmingham; 
* URG could not provide evidence to support claims of f-43,000 with 
regard to the employment of temporary staff, 
* there was an overcharge of f-2,1 00 in respect of professional fees. 
Despite objections and queries from the RSD Director of Finance, Chris Watney 
gave express instructions for expense invoices to be paid. Finally when the 
contract was complete Martin Davies withheld the final settlement from URG as 
a number of queries had not been resolved. URG's response was to instruct their 
solicitors to demand payment. This they did on 9th December 1991 demanding 
f 182,000. Martin Davies negotiated a 10% reduction and accepted the revised 
offer on 20th December. At no time did he seek legal advice because he thought it 
would be "fruitless" 
The sale agreement of QaBS included a turnover agreement. The purpose of this 
arrangement was to provide a safety net if the DHAs did not use the computer 
bureau service as much as the stated amount. The turnover target was set at an 
unrealistically high level and the auditors believe that WMRHA officers knew 
that payments would be due to the tune of f 1.9m. Also the high levels were set 
despite predictions in a letter of 21't June 1989 that DHA use of the computer 
bureau would decline from f3.61m in 1988\89 to f2.04m in 1991\92. The result 
was that when QaBS collapsed the guarantee payment mechanism had been 
triggered and cost WMRHA fO. 6m. When QaBS went into Receivership in 
September 1991 the WMRHA faced a number of complications. Firstly, it needed 
to maintain certain services, e. g. the computer bureau. Secondly, most DHAs had 
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pre-paid for the bureau services and totalled fO. 9m. Thirdly, QaBS still owed the 
final instalment of 0.1 5m of the original buy-out. Therefore the WMRHA 
became involved in the sale of QaBS even though it was primarily an issue for 
the Receiver and any potential buyers. The WMRHA wanted to protect the pre- 
payments and include a contract for services with the Authority. WMRHA agreed 
to a further turnover guarantee in order to sweeten the deal for any buyer. The 
result was that WMRHA underwrote the entire turnover target of f 9.5m in the 
contract with the buyer, At&T Istel. By the end of October 1992 WMRHA had 
had to pay out f 325,000 and if trends continued would have to pay out f-1.5 - 2m 
for work which had not been carried out. 
Development work on the electronic Trading System began in May 1990 based on 
the original business plan which specified an estimated cost of f-4.3m and a 
delivery date of June, 1992. Sadly this plan was flawed as it was speculative and 
unrealistic. RSD supplied the contractor with information and the contractor 
prepared the business plan. In particular no market research was undertaken nor 
were suppliers consulted even though it was envisaged that 3,000 suppliers 
would be connected to the system. Potential customers similarly were not 
consulted and the royalty projection of f 3.9m which was to offset the 
development cost of f-5.3m was not supported by any evidence to sustain such a 
high level. In June 1990, just one month after the formal agreement with the 
contractor, the Chief Executive of RSD changed the original specification when 
he asked the contractor to deliver a system with reduced functionality by April 
1991 and to carry out work on the Supplies Information System (SIS) which was 
not part of the original project. This cost in excess of fI in. 
With the departure of Chris Watney in March 1991 executive responsibility for 
supplies was placed with Martin Davies, WMRHA Director of Finance. He 
signed the contract in August 1991,15 months after work had begun. The 
business plan had not been updated despite the fact that it was known that only 
II suppliers had signed up to use the system. Also performance monitoring of the 
scheme was not possible, nor could the total cost of the system be calculated 
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because the contract was on a time and materials basis and the RSD kept 
changing its mind and failed to specify a final delivery date. 
5.2.2. Tendering Process 
Formal procedures of WMRHA laid down in Standing Orders and Standing 
Financial Instructions required specific actions to occur when the Authority was 
to let a contract: 
firstly, before any contract is entered into a written estimate of the 
probable expenditure is obtained. With URG, work commenced in April 
before the terms of the contract were known; 
(ii) secondly, competitive tendering is required. Whilst four other 
consultancies were asked to make presentations the auditors do not 
consider that there was a serious attempt to compare them competitively; 
thirdly, if competitive tendering is not used because the proposed service 
is of a special nature than a formal record of the decision should be made. 
A limited file note was made in URGs case but it was not signed; 
(iv) fourthly, any contract over f 5,000 should be set out in a formal document 
under the seal of the Authority. There was no formal document with URG 
but a letter from them setting out their conditions. If a document had been 
sealed then there would have been a better chance of the WMRHA 
knowing of the f. 2.5m contract. 
The sale of the Management Services Division (MSD) of RMS was overseen by 
a WMRHA Negotiating Group which comprised of four WMRHA Directors and 
two DHA General Managers. They were assisted by Evershed and Tomkins 
(solicitors) and Peat Marwick McLintock (financial advisors). Their initial 
process was that WMRHA issued a press release in December 1988 announcing 
the intention to allow a management buy-out of MSD. A number of private sector 
companies stepped forward and declared an interest in buying MSD. The 
Negotiating Group agreed that all interested parties should be allowed to submit 
offers for MSD and therefore relevant information and a memorandum of sale 
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were issued. However, all private sector companies declined to make an offer. 
Peat Marwick McLintock identified two main areas of concern for these 
organisations. Firstly, the predicted use of the computer bureau was outlined in 
the received information however no turnover guarantee was on offer as it was to 
QaBS. Secondly, the liability of potential redundancy for transferred staff who 
were protected by TUPE. The result was a lack of a level playing field for all 
potential bidders. Whilst the TUPE issue was a matter of employment law the 
turnover guarantee was purely a WMRHA decision which the auditors believe to 
be ultra vires. On 12 th July 1989 the WMRHA resolved to accept the offer for 
MSD subject to agreement on outstanding issues. The WMRHA established an 
Executive Sub-Committee of the Chairman and two Members to action this 
decision. No working papers or minutes of this Sub-Committee have been found. 
Work commenced on the Electronic Trading System in April 1990. The 
anticipated spend in that year was fl. 4m. There was no competitive tendering 
process for this project, nor for the additional work on SIS. No document was 
placed on record as to the reasons for single tender action nor was there a 
contract under the seal of the Authority at the start of the project. Fifteen months 
later on 16 th August 1991 the WMRHA Director of Finance signed a contract by 
which time f3.5m had been paid to the contractor. In addition the contract was 
weighted against WMRHA. Royalties were to be a key component of the funding 
of the overall project however the contract provided for royalties to be paid on 
the sale and use of version 1.0 of the system. By August 1991 this version was 
obsolete. Despite concerns being expressed by officers of RSD to their Chief 
Executive and recommendations that legal advice be sought, no evidence could 
be found that these concerns were passed on to Martin Davies. 
5.2.3. Conflict of Interest 
The PAC Report comments on and notes a number of interesting relationships 
but stops short of stating that conflicts of interest exist. They have been placed 
under this heading as in its broadest definition no public servant should place 
themselves in a position where it may be perceived that a conflict of interest may 
exist. 
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The consultancy firm PM Vignoles Associates had a major involvement in the 
affairs of RSM: 
* Philip Vignoles introduced Chris Watney to URG who had agreed to pay 
Mr. Vignoles an introductory fee if the meeting led to any business. As a 
consultancy contract resulted Mr. Vignoles was paid f78,3 80 by URG; 
9 Philip Vignoles provided the off pay-roll appointments of two members 
of staff for RSM, Peter Gibbs and Julia Berridge; 
e through MMM Consultancy, Mr. Vignoles provided the pay-roll 
appointment of the RSD Chief Executive, Mike Winslow and another 
member of staff, Mike Hurt; 
* Philip Vignoles assisted with the MSD buy-out which became QaBS 
* Mr. Vignoles regularly visited all parts of RSM to discuss business 
opportunities. Staff felt obliged to see him as Chris Watney was 
encouraging them to see Vignoles. 
It is clear that Chris Watney and Philip Vignoles had a business relationship 
outside the NHS. Of note: 
e Chris Watney was a director of the firm Laureat Search. Philip and Lucy 
Vignoles were also directors; 
* when Chris Watney left WMRHA there was a cocktail party at 
Birmingham Botanical Gardens. Laureat Search organised the event and 
paid the f 500 bill; 
e Chris Watney carried out consultancy work for the firm Whisstocks 
whilst employed by WMRHA. The Chairman of Whisstocks was Philip 
Vignoles who stated that the work was in respect of advice given on 
organisation, marketing and purchasing. He had been assured by Chris 
Watney that the WMRHA Chairman had given specific approval for him 
to undertake outside work; Sir James Ackers denies such approval was 
given. Mr. Watney was paid f200 a day for 20 days; 
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9 Chris Watney spent one day per week in London and claimed to be 
conducting research on behalf of WMRHA; 
* in February 1991 Mr. Watney travelled to Germany and France. It ýwas 
believed that he was visiting firms with whom the RHA did business. It 
was established that this was not the case but Chris Watney clalmed he 
was visiting new firms which could not be disclosed because of 
confidentiality. 
5.2.4. Poor Management Control 
The establishment of RMS was a recognition by WMRHA that there was a need 
to understand its core and non-core activities. The mood of the Thatcher 
Government was that the public sector should be more business like particularly 
in non-core areas. The appointment of Chris Watney was designed to pursue that 
agenda. However it was clear from an early stage that Chris Watney was actively 
exploring the privatisation of RMS even though there was no clear WMRHA 
policy to do so. The reality was that WMRHA wished to have stronger and more 
commercial management but with its own WMRHA Members Panel. 
On I" April 1987 the Regional Supplies Organisation moved from joint 
WMRHA\DHAs funding to a purely WMRHA managed service as money was 
withdrawn from the DHAs to establish the service. There was recurring funding 
of f. 6. IM but for the first three years of its existence there were growing deficits 
of f, 0.629M (1987\88), f. 1.219M (1988\89) and f2.078M (1989\90). These 
deficits had been supported by non-recurring funding in each year, contrary to 
WMRHA policy. During this time f 1.1 M savings from reductions in stock- 
holdings had been realised but not passed on to the customer DHAs which should 
have occurred under the RMS\DHA agreements. Also Chris Watney made f-2.5M 
of funding available to RSD from other regional services. Whilst this allowed an 
overall balancing of RMS budget it implied that DHAs were being overcharged 
for other regional services, and occurred at a time of steeply rising charges in 
MSD. In addition Mr Watney levied f 75,000 from DHAs to support his own 
organisation, this was in clear breach of the agreed principles of funding Mr 
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Watney's core organisation. These issues did not come to light until the Carver 
Report was submitted in early 1991, by which time the WMRHA Director of 
Finance had had to agree to loans totalling f3.7M to cover deficits in RSD for 
1990\91 and 1991\92. 
In November 1987 Mr Watney recommended that the Regional Supplies Council 
be abolished. In its place there should be a Regional Supplies Board which would 
be a mechanism similar to other parts of RMS. This proposal was agreed and 
Chris Watney became its Chairman. Its purpose was to establish supplies policy 
and to oversee the management of RSD. The Members Panel was left to keep an 
overview of the operation of WMRHA services. However the lack of any terms 
of reference meant that it could not function as the supervisory body between the 
WMREA Board and the Director of RMS. This led to confusion whereby the 
WMRHA Board expected the Panel to control Chris Watney but the Panel 
thought it was a sounding board. Mr Watney did not report to the WMREA 
Board but to the Regional General Manager, Ken Bales. The results were that 
Chris Watney ignored the Panel, the Panel was ineffective and the WMRHA 
Board was ignorant of what was happening in RSD. 
In the pursuit of making RSD more commercially viable Chris Watney sought 
outside appointments for the chief executive and other senior staff in RSD. 
Between February 1989 and October 1990 the Director of RMS appointed three 
consultants on contract to fill NHS posts. Their salaries were f60, OOO per year 
each, plus expenses against an equivalent salary for regional NHS staff of f40- 
45,000. It was agreed that high calibre staff were not available within the NHS. 
Whilst the use of consultants with scarce skills is not uncommon within the 
public sector, break or review points are normal to protect the employer. In this 
case the consultants had 12 month notice clauses in their contracts. It is clear that 
not all members of the RSD Board were aware that expensive consultants were 
occupying permanent NHS posts. Early in 1992 with the creation of the National 
Supplies Authority WMRHA terminated the contracts. By that time f, 410,000 
had been paid out in fees and expenses to which a further f 100,000 was added 
after a negotiated termination settlement. 
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The fiasco of the URG contract demonstrates poor management control. There 
was no clear WMRHA policy being followed by Chris Watney who appeared to 
do whatever he wished. On 31 st January 1990 URG made a presentation setting 
out the scope of the project and possible cost to some members of the Supplies 
Board. Present were mainly executive directors with the exception of Malcolm 
Cooper, non-executive director and Frank Betteridge who was Chairman of the 
Members Panel. On 4th April a final presentation was made to a slightly different 
group with Mr Cooper being joined by fellow non-executive director Colin 
Jackson, and Dr Lloyd, Panel Member, joining Mr Betteridge. One hour after the 
meeting Chris Watney and Mike Winslow gave URG the go ahead despite the 
fact that the WMRHA Board knew nothing of the proposed f2.5M contract. On 
I oth May at a Dinner with URG Chris Watney and Frank Betteridge were joined 
by Sir James Ackers and Martin Davies. URG advised the auditors that the 
meeting was to meet the WMRHA Chairman, to outline the cost and seek 
assurances that Chris Watney had authority to proceed. Sir James Ackers recalled 
afterwards that he had not been advised that a firm agreement had been made. 
Martin Davies thought that only work on a scoping study had been done despite 
the fact that URG's invitation to dinner identified that a project had started with 
RSD. When the Director of Finance did become aware of the contract he voiced 
some concerns about some aspects but never reported his doubts to the WMRHA 
Board. The resultant contract was woolly and imprecise with no performance 
targets which left the WMRHA exposed and liable to large payments without 
recourse. 
The employment of Chris Watney has an interesting history of its own. He was 
appointed on 2 nd June 1986 with a salary of f, 27,421 and notice period of 12 
weeks. After several national pay awards he reached a salary of 02,250 in 
February 1988 when he was offered a rolling 3 year term with a review every 12 
months. The contract was performance related and pensionable but with no 
entitlement to pension enhancement. No external financial interests would be 
allowed and unsatisfactory performance would be grounds for action under the 
WMRHA disciplinary procedures. Mr Watney received national pay awards and 
performance related pay in both 1988 and 1989. However during the summer of 
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1989 he sought to increase his remuneration package to approximately f 50,000 
back dated to June 1989 and discussed the matter with Sir James Ackers and 
Frank Betteridge. In March 1990 Sir James offered a package of f4l, 069 to 
reflect Mr Watney's responsibilities. This did not meet Chris Watney's 
expectations and he arranged to see the WMRHA Chairman. Following advice 
from the Director of Personnel and a meeting with Mr Watney, Sir James 
informed Chris Watney on 6 th June 1990 of three steps to bring his salary to 
f51,266 in September 1990. The first step was a new base salary on creation of 
the new RHA in July. Second a performance related pay increase on Ist 
September and third an increase of 8% for general managers' pay. The package 
was not backdated and Sir James asked for agreement or that Mr Watney should 
seek alternative employment; Mr Watney accepted. It is clear that these 
arrangements are inconsistent with the national scheme of employment which 
governed Chris Watney's terms and conditions of his contract, and therefore 
should not have been agreed. 
In January 1991 Chris Watney enquired about pension arrangements and was told 
by the Director of Personnel, Mr Nock, that under the conditions of his fixed 
term contract, he was not entitled to enhancement of pension in the event of 
redundancy because it was balanced against the two years notice of his contract. 
On 12 th February Mr Nock told Sir James Ackers that Chris Watney was looking 
for a redundancy\early retirement package, and raised the issue of no pension 
enhancement under the fixed term contract. Mr Nock also raised the question of 
lowering Chris Watney's performance rating, which was then the highest at Band 
1. The outcome was that Mr Nock wished to explore with Sir James two points. 
Firstly the possibility of moving Chris Watney to a new contract which would 
allow pension enhancement and secondly reducing the performance rating to 
Band 2 or even Band 3. On II th March 1991 Chris Watney signed a new contract 
which was permanent not fixed ten-n. It had a notice period of six months and 
allowed pension enhancement if the individual was made redundant. This 
management action is incredible when it is remembered that the Carver Review 
into the RSD was underway at this time and in fact reported to Sir James Ackers 
only four days later on 15 th March 1991. In addition for the Director of Personnel 
Chapter 5 118 
to suggest downgrading a performance rating by two levels is an indication that 
all was not well. Also the Comptroller and Auditor General has discovered that 
there was no need to engineer a device to enhance Mr Watney's pension. 
Technically if Mr Watney was made redundant he had a statutory right to a 
pension irrespective of his contract. Therefore WMRHA did not in effect 
improve Chris Watney's position. 
On 25 th March 1991 the WMRHA Chairman saw Chris Watney and informed 
him that he was being made redundant on the grounds of organisational change. 
Based on figures supplied by the Industrial Relations Manager, Mr Aldworth, and 
the Payroll Manager, Miss Fox, Mr Watney accepted a severance package of- 
"f 195962 - redundancy sum; 
" f8,170 per annum -immediate pension; 
" f24ý5 10 - lump sum settlement. 
Three days later Mr Aldworth and Miss Fox informed the Director of Personnel 
that significant errors had been made in the calculation. The proper sums were: 
0f7!, 408; 
of6!, 45 8 per annum; 
0 19,374. 
The WMRHA Directors of Finance and Personnel decided to honour the original 
offer and though the Regional General Manager was made aware of their 
decision he chose not to overrule it. Mr Watney was advised orally of the revised 
package on 26 th April 1991 and in writing on 2 nd May 1991. The package had 
been adjusted because of the mistake but the overall effect reflected the original 
agreement. The final offer was: 
0f6,462 per annum 
of 19,387 
immediate pension; 
lump sum; 
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9 f20,142 - redundancy payment; 
*f 12,876 - payment in lieu of notice; 
* f285982 - special payment to compensate for 
the pension calculations. 
This final payment is ultra vires as there is no provision within NHS regulations 
to make such a payment. Also the redundancy payment was incorrect. The 
outcome was an overpayment of f4l, 500. Both the Industrial Relations Manager 
and the Payroll Manager were severely reprimanded, and Mr Nock received a 
formal warning. No action was taken against any other person even though the 
WMRHA Chairman was not made aware of the mistake or the decision not to 
correct it, until much later. In the light of the concerns about the RSD following 
the Carver Report, it is amazing that disciplinary action was not taken against 
Chris Watney, instead he pocketed some f 80,000 and a pension. 
This review of the WMRHA RMS has illustrated a number of questionable 
decisions made by Martin Davies, Director of Finance. In particular the 
authorisation of loans and the signature of contracts for multi-million sums 
without the knowledge of the WMRHA Board. On 7 th September 1992 Mr 
Davies resigned with an agreed package from the WMRHA. He received six 
months Pay in lieu of notice and two months untaken leave as due to the 
exceptional workload Mr Davies had throughout his appointment, he had had to 
bring forward 29 days from four previous years. The RHA was willing to make 
full recognition of this untaken leave. In addition Mr Davies had been awarded 
f6,222 payable in equal monthly instalments though his settlement included the 
full 12 months. In total he was paid f42,924. Also as part of the deal Martin 
Davies was allowed to use his lease car for a maximum period of eight months 
from I" September 1992, which cost the RHA some 0,000. There were two 
important non-financial aspects of the termination agreement. Firstly, it contained 
a "silence" clause, which limited any public announcement by either party. 
Effectively a short joint Davies\WMRHA statement was issued which stated that 
Mr Davies was leaving to pursue his professional interests after a significant 
contribution from him to the RHA. The aim of this clause was to curtail any 
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excessive comment on his departure. Secondly, the WMRHA agreed to help Mr 
Davies seek alternative employment, without guarantee, and to commend his 
candidacy for other NHS posts in the region. When the WMRHA was challenged 
by the NHS Executive over this package, it was argued that it was in everyone's 
best interest to secure Martin Davies' departure swiftly and on a voluntary basis, 
and thus avoid costly, contested disciplinary action. This is an incredible position 
to adopt when by September 1992 the URG, Electronic Trading System and 
QaBS chickens were all coming home to roost, and in all cases the Director of 
Finance had a major role. 
Separate from the activities of the RMS in January 1992 the Director of Finance 
made a loan of 000,000 to the Health Management Trust (HMT) which was a 
registered charity. It owned the right to licence ex-crown copyright products. The 
loan was to assist a HMT company FIP Ltd which was in financial difficulties. 
This loan was made without the authority of the WMRHA Board and was beyond 
the powers of the Director of Finance. 
The sale of MSD had a number of issues which fall into the category of poor 
management control. Firstly, the financial basis of the organisation was not 
known. In 1986\87 the trading result is shown as break even in the business plan 
but the Director of Finance shows a surplus of f 1.132m with several other 
interpretations found in various documents. The same is true for 1987\88 and 
1988\89. How can an organisation be sold unless you know its financial state? 
Similarly the figures were not complete as they did not include all the indirect 
costs that a commercial business occurs such as superannuation contributions and 
financing of working capital. These costs have been estimated at f-1.41m. When 
added to the best interpretation of the trading results, MSD made a loss of over 
0.25m in 1986\87 and over fO. 85m in 1987\88. If pessimistic figures were used 
the losses over the three years were fl-41m, fl. 5m and fO. 76m. These figures 
together with the proposed turnover guarantee should have rang alarm bells that 
WMRHA was liable to large financial risk. In addition the Negotiating Team 
failed to undertake a critical analysis of the business plan. If they had done so the 
QaBS marketing strategy would have been exposed. It intended to generate 40% 
Chapter 5 121 
of its income from non-NHS sources within five years. The rationale behind the 
strategy was very simplistic as it was based on the notion that the external market 
was huge and QaBS only needed a small proportion to be successful. Yet their 
pricing strategy was bizarre as they intended to charge existing customers an 
extra 10% in real terms and in future consultants would be charged out at f 1,700 
per week rather than the existing f650. All of this information was available but 
senior management failed to carry out a thorough analysis before jumping to a 
decision. 
The Electronic Trading System failings have been mainly covered elsewhere but 
the overall poor management control can be summarised as: 
no WMRHA Board approval; 
improper letting of contracts; 
non-viable business plan; 
inadequate management control of the project. 
5.3.5. Agency Theo 
Examination of the WMRHA case using agency theory shows that a principal- 
agent relationship existed on two levels. The WMRHA was the agent and the 
DoH was the principal acting on behalf of the communities of the West 
Midlands. On the next level down the WMRHA board was the principal and its 
staff, including its non-board senior managers, were the agents. A clear failure to 
align the goals of principal and agent has been demonstrated at both levels, and 
the issue of moral hazard is seen at the second level as a number of key players 
appear to have no interest but their own. The literature in chapter 4 pointed out 
that poor board control leads to difficulties which was the case with WMRHA. 
When the stakeholder perspective is taken it can be seen that there were 
significant stakeholders with an interest. In particular the various NHS 
organisations who were dependent on the delivery of services from RMS for 
which they paid inflated prices, and the staff who were transferred into the 
private sector. Applying Mitchell's (1997) classification, as explained in chapter 
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4, is helpful as these stakeholders are discretionary because they have the 
attribute of legitimacy. As problems developed they became dependent 
stakeholders through the acquisition of urgency. They had to exercise the power 
attribute through others but in the end they exerted a significant influence.. 
5.3-6. Summary of Failings 
The District Auditors summarised the failings of the WMRHA as follows: 
0 Top Management 
There was no clear strategy document and therefore it was difficult to monitor 
directors' activities against WMRHA objectives. Leaving the Director of RMS to 
his own devices was a major failing of responsibility. Throughout the PAC 
Report many individuals at the WMRHA are mentioned on numerous occasions 
however the Regional General Manager, Ken Bales, appears to be absent from 
any involvement in the whole RMS affair. As the senior executive he was 
responsible for the overall operation of the RHA but allowed the Board to be kept 
in the dark, did not control the actions of directors, and failed to see that Standing 
Orders and Standing Financial Instructions were followed. Whilst the Director of 
Finance was engaged in the various projects he failed to exercise the 
responsibilities expected of the senior finance professional of a public body. He 
and the other directors were all guilty of failing to report irregularities to the 
WMRHA Board. 
0 Management Controls 
Many did not work such as the Members Panel and there was no delegated 
scheme of authority for officers to understand their boundaries. Projects were 
dependent on business plans which were poorly appraised. Standing Orders were 
largely ignored and NHS rules were contravened. 
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Financial Control 
This was below the standards expected of a public body. The RHA made internal 
loans of some f 7m to RSD, which has now been taken over by the NHS Supplies 
Authority, and is unlikely to be recovered. WMRHA awarded major projects of 
more than f 8m without competitive tendering. with more than f4m spent before 
formal contract arrangements were in place 
9 Communication 
The external world lacked confidence in WMRHA to manage its affairs. 
Information was not shared with DHAs and led to the Carver Review at which 
time the costs of URG emerged. Internal communication was equally inadequate 
with concerns not being listened to and many individuals were in the dark as to 
the exact position with projects on which they should have been informed 
5.4. Summary of the Case Study 
The Wessex study in chapter 2 had at its heart the well meant intention of 
delivering innovation to the NHS. The West Midlands study, whilst another 
example of corporate governance failure from the NHS, has at its roots 
malfeasance and personal gain. Despite the very different underlying causes in 
the two substantial corporate governance failures the outcomes are similar with 
the elements of accountability, directors and management control, audit 
committees, and conflict of interest prominent as causal factors. For sometime 
the command and control system of the NHS failed to function and WMRHA as 
a principal did not control some of its agents. Agency theory have been found to 
be useful in understanding what took place with key theoretical components 
demonstrated in the WMRHA case study. 
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Chapter 6. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FAILURE IN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT: WESTMINSTER CITY COUNCIL 
To obtain an alternative perspective on corporate governance failure, the third 
case study remains within the UK Public Sector but uses the high profile local 
government scandal of Westminster City Council. The steward and principal 
perspective in this study is different than the NHS. Local Government is closest 
to the historical origins of stewardship with councillors elected as stewards by the 
local community which is the principal. Both the purpose of this chapter and the 
mechanism for its delivery, remain the same as for the two preceeding NHS 
studies. The source of information for this case is not a select committee report 
but a large multi-volume public audit report published by the District Auditor 
who for Westminster City Council was Deloitte and Touche, one of the UK's 
major audit companies. 
6.1. The Story of Westminster City Council 
In the summer of 1984 a discussion paper was considered by the Majority Party 
(Conservative) group on the Housing Committee. The subject was the possibility 
of increasing sales to council tenants. The group decided not to pursue extension 
of the Designated Sales scheme which was a policy where a Council owned 
dwelling in designated blocks was not offered for reletting when it became vacant 
but was offered for sale to an approved applicant. The intention was that all 
dwellings in designated blocks would become owner occupied 
The Local Government elections held on 8 th May 1986 dramatically changed the 
political composition of the Council. Conservative seats fell from 43 to 32, 
Labour gained from 16 to 27 and I Independent remained; the overall majority 
reduced to four. Following these elections all Councillors were issued with a 
Members Manual dated 1986. It made clear that Council services and facilities 
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were available to support members in their official Council duties and not 
political activities. 
Over the next couple of months the leadership of the Majority Party began to 
examine the social mix of certain electoral wards and how it might be possible to 
skew housing policy which would favour the Tory Party. For example at a 
working lunch on 3 oth June 1986 one of the topics was "Economic justification 
for Gerrymander on housing" (vol 4 para. 23). On 4 th July 1986 the Leader of the 
Council received briefing notes on Council House and Flat Sales, Purchase of 
Flats in the Private Sector and the Private Rented Sector. On I oth July 1986 a 
paper "Policy Coordination and Implementation" was presented to the 
Chairman's Group and recorded the process for controlling policy. The Deputy 
Leader was to clear all reports going to committees and sub-committees at draft 
stage. He was to decide which items were to be referred to the Chairman's Group 
who, in turn, would decide which items went to the Policy and Resources 
Committee. 
The Director of Planning and Transportation invited four consultants on II th July 
1986 to bid to undertake a study of housing and economy in Westminster. 
Councillor Kirwan, Chairman of the Housing Committee wrote to the Leader on 
18 th July 1986 expressing major concern at the crisis of housing homeless 
families. Referrals and temporary accommodation costs had risen dramatically 
over the recent five years. More accommodation was vetoed by the Leader as was 
buying out tenants as they were more likely to be Tory supporters. Kirwan 
recorded that members must meet with officers so that they could receive advice 
on what legally was possible. 
On 7 th August 1986 Councillor Lady Porter wrote to the Secretary of State for the 
Environment and asked for a change in homelessness legislation. She cited the 
fact that 67% of available family lettings in Westminster Borough had gone to 
homeless families and therefore the Council's ability to help many other more 
deserving families was now affected. Around the same time the four consultants 
submitted their proposals for the housing study. The following month PA 
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Cambridge Economic Consultants (PA CEC) were recommended for 
appointment after a report to the Planning and Development Committee. 
On 6 th September 1986 the Majority Party held a Saturday seminar at which the 
Housing Committee Chairman presented a paper. The recorded objective was 
(Vol 4 para. 59): 
to ensure that as far as possible, Westminster's housing policies 
achieve the type of social and economic residential mix that will 
enable us to retain control of the Council in 1990 and help us to 
retain the Conservative majority in the parliamentary seat of North 
Westminster. 
The paper went on to indicate that there should be a change of emphasis with 
more concentration in the marginal wards. 
On 24 th September 1986 the Housing Committee was informed of the ongoing 
rise in the number of referrals made to the Homeless Persons Unit. The 
Committee resolved to request an additional allocation of f 1.52m but also asked 
the Director of Housing to conduct a review of the home ownership policy with a 
view to expand the existing programme. PA CEC were appointed by the Council 
to undertake the economic and housing study on 24 th September 1986. 
A senior management conference for the top 70 Council officers was held on 25 th 
November 1986. Councillor Kirwan announced that the Council was to adopt a 
policy of selling Council properties in marginal wards in order to boost the 
Conservative vote. In the last quarter of 1986 and the early part of 1987 the 
leading members of the Majority Party debated proposals drawn up by Councillor 
Segal with the aim to implement new approaches to housing to boost the Tory 
vote. At a Housing Committee meeting on 11 th February 1987 a report drew 
attention to the rising demand from the homeless such that 512 homeless 
households were in temporary accommodation of which 312 were in hotels. 
Because of the backlog of cases the Director of Housing was given authority to 
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offer local housing against an agreed set of criteria. 
The preliminary finds of PA CEC were given at a weekend conference on 
14 th\ 15 th February 1987 at which the leading Tory Councillors and the Managing 
Director of the Council were present. On the following day the Policy and 
Resources Committee approved a "Quality of Life" initiative and allocated bids 
of f. 1.7 5m revenue and f3m capital for 19 8 7\8 8. The aim was to launch a package 
of initiatives designed to improve the quality of life in the Borough. The same 
month new Housing Policy papers were written and identified opportunities in 
eight key wards, with a stated target of "more electors" to be included on the 
February 1990 electoral register. 
On 18 th March 1987 the Director of Housing wrote a briefing note for the Council 
Leader. It clearly identified that the Council had net 1066 property vacancies to 
be filled each year. If the proposed sale of all vacancies in the key marginal wards 
took place, then only 567 would be left. This figure would be insufficient to 
cover the Council's obligations such as the Homeless Persons Act. He argued 
that a policy change would be required to mitigate the problem, e. g. reduction in 
assistance to non-statutory groups. Legal advice was sought which was explicit in 
the need to justify in full any policy change to be defendable under legal 
challenge. 
At a Majority Party seminar on 21" March 1987 Councillor Kirwan tried to 
change the proposed new approach to housing policy in light of statutory duties 
and the lack of justification as the PA CEC study did not provide such support; 
she was ignored. A series of questions were sent by the Leader's Office to the 
Director of Housing and the City Solicitor who in his evidence to the District 
Auditor stated that the questions caused him to "smell a rat" and to send a 
"forthright" reply (vol 4 para. 90). He was asked about the conflict with statutory 
obligations, the legality of the proposed policy, the possibility of surcharging and 
whether any issue was ultra vires. 
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At the Housing Committee on I" April 1987 a possible barter deal between the 
Council and a developer was discussed for the Walterton\Elgin ward. This area 
was not one of the key 8 wards and the Leader expressed concern at the proposed 
loss of 256 properties and the adverse impact on the Council. However as the 
scheme would not impinge on the gentrification project the barter deal was 
agreed. The same meeting called for a report from the Director of Housing to put 
forward proposals to increase designated sales from 10 to 250. Despite the 
reservations of the Housing Department a paper was prepared for the Chain-nan's 
Group in May and Counsel's advice sought on the legality of the proposed 
scheme of capital grants. One of the outcomes was that a revised higher figure 
than 250 was agreed to ensure that 250 sales per year in the key marginal wards 
were achieved without appearing to target these areas specifically. 
On 13 th May Councillor Lady Porter was re-elected as leader of the Majority 
Party despite the election being contested by Councillor Kirwan. At this time a 
group of senior officers met to consider the issue of homelessness in the 
Borough. They concluded that some 600-700 permanent homes were required for 
the homeless for the Council to meet its statutory duty. On II th June 1987 the 
Leader of the Council appointed new Chairman, Councillor Hartley, and Vice 
Chairman, Councillor Dutt, to the Housing Committee. 
Further Counsel's advice was taken in June on draft reports on designated sales 
and housing priorities which were due for presentation to the Housing Committee 
in July. These reports indicated that there would be no adverse impact on 
statutory obligations because of the proposed extension of the designated sales 
programme. Also the financial implications of the sales would be broadly neutral, 
the reports did not contain an option to increase sales by 500 per year, nor was 
there any proposal to make capital grants of f. 15,000 to tenants to encourage them 
to buy non-Council property. 
Lady Porter held a Strategy Weekend on 13 1h\ 14 th June with members but with 
some senior officers present. In a paper "Building Stable Communities" it was 
emphasised that certain marginal wards required special attention and in her 
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"Setting the Scene" paper the Leader pointed out that the electoral register for the 
1990 election would be compiled in 2 years time. Several days later the draft 
report for the Housing Committee on home ownership was amended to include 
an option to increase designated sales to 500 per year which when examined by 
the City Treasurer indicated significant financial cost to the Council. 
On 2 nd July the local Housing Department wrote to the Department of the 
Environment with regard to homelessness. The Council requested permission to 
be allowed to start a major property acquisition programme outside the Borough 
for homeless people as the Council was to pursue a home ownership agenda 
within its boundaries. The Housing Committee on 8 th July 1987 considered the 
reports and the Majority Party produced a list of properties proposed as 
candidates for designation for sale to achieve a level of 500 sales per year. After 
the debate the Committee divided along party lines with the Majority Party 
winning the vote 7 to 5. In addition to agreeing the expansion of the designated 
sales, the Director of Housing was authorised to select purchasers against a list of 
criteria, and a capital grant scheme of f 15,000 to encourage tenants to purchase 
non-Council property was agreed. A separate agenda item authorised the Director 
of Housing to use a specific list of priorities for the allocation of properties. The 
following week the Director of Social Services responded to a draft report on 
placement of homeless people in accommodation outside the Borough. His view 
was explicit that temporary accommodation had a significant adverse effect on 
families with subsequent impact on various Council services. 
At the end of July the Department of the Environment wrote to the Council and 
gave a cautionary comment on the legality of the capital grant scheme. Around 
this time the Chair of the Westminster Council Tenants and Residents Committee 
wrote to all Councillors to place on record their opposition to the sales 
programme which was being rushed through without proper consideration and 
with total disregard to statutory obligations. At a full Council meeting on 29th 
July the Minority Party attempted to overturn the Housing Committee decision 
but it was defeated in a vote. However Appointed Members Panels of the 
Housing Committee and, of the Policy and Resources Committee were asked to 
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examine the financial implications of the new housing policy; they met on 2 nd 
September 1987. At this meeting officers reported that discussions with 
Department of the Environment were not encouraging on the issue of restrictions 
on resale prices. This would have allowed the Council to impose restrictions in 
resale prices of property originally sold under the designated sales programme 
thereby keeping prices at an affordable level for individuals who otherwise would 
not be able to buy in the Borough. The fear was that companies would buy up 
properties as transient accommodation or the properties might go as holiday 
homes, but officers confirmed that ministerial consent was not required for the 
Council to impose clauses in sale contracts for resident owner occupiers. 
The papers of the meeting show that the anticipated cost of the new housing 
policy would be f 1.2m (1987\88), f4.4m (1989\90) and an increase of f 1.6m for 
each succeeding year. In addition officers recommended the purchase (up to 
f-2.5m) or rent (f-160,000 per year) of a building to become a Home Ownership 
Centre for the Council. At the same meeting the joint meeting received a report 
on temporary accommodation for the homeless. It highlighted the fact that more 
than 1500 homeless households were temporarily housed in the Borough by other 
Councils. Therefore it was argued that there was now a need to house some of 
Westminster's homeless outside the Borough. The report went on to point out 
that under the law permanent housing of the homeless must be deemed to be 
"suitable", this did not apply to temporary accommodation. Members were asked 
to approve recommendations in the report as a further report on permanent 
housing for the homeless would be forthcoming in the future. The Panels 
reconvened on 4 th September 1987 when officers' recommendations were 
approved by a majority of two to one in both cases. On 21" September the 
Council received a response from the Department of the Environment which 
indicated that a large scale programme of home acquisition outside the Borough 
for the homeless would not be supported; each case would have to be considered 
on its own merits. 
29th September saw the production of the first monitoring report of Building 
Stable Communities (BSC). Clearly, identified are the 8 marginal wards with 
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their monthly sales target, actual sales and cumulative sales. Further reports 
followed such as 3 rd November. Later that month PA Cambridge Economic 
Consultants were appointed to advise and monitor the Council's initiative on 
BSC, and on 26 th November 1987 a memo was written to a senior officer in the 
Housing Department and highlighted the urgent need for four-bedroom 
accommodation as II families were waiting at a cost of some f 5,500 per week in 
bed and breakfast. At the same time the Borough had a number of voids in 
suitable accommodation but they had been designated for sale. 
In December a report entitled Zoned Improvement Patrols (ZIP) Teams was 
produced by Councillor Davis. It proposed enforcement action teams to target 
specific problems in the implementation of BSC. The proposal was agreed. The 
following month, at an informal meeting of chairmen, it was agreed that 
production of the Council's Ratepayer Reporter should include supplements on 
two further marginal wards following the recent supplements on two other 
marginal wards. 
The beginning of February saw receipt by the Housing Department of a letter 
from the Department of Environment who advised that restrictions on the resale 
of properties intended to keep the price at a reasonable level could not be 
supported. 
A paper called "Keeping Westminster Conservative" was prepared in March for 
the Leader of the Council. The eight marginal areas were referred to as "key 
battle-zone wards". On 17 th March 1998 the Council's Managing Director 
received a letter from the Leader of the Opposition. Councillor Dimoldberg 
accused officers of allocating resources to key wards when there was no apparent 
justification for their selection other than for a party political purpose of the 
Majority Party, a full explanation was sought. The response by Bill Phillips 
refuted the allegations completely, however the Leader of the Opposition rejected 
his answer and demanded facts not assurances. 
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April saw several meetings of different individuals to firm up the monitoring 
arrangements for Building Stable Communities and included detailed proposals 
with regard to the designated sales in the key marginal wards. The District 
Auditor (vol 4 para. 585) notes that the targets for new residents in the eight 
wards were the same as the targets for more electors as considered at a political 
meeting of the Majority Party the previous month. Around the same time an 
Action Plan was established for the BSC project but the City Solicitor questioned 
on several occasions fundamental issues such as the existence of a strategy 
document and if so had it been approved by the Council. On 24th May 1998 the 
Policy and Resources Committee met and on the agenda was an officers' report 
and recommendation to approve a Corporate Policy Statement for Building 
Stable Communities which should then be taken into account by all Service 
Committees when directing their activities. The report made no mention of the 
targeting of eight key wards, the role or existence of a BSC Officers' Steering 
Group or of the BSC Members' Steering Group. A week later at a meeting 
between the Deputy Leader and officers on 31't May 1998 progress of the 
designated sales in five of the eight wards was reviewed. It was found that Little 
Venice and Victoria would achieve a projected surplus by 1990. The result was 
that priority was given to Cavendish, St. James's and West End as they had 
projected shortfalls. Correspondence had continued between the Council's 
Managing Director and the Leader of the Opposition over a period of some 
months. The former indicated that nothing improper had occurred whilst the 
latter continued to press for information on the designation of eight key wards. 
In the middle of June a draft report was prepared for the Chairmen's Group by 
the BSC Officers' Steering Group. It stated that in addition to Victoria and Little 
Venice, Hamilton Terrace, Bayswater and Millbank were no longer a problem but 
there were still difficulties in the other three wards. On 21't June the Leader of 
the Opposition wrote again to the Managing Director and accused Council 
officers of serving the political purposes of the Majority Party. The same letter 
was sent to all chief officers. On Is' July Councillor Bradley (Minority Party) 
wrote to Bill Phillips to express his concern that the Millbank Ward insert to 
Ratepayer Reporter did not fulfill the objective of public service information but 
Chapter 6 133 
had a political basis. He also observed that the four inserts prepared so far were 
Cavendish, St. James's, Hamilton Terrace and Millbank, four of the key wards. 
The City Solicitor reminded the Managing Director that a selective approach to 
the dissemination of information must have a rationale and not have a party 
political consideration. At the end of July the Director of Housing met with the 
Housing Committee Chairman and produced an action list which included "find 
defence of eight wards". Further political activity took place over the next month 
with the result that on 5 th September the Director of Housing was asked by the 
City Solicitor to explain why the eight wards were chosen, by whom and why 
were they regarded as "key". At a meeting of the BSC Members Committee on 
8th September there was a report entitled "Key BSC statistics for the Four Stress 
Wards" which referred to West End, Victoria, St. James' and Cavendish. 
The Borough's Managing Director received a memo on 12 th October from one of 
the Divisional Directors of Housing. It pointed out the ongoing issue of a lack of 
temporary accommodation for the homeless. At that time the Council was 
housing 350 families in hotels both within and outside Westminster. The memo 
went on to highlight the deteriorating situation as the Council reduced its stock of 
permanent accommodation through sales. Later that month the Director of 
Housing and the City Treasurer proposed to the Housing Committee an 
expansion of the sales and administrative capacity of the Council to promote the 
right to buy and flexible ownership. The report went to the Policy and Resources 
Committee on 17 th October and extra spending was agreed; it amounted to 
f278,000 in 1988\89 and f882,000 in 1989\90. On 24 th October the Director of 
Housing was reminded that he had not responded to the issues raised by the 
Leader of the Opposition. He replied that he had nothing further to add. 
Monitoring of BSC continued and from notes of an informal meeting of 
Chairmen held on 20th December the Leader of the Council asked for 
congratulations to be given to those staff who were responsible for exceeding the 
right to buy target. It was noted that there was now scope to increase the target 
further to 1000, but designated sales was less satisfactory and voids needed to be 
filled. The start of 1989 saw Councillor Legg, Chairman of Finance Management 
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and Personnel Sub-Committee receive a note from the Assistant City Treasurer. It 
reported difficulties with the Housing Committee finances due to the designated 
sales policy. Rent losses were f 646,000 in that year and f 558,000 for 1989\90. In 
addition f20, OOO per year would be lost for heating charges. Also the cost of 
securing properties for designated sales had increased from an estimate of 
f425,000 to f 1,025,000 and would increase further to f 1,046,000 for 1989\90. 
On 24 th January the Chairman's Group considered the issue of homelessness. It 
was noted that whilst costs had been reduced by f2.3m over 2 years, they had 
been more than offset by other factors such as increased priority to medical cases. 
The Group agreed to de-designate family flats of 4 bedrooms or more and 
develop options to increase the provision of temporary accommodation. The 
latter decision was followed up on 14 th February 1989 when an informal meeting 
of Chairmen approved direct leasing of properties and asked for more 
information on vacant sites inside and outside the Borough for poitakabin 
schemes. The day before, 13 th February, had seen the approval by the Policy and 
Resources Committee of a Code of Practice for Management by Officers and 
Members. 
By May the informal meeting of Chairmen had considered a business plan for 
homelessness. It included the possibility of moving homeless families into short 
life property owned by the Peabody Housing Association in Victoria and 
Millbank wards. This offer was some three months old and the Opposition were 
challenging the reasons for not taking up a competitive proposal which would 
save 0,000 per homeless family. The Housing Chairman agreed to prepare an 
operational plan for use of the temporary accommodation. Contemporaneous 
notes indicate that the preference was to use housing association voids in "non 
key wards in WCC" and "our voids - outside marginal ward. Use them all 
ASAFý. 
On IOh May the Director of Housing wrote a personal and confidential memo to 
the Managing Director. It recorded the fact that there would be a recurring f-1.8m 
shortfall in the budget due to the designated sales programme and the rising 
levels of homelessness. The latter had been estimated at 750 families for the first 
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6 months of the year, reality was 825. The memo advised that both the financial 
implications and the long term prospects of temporary accommodation were 
poor. It was suggested that the City Solicitor should be consulted as to whether 
Counsel's opinion should be sought. Written instructions were requested from 
the Managing Director on the matter of homelessness. The Housing Committee 
met on 5 th July and should have considered "Supply Allocation of Rental 
Housing 1988\89" and "Homeless Persons Review" but ran out of time. The 
former report was referred to the Director of Housing for decision in consultation 
with the Committee Chairman whilst the latter report was deemed to be noted. 
However two days later Councillor Coleman wrote to the Chief Assistant 
(Housing and Social Services) with written representations about the two reports 
in accordance with the Council's Standing Orders. The basis of the 
representations was a failure to carry out Committee decisions, i. e. annual 
reviews of the designated sales programme, failure to draw attention to the 
serious financial implications of the rising levels of homelessness and failure to 
ensure that the Council met its statutory obligations. Councillor Coleman 
informed the Director of Housing that he would be objecting to the District 
Auditor that unlawful expenditure had been made from the Council's 1987\88 
accounts. The formal objection was made on 17 th July 1989. On I 9th July 
Councillor Patricia Kirwan, former Chairman of the Housing Committee, took 
part in a Panorama television programme about Shirley Porter. In effect she 
agreed that the Conservative Party in Westminster was using the designated sales 
programme to maintain their position in power. 
Counsel was given instructions on 21 st July 1989 to advise on the Council's 
designated sales programme. He responded that the Director of Housing's 
intention to submit a report to the September meeting of the Housing Committee 
was advisable. The Committee was to be invited to review the programme and 
consider whether a policy change was required, having taken all circumstances 
into account. On 23 rd August 1989 the District Auditor wrote to the Managing 
Director of Westminster City Council and requested the documents that had been 
referred to in the Panorama programme. 
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Between that time and the meeting of the Housing Committee on 28 th September 
1998 there were a number of consultations by the Chief Officers with Leading 
Counsel who declared that he was broadly happy with the draft report on ReN, ie-w 
of Home Ownership. At the meeting the Committee ran out of time and Standing 
Order 30 came into effect. The report on Review of Home Ownership was 
referred to the Director of Housing for decision after consultation with the 
Committee Chairman. However the Director of Housing decided that the matter 
should be resolved by members and did not approve the report. Further Counsel's 
opinion was sought and appended to the report which was represented to a 
special meeting of the Housing Committee on 3 oth October 1988. The Committee 
resolved to reduce the scale of the designated sales programme. 
The result was that Councillor Coleman made further submissions to the District 
Auditor to support his Objections. The Managing Director responded to the 
allegations with letters dated 27 th November 1989 and I" May 1990. In all cases 
the Council rejected the allegations of unlawfulness. On 25 
th January 1990 Mr. 
Hilditch, one of the Objectors sought leave for Judicial Review but it was refused 
by the High Court on 12 th February and at the Court of Appeal on 14 th June1990. 
The latter Court was of the view that an investigation by the District Auditor was 
more appropriate. Over the next six months the District Auditor reviewed the 
documentation held at City Hall and obtained preliminary legal advice. Over the 
next two years he carried out a range of interviews and pursued requests of the 
Council for further documents. The initial round of interviews involved 44 
individuals and 56 meetings. The first quarter of 1993 saw a second round of 
interviews which involved 29 individuals seen over 47 meetings. From the 
information that was gathered the District Auditor's team searched a large 
number of Council offices and storerooms. John Magill records (vol 1 para. 26) 
44significant new documentation, previously undisclosed was obtained in the 
course of this search for documents". Further interviews followed with the final 
tally reaching 135 and involved 50 individuals. The District Auditor notes that 
his investigation was hampered by a number of events: 
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* the shredding of documents by Mr. Phillips, Managing Director on 
leaving the Council at the end of 1990. Some of these documents were 
found in the offices of other senior Council officers; 
9 the inability of the Council to locate a number of documents; 
* the disappearance of the working papers of two senior members of the 
Policy Unit; 
* the disposal by the Leader of the Council after she ceased to be Leader, of 
papers which was relevant to the Inquiry; 
e the delay by the Council in the provision of certain documents. In some 
cases not until 1993; 
9 difficulties in organising interviews which in some cases led to the use of 
the District Auditor's formal powers under the 1982 Local Government 
Finance Act which can require individuals to attend; 
* the provision of inaccurate and sometimes misleading information by the 
Council and interviewees. 
On 13 th January 1994, the District Auditor issued formal Notices to 10 
individuals. It informed each person that the Auditor was considering whether to 
surcharge the sum of f, 21.25m on the grounds of willful misconduct. The group 
of 10 included Shirley Porter, four other Councillors, the Managing Director, the 
Director of Housing and three other officers. At that stage the provisional view 
was that formal audit action was not required against 18 other individuals, and the 
overall aim was to allow those at risk to make representations to the District 
Auditor. An audit hearing sat on 32 days for the period I 9th October 1994 to 7 th 
February 1995. Written and oral representations and evidence was taken from the 
Objectors, the Respondents and from the Council. The District Auditor's findings 
were published in May 1996. He found six individuals guilty of willful 
misconduct and included Shirley Porter, two Councillors, the Managing Director, 
the Director of Housing and one other officer. The calculated loss to the Council 
was over 01.6m. The following year an appeal against the surcharge was heard 
at the Divisional Court with the result only Shirley Porter and David Weeks still 
faced the surcharge. They pursued a further appeal to the Court of Appeal which 
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decided in their favour in April 1999 by a majority of 2: 1. Henderson (1999) 
reported that the sales policy was deemed lawful. The dissenting judge indicated 
that he would have reduced the surcharge to f 7m. Because of the significance of 
the ruling, counsel for the District Auditor was given instant leave to appeal to 
the House of Lords. This will mean that the legal costs to the taxpayer at the end 
of the process will be some fI Om and the saga will have dragged on for 12 years. 
Gibb (2001) reported that on 13th December 2001 the appeal was heard by five 
law lords and found in the favour of the District Auditor. The outcome was a 
reimposition of a surcharge of f26.5m on both Dame Shirley Porter and David 
Weeks. John Magill is quoted as stating: 
I am, of course, delighted that the House of Lords has confirmed 
the decision of the High Court. Both courts unanimously 
concluded that the facts that I unearthed were the truth and that 
Dame Shirley Porter and David Weeks had lied to me in 
attempting to cover up their activities. The judgement also 
confirmed that their conduct in using council resources to achieve 
party political advantage was disgraceful and that they should be 
surcharged f 26.5m 
6.2. Failings of Westminster Citv Council 
6.2.1. Conflict of Interest 
This case is littered with examples of conflicts of interest of which a flavour is 
given below. 
Council members are elected by their local communities to operate their local 
authority to provide a range of services to local people. This is supposed to be 
undertaken in an apolitical way in regard to the implementation of policy. The 
politics arise with regard to the policy on a particular issue. For example it is 
acceptable to have an Education Policy which involves selective schools such as 
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Grammar Schools, so long as the access to that service is not confined to certain 
parts of the community. In Westminster's case, the policy of selling Council 
properties to tenants was a reasonable political stance and had been enacted in 
many other Councils in England. However, the conflict of interest arose -VN-hen 
implementation of the policy excluded large parts of the Borough and it was clear 
that the exclusion was for narrow sectional interests. During late summer of 1986 
the Policy Unit of Westminster City Council produced a paper entitled 
"Homelessness\Gentrification" which defined gentrification (vol 4 para. 43) as: 
..... 
it is ensuring that the right people live in the right areas. The 
areas are relatively easy to define: target wards identified on the 
basis of electoral trends and results. Defining 'people' is much 
more difficult and is not strictly Council business..... . 
At a meeting of the Chairmen's Group on 27 th January 1987 Councillor Segal 
presented his paper on "Home Ownership Proposals". It stated (vol 4 para. 13 1): 
the short term objective must be to target the marginal wards and, 
as a matter of utmost urgency, redress the imbalance by 
encouraging a pattern of tenure which is more likely to translate 
into Conservative votes. 
The following month work was done within the Housing Directorate on 
extending the designated sales scheme to marginal wards. This piece of work 
originally identified nine such wards; Churchill, Victoria, St James', West End, 
Millbank, Cavendish, Little Venice, Bayswater and Maida Vale. This list was 
amended by the members of the Chairmen's Group in March. Churchill and 
Maida Vale were omitted from the final list and Hamilton Terrace was included 
(vol 4 para-153). At a senior management conference on 25th November 1986, 
held at the London City YMCA, the top 70 Council Officers were told by the 
then Chairman of the Housing Committee that the Council would have a policy 
of selling council properties in marginal wards so as to boost the Conservative 
vote. She later confirmed on a Panorama programme in July 1989 that the 
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designated sales programme had the political goal of maintaining the 
Conservative Party in power in Westminster. 
The Chairmen's Group met on 16 th November 1986 and received a report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into Conduct of Local Authority Business (the 
"Widdicombe Report"). The recommendations of the Widdicombe Report and a 
paper from the Council's Chief Executive entitled "Conventions Governing 
Relationships between Members and Officers". The Chief Executive reminded 
members that (vol 4 para. 105): 
Council stationery and photocopying, dispatch and postal 
facilities, wherever provided, are available to provide support to 
members of the Council. However, in making use of the facilities, 
members must take account of the distinction between their 
official duties as Councillors and their wider political role. These 
services are provided to assist members in the performance of 
their official Council duties and with constituents' casework. 
Party political activity and campaigning fall outside the scope of 
official duties and do not qualify for the use of Council facilities; 
nor is it appropriate for Council stationery or postal facilities to be 
used to indicate the party allegiance of any member or group on 
the Council. 
This relationship was well understood by the Leader of the Council who in 
response to a question from an Opposition Councillor at a Council meeting on 
I oth June 1987 responded (vol 4 para. 301) "as the member well knows, Council 
facilities must not be used for party political purposes" 
Under the Housing Act 1985, the Council had a statutory duty to house homeless 
people. As early as 18 th jUly 1986 the Chairman of the Housing Committee, 
Councillor Kirwan, wrote to the Leader of the Council and said on the subject of 
Homeless Families. "we are rapidly reaching crisis point". Despite such 
warnings, the Council pursued its right to buy scheme and set designated sales 
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targets. The following year, Councillor Kirwan was ousted from the Housing 
Committee after which no politician raised the issue of a conflict between a 
political policy and the statutory duty to the homeless. This was despite the fact 
that evidence continued to mount that the Council had a growing homeless 
problem. On 13 th June 1989 the Director of Housing updated the Informal 
Meeting of Chairmen on the key housing issues (vol 4 para. 745). "The number in 
temporary accommodation is 761, of which 328 are assessed and awaiting 
rehousing". Two weeks later the same group were informed that by April of the 
following year, it was anticipated that there would be 600 families in temporary 
accommodation, assessed and awaiting rehousing. Despite further discussion in 
July, the notes of the meeting on 18th record under the heading of 
"Homelessness" that "home ownership policies remain unchanged" (vol 4 
para. 760). 
Role confusion was a significant issue for senior officers of the Council. Their 
normal role is to advise Councillors on the options and consequences during 
policy development and to implement policy when approved through the formal 
governance process. They are analogous to Civil Servants and should be 
apolitical so that they can work with Councillors of any party. In the Westminster 
case there is clear evidence of some officers acting as political agents of the 
Conservative Party. For example at the meeting of the Chief Officers Board on 
18 th September 1986, amongst a number of items for discussion there were 
"Opposition Communications" and "4 Year Strategy". On the former, the advice 
was not to give any information unless legally obliged to do so and if necessary 
use delaying tactics. On the latter, chief officers were told to "use Labour job 
adverts to see how the Opposition is thinking" (vol 4 para. 71). Other examples 
are not hard to find. On a briefing note prepared by PA CEC, the Director of 
Housing wrote against households rehoused as homeless, "don't want this kind of 
people - is this politically defensible ....... 
( vol 4 para 90). In January 1987 the 
Director of Housing wrote on a memo "? approx 2K voters" (vol 4 para. 120) 
when referring to homeless families. In March, the same chief officer wrote to 
the Council's Managing Director outlining a device whereby the Majority Party 
could raise designated sales as a topic at the Housing Committee without opening 
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the whole issue to debate by the Opposition. In fact he proposed a political tactic 
to the advantage of the Conservative Party and used the term "smokescreen" (vol 
4 para. 204). On 3 rd August 1987 at a working lunch which included a number of 
papers, the City Solicitor made the following notes on his copy of the paper, 
"BSC targets" (vol 4 para. 437): 
this paper should not have been produced by an officer. Much 
more subtle approach required. This paper shows officers working 
for a Tory victory. I am troubled by the appearance of this paper. 
A Chairmen's strategy weekend was held in early May 1988. Clearly a political 
function, it was attended by a number of officers who also presented papers. The 
Director of Housing suggested the way forward for the right to buy, designated 
sales and assisted purchases. It included "designating other estates in key wards 
7 (vol 4 para. 603). 
The Council produced a publication called the Ratepayer Reporter which was an 
apolitical vehicle for giving information on Council services to the local 
community. The Majority Party decided to place inserts into the Ratepayer 
Reporter and target the key eight marginal wards so as to promote the right to buy 
scheme. The Acting Head of Press and Public Relations wrote to the Council's 
Managing Director on 9th December 1987 and pointed out that the Council's City 
Solicitor had given clear advice. Firstly, all wards needed to be covered so as to 
avoid the possibility of political bias. Secondly, there should be a sound reason of 
the ward profiles as they would take time and money to produce. Thirdly, why 
Cavendish and St. James' wards (two of the key eight) should be the starting 
point. The note goes on to point out that the Council's services were not Provided 
on a ward basis and therefore this approach would be new and cost f 5,000 for 
each of the 23 wards. Despite these concerns the inserts proceeded and in January 
1988 the Chairmen's Group decided to target Millbank and Little Venice (two 
more of the key wards) for the next edition. It was recognised that profiles would 
have to be prepared for Opposition wards, but a Conservative Party newssheet 
would be circulated at the same time. At an Extra-Ordinary Council meeting on 
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2 nd March 1998 in response to a question from the Opposition on which areas 
were to be included in the Ratepayer Reporter, Councillor Porter replied (vol 4 
para. 550) : 
the special inserts in the last edition of the Ratepayer Reporter 
were aimed at wards where particular Quality of Life schemes are 
being undertaken. No decision has been taken yet about which 
wards will be dealt with in this way in the future. 
Throughout the late 1980s, the Council took legal advice from Queen's Counsel 
(QC) on their Housing Policy. Mr. Sullivan QC made it clear at a consultation 
between himself and several officers on 5 th May 1987 that electoral marginality of 
wards was not a proper basis for selecting properties for inclusion in the 
designated sales programme. Housing and planning grounds would be more 
appropriate and saleability would be acceptable. The Barrister was informed that 
justification of the new policy of increased designated sales could be found in the 
PA CEC report. However he was not told of the conclusion to a Housing 
Department paper which stated (vol 4 para. 239): 
the PA report suggests a need to supplement the rented supply. 
There is nothing in the PA report which at the moment would 
justify a designated sales programme. 
Based on the information given, Mr. Sullivan advised that there may be a lawful 
basis for the increase in designated sales. In addition he advised that the Council 
set aside housing stock for the homeless so as to not breach statutory duties, but 
this did not mean that if homeless families were housed in temporary 
accommodation for longer periods before being rehoused permanently, statutory 
duties would be breached. Basically the impact on the homeless because of 
increased sales was a matter of judgement and he did not advise that statutory 
duties discharge could be balanced against the wish to increase home ownership. 
He advised officers to prepare a report which laid out all the pros and cons of any 
policy and which contained all relevant considerations. It was agreed that a draft 
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report would be submitted to Mr. Sullivan for review. Following various drafts, 
draft 4 was forwarded for Counsel review in early June 1987. In summary the 
reported stated: 
extension of the designated sales programme would have no 
impact on discharge of statutory duties to the homeless; 
the financial impact of sales in revenue terms would be broadly 
neutral; 
e there was no option of an increase in designated sales by 500 per 
annum; 
638 units of accommodation would be set aside for housing the 
homeless in 1987\88. 
The report made no reference to any proposal to make grants of f 15,000 to 
Council tenants to allow purchase of non-Council property. There were also other 
material difference between this draft report and the final version at the Housing 
Committee at 8 th July 1987. Whilst Mr. Sullivan received new instructions on 3 rd 
July 1987, they did not include approval or advise on the final report, nor did they 
draw attention to the differences between draft four and the final version. A 
consultation took place on 6 th July 1988 which also involved Mr. Wilkie QC who 
acted as Junior Counsel. It appears the consultation was in a rush over the lunch 
period and no formal note of the conference can be produced by the Council. On 
22 nd July 1987 Councillor Killick, a member of the Majority Party, spoke with the 
City Solicitor on whether a target of 500 sales per year would compromise 
delivery of statutory duties. She was told that Counsel's opinion was that they 
were alright. Clearly Mr. Sullivan was unaware of the 500 target and could not 
have given this advice. Councillor Kirwan was also concerned and asked the 
Chief Executive on 23 rd July 1987 about the legality of the report on the Housing 
Committee agenda for 29th July. At that meeting the Opposition challenged the 
process used by the Majority Pa rty in particular the fact that Counsel's advice 
was some months old and did not include key issues, such as the sales target of 
500 per year. Also on that day, the Leader of the Council wrote to her Party's 
Members and stated .......... our legal advice is that policy is completely judge 
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proof'. This was Mr. Sullivan's view on 5h May but only based on the 
information that he was given and if his recommendations were followed. Further 
advice was sought from Mr. Wilkie on 9thMay 1989 with regard to homelessness. 
At the same time a detailed report had been prepared for the informal meeting of 
Chairmen on that day. The District Auditor recorded the note made by the 
Council's Managing Director (vol 4 para. 734) "don't go to Counsel - he'll want 
everything in the report". This suggests that information was being kept away 
from Counsel to avoid the Council being given advice contrary to their goals. 
The Housing Committee met on 5 th July 1989 and considered a report entitled 
Homeless Persons' Review. The report did not highlight Counsel's advice on the 
statutory duty to homeless households and the information available at that time 
to the Chairmen's Group which showed that such households exceeded the 
available supply. Neither did it mention the consequences, financial or otherwise, 
of this position. On I 9th July 1989 the Panorama programme about the Leader of 
the Council was shown. The comments of Councillor Kirwan provoked much 
activity from the Opposition, such that the Council sought legal advice from Mr. 
Sullivan. However, over the next three months as his services were used, he was 
only given parts of the picture. For example on 12 th October 1989 he was given 
instructions which included extensive documentation. Amongst the paperwork 
was "BSC Campaign - Plan for Action" which was undated, but had been 
produced in summer 1987. The profiles of the eight key wards which 
accompanied the document were not supplied to Mr. Sullivan and he was told it 
was not a Council document, even though it had been produced by the Head of 
the Policy Unit, working to the Managing Director, and with assistance from 
various directorates of the Council. Overall Counsel was used to provide advice 
that backed up the Majority Party's position. Unfortunately this was achieved by 
the partial provision of information or misleading Counsel. 
On 28 th May 1987 a meeting was held to discuss the creation of Westminster 
Housing Trust (WHT). Present were the advisor to the Leader, Richard Loftus, 
the Managing Director, the City Solicitor and the Divisional Director of Housing 
(Private Sector). A paper written by Mr. Loftus suggested that the Trust would 
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provide sensibly priced, middle-market affordable residential accommodation. 
The WHT would have to be established as a non-profit making Trust to develop 
and sell residential units and the Trustees would need to be of unquestionable 
status, but politically cooperative. The Council would transfer freeholds of its 
land bank or other empty sites in the key wards to WHT. A file note made by the 
City Solicitor records (vol 4 para. 278): 
Mr. Loftus accepted that the role of the Housing Trust was not 
strictly necessary and that its intervention was purely to sanitise 
what might otherwise appear to be politically motivated decisions. 
By 10 th June, the Director of Housing had prepared a paper on the creation of 
WHT and sought the City Solicitor's views. This lead to the Chairmen's Group 
considering a strictly confidential paper on 29th June. The Head of the Policy 
Unit then produced in the next week a Next Steps paper which outlined that an 
organisation separate from the Council was required. The paper was considered 
by a mixed members and officers group who agreed that 'planning gain should be 
used to achieve more residential accommodation of the right sort' (vol 4 
para. 361). Further meetings were held in July and of note is the fact that both 
agenda and minutes were annotated strictly confidential. A review meeting of 
progress was chaired by the Deputy Leader on I 9th November 1987. Notes of the 
meeting record (vol 4 para. 509): 
24 sites have been identified, seven of which were in target 
wards ..... it was agreed that sites 
in target wards should always 
receive priority, but that sites in other wards should not be 
disregarded. In addition planning gain residential accommodation 
would be another source for the Trust. 
By the following year the Opposition had become aware of the development 
work. Councillor Coleman wrote to the Managing Director of the Council in 
April and asked for details of all discussions, copies of all papers and information 
on any unminuted meetings. In addition he wanted to know which Majority Party 
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members were involved. Mr. Phillips responded on 5 th August 1988 and implied 
that a couple of Conservative Councillors had been exploring an idea and some 
officers were informally investigating the feasibility of such a scheme. If it 
looked possible, then a report would go to the Housing Committee. On II th 
August, Mr. Sullivan QC advised on the establishment and funding of WHT; his 
advice was pessimistic. September saw a situation report on WHT which 
identified the advantages and disadvantages. It concluded that good stage 
management would be required to maximise the former and minimise the latter. 
A strategy weekend produced a set of actions agreed by an informal meeting of 
Chairmen. It included "WHT continue with it". That is what happened until the 
Opposition made its Representation. However at that stage the Managing 
Director wrote to the Director of Housing in terms which can only be described 
as covering his back, despite the fact that he had been involved in most of the key 
meetings (vol 4 para. 790). Officers expended considerable energies in the pursuit 
of an approach to housing policy which had not been debated, let alone agreed 
within the Council's formal decision making procedures. Whilst in the early 
days, it could be argued that a possible innovative idea was being explored, two 
and a half years after WHT was first raised, the Housing Committee was still 
unaware of the proposal. 
6.2.2. Management Control 
Following the election in May 1986 the Majority Party decided to review its 
policies. Part of this work was to undertake a housing and economy study in 
Westminster. On 3 oth June 1986 the firm Jones Lang Woolton were consulted 
about this work. A revised brief for the study was the result a few days later. On 
I lth July 1986 the Director of Planning and Transport invited proposals from four 
consultants to carry out the study as the Council's Planning and Transport 
Committee had approved the work. In fact the Planning and Transport 
Committee Appointed Members Panel did not meet until 22 nd July when 
approval was given, the budget was f30,000. In August following presentations 
to a group of Members and officers a report was prepared for the Appointed 
Members Panel. It recommended the appointment of PA CEC and was agreed at 
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the start of September. On 15 th September there was a meeting with the 
consultants and involved both senior officers and politicians. Further work 
followed at officer level, however it was not until 29h September 1986 that the 
PA CEC was formally appointed by the Council to undertake the study. The 
report went through various draft stages and was submitted in April 1987. 
However PA CEC's lead consultant Victor Housner continued to be involved 
with the Council as it developed its BSC programme from the study. On 2 nd 
October the Managing Director advised the Leader that there was work for 
Housner who was offering 120 days time at about f285 per day (vol 4 para. 489). 
This proposal was worth in excess of 00,000 and was not an extension of the 
original study. No other consultants were given the opportunity to bid for the 
work nor was the expenditure approved by any Council Committee until it went 
to the Planning and Development Committee on 17 th November. 
On 23 rd April 1987 the Home Ownership Team Leader, Garry Peltzer Dunn wrote 
to the Department of Environment (DOE). The letter went over the issues of right 
to buy schemes and it acknowledged that normally a tenant could purchase their 
existing property at a discount up to a maximum of f 35,000. However, 
Westminster City Council wished to offer vacant properties to tenants under the 
same terms and conditions as if they already occupied the property (vol 4 
para. 224): 
in an attempt to increase home ownership and at the same time 
maintain letting stock, the City Council formally requests 
authority to undertake sales on a like basis in respect of the 
disposal of vacant flats to existing Westminster City Council 
tenants, without the necessity of granting a tenancy of the vacant 
flat to the tenant prior to disposal. 
Two months later on 23rd June 1987 the DOE responded that their legal 
department were of the view that the Council could proceed and special consent 
was not required. This advice appears to have been accepted and acted upon by 
the Council. Further correspondence took place with the DOE at the beginning of 
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July. The Head of the Director of Housing's office wrote on the subject of 
Homeless Persons. The letter enclosed a copy of a report on the expansion of 
home ownership to be considered by the Housing Committee in the following 
week. It was argued that due to the scale of homelessness in the Borough and the 
fact that other London Boroughs used a lot of accommodation within 
Westminster, designation of Council property for sale would require alternative 
solutions to the homelessness issue. Therefore the Council wished to embark on 
a significant property acquisition programme outside the Borough. Ministerial 
approval was sought for this action. The letter stated specifically "the City 
Council therefore as a matter of urgency wishes to ......... (vol 4 para. 349). In 
reality the matter had never been placed before the Council and therefore had 
never taken the decision to pursue an acquisition programme. The decision had 
been taken by the Chairman's Group at its meeting on 29th June 1987. 
The Housing Committee met on 8th July 1987 and discussed an agenda item 
entitled "Review of Home Ownership". As part of the review the paper discussed 
the problem of ensuring that property that was sold remained at affordable levels 
when resold in the future so as to allow other first-time buyers to benefit. The 
fear was that prices would escalate as companies bought the properties for 
transient accommodation or individuals would buy as holiday homes. The report 
recommended that officers take up the issue with the DOE so as to create a 
scheme which delivered the Council's aims. This action was agreed by the 
Committee. The Home Ownership Project Leader wrote to the DOE on 17 th July 
1987 and sought agreement to three key proposals. Firstly, that clauses would be 
inserted into the lease of property for sale to stipulate that the accommodation 
must be the owner's sole or main home. Secondly, it was proposed that the resale 
price be restricted to 70% of open market value in perpetuity. Thirdly, the 
Council wished to make available capital grants of f 15,000 to Council tenants 
who wanted to buy a property on the open market. The DOE replied on 27 th July 
1987 and whilst sympathetic to the aim of increasing home ownership to the less 
affluent, expressed reservations and put forward three alternatives. They argued 
that the ceiling of 70% represented shared ownership as the purchaser would only 
be buying 70% of the equity of the property; the options addressed this problem. 
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The DOE passed back the issue of capital grants and stated that it was for the 
Council to decide whether they could proceed legally under the Local 
Government Act 1972. They advised that the Council should consider whether 
such a policy would be open to all residents or some individuals. 
This cautionary advice was never passed on to the Council or any meeting of the 
Housing Committee. This omission is remarkable in that as the absence of the 
legal clauses and price cap had been described by officers (vol 4 para. 412) as "the 
major difficulty which the Council faces in securing its long term objective to 
retain affordable housing in the City ........... In addition only four days after the 
DOE letter, the Director of Housing wrote to the Chairman of Millbank Estate 
Leaseholders Association (vol 4 para. 434): 
the DOE has not yet reached a final decision on the Council's 
proposals for limiting the sale of flats purchased by non-tenants. 
Once DOE decision has been received it will be reported to the 
members of the Housing Committee. 
Towards the end of September 1987, the DOE replied about the Council's 
proposals to commence a major property acquisition programme outside of 
Westminster. In general the response was unsupported as blanket approval for an 
unspecified number of purchases would not be given by Ministers. Also Local 
Authorities are normally expected to address homelessness issues from within 
their existing housing stock. In October 1987 the Council went back to the DOE 
and sought a review of their position on the proposed restrictions on the resale of 
properties. A response dated 2nd February 1988 made it clear that the DOE could 
not support the Council's proposals. The receipt of this letter was never reported 
to the Council, any Committee or Sub-Committee. 
On 2 nd September 1987 a joint session of Appointed Members Panels of the 
Housing and the Policy and Resource Committees, met to consider a report 
entitled 6'Home Ownership Services". Within the report there was a section on 
temporary accommodation for the homeless. It concentrated on the Council's 
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statutory duty to house the homeless and pointed out that "suitable" 
accommodation applies to permanent housing whilst it was wished that 
temporary accommodation would meet this standard as well. The report informed 
members that future reports would address the provision of permanent housing 
for the homeless. No such report was ever presented to an Appointed Members 
Panel or the Housing Committee. 
At the meeting of the Housing Committee on 28 th September 1988 members 
discussed a report entitled "Homeless Persons Review" which had been prepared 
by the Director of Housing. The Committee was informed that additional 
temporary accommodation was to be sought outside the Borough as a result of 
the levels of homeless families housed within the Westminster area by other 
councils. However the Director of Housing neglected to inform the Committee of 
the key fact which he had already passed on to the Council's Managing Director. 
The need for extra accommodation was fuelled mainly by the reducing supply of 
permanent housing as a result of designated sales and right to buy programmes. 
The Director offered no advice to members as to how they should take action to 
ensure that the Council met its statutory duty to the homeless. 
The decision-making process of Local Government is operated through formal 
Committees or Sub-Committees of a Council. Some policy issues can be agreed 
by a particular Committee but key policy decisions usually are approved by the 
full Council. In the case of Westminster City Council there was in existence a 
body known as the Chairmen's Group. The District Auditor found Terms of 
Reference which stated (vol 4 para. 12): 
the Group shall be responsible for advising the Party (i. e. the 
Conservative Party) on matters of policy and political tactics but 
shall not be empowered to take decisions or take action binding on 
the Party without reference to a Party meeting. 
It is clear that this Group existed for party political purposes and had no formal 
executive authority within the Council. Under the governance arrangements for 
Chapter 6 152 
Local Government any decision taken by the Chairmen's Group did not become 
formal Council policy until adopted by the full Council, a Committee, Sub- 
Committee or officer of the Council acting under delegated powers. The 
Westminster case has many examples of the Chairmen's Group acting as an 
executive committee with decisions taken that were never proposed or adopted 
under the due governance process. At some meetings senior officers were present 
and contributed to the debate: 
(i) Following a meeting on 22 nd June 1986, "Policies for Future" were agreed 
as was the establishment of a performance review group which 
encompassed the Leader and two Majority Party Councillors to monitor 
officers' implementation of the programme; 
(ii) A paper to the Chairmen's Group on I Oth jUly 1986 stated (vol 4 para. 28) 
............... the Chairmen's Group to decide which items go to the Policy 
and Resources Committee"; 
(iii) A key housing policy decision was taken at the meeting on 2 nd September 
1986 (vol 4 para. 48) 4 ............ provision 
for the homeless should be made 
in specific wards within Westminster in terms of rehousing ........... 
In 
addition temporary accommodation should be sought outside 
Westminster"; 
Ten days later, under the subject of 'Budget Strategy' the minutes record 
(vol 4 para. 50) .............. it was agreed that it was particularly important 
to have no rate increases in the last two of the next four years but the 
overall aim ought to be to achieve a nil rate of increase over the entire 
period"; 
(V) The Group met on 23 d September 1986 and discussed the Homeless 
Action Plan. A number of decisions were made (vol 4 para. 74) "'it was 
agreed that there should be a reduction in the intake of cases. Officers 
should adopt a tougher policy without reference to Committee.... Increased 
productivity in interviews\assessing homeless persons agreed ..... 
Reduce 
use of hotels and costs of temporary accommodation - agreed to provide 
more units but outside of the City's boundaries ...... Permanent rehousing 
outside WCC - all options were agreed"; 
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(vi) In November 1986 the Opposition challenged the existence of the 
Chairmen's Group and stated that it was a Committee of the Council. As 
such the Opposition was entitled to any papers submitted to the Group. 
The City Solicitor advised that the Group did not take decisions and for 
that reason it did not constitute a Committee; 
(vii) The Chairmen's Group committed Council staff to undertake a detailed 
analysis of Council owned property in the key wards; 
(vili) At a meeting of the Group on 24th March 1987 there was discussion of a 
draft report "Review of Home Ownership". It became clear that 
designation of properties for sale would have to go to the Housing 
Committee. The report was rejected. The District Auditor notes (vol 4 
para. 202) that .......... the message from members was that they did not want 
to go through everything, they just wanted to get on with designated 
sales"; 
(ix) The following month the Group was invited to approve a revised list of 
Building Stable Communities schemes for implementation and to decide 
the method of approval for each scheme; 
(X) At a Group meeting on 29th June 1987 a strictly confidential paper on 
Homelessness was discussed. Attached was another paper marked very 
strictly private and confidential and entitled "Homelessness: Mapping the 
Way Ahead and Summary of Recommendations". This same meeting 
discussed the possibility of establishing a Westminster Housing Trust; 
(xi) On 9th July 1987 the Managing Director prepared a note following a 
Chairmen's Group meeting. The correspondence identified "Member and 
Officer Priorities 1987\88". Each chief officer was tasked with reviewing 
their activities in light of the agreed list; 
(xii) Later that month the Group agreed to establish an Officers' Steering 
Group to drive forward BSC. This new group would report to two of the 
Majority Party Councillors; 
(xiii) The Group rather than the Housing or Finance Committees, came to a 
number of decisions on I" September 1987 (vol 4 para. 46 1): 
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officers to look at the implications of emptying Bruce 
House as quickly as possible and disposing of the property 
through the Housing Trust for conversion into 'Yuppie' 
flats 
.... That the site, reserved for library use in Bishops 
Bridge Road should be disposed of through the Housing 
Trust 
... The MD to make sure that resources were made 
available (using outside consultants if necessary) to 
maximise the disposal of opportunity sites throughout the 
city. 
xiv) Two weeks later the Group commissioned regular monitoring reports on 
BSC. The first report was reviewed on 29th September 1987. This meeting 
records the following (vol 4 para. 487) "the Leader opened the meeting by 
stating that the Chairmen's Group must concentrate only on important 
matters and problems. For example every effort must be made to 
accelerate right to buy sales and to clear the backlog"; 
(xv) The meeting on 17 th November 1987 discussed the manipulation of 
Ratepayer Reporter which has been discussed previously; 
(xvi) In December the Group discussed "Corporate Priorities for next three 
months" which included right to buy, Westminster Housing Trust and 
BSC Action Plan. At the subsequent meeting in January 1988 the District 
Auditor could find no copy of various papers. In fact under the heading 
"Chairmen's paper; " he found the entry "File copies only being retained, 
others shredded" (vol 4 para. 526); 
(xvii) At the 26 th January meeting the Leader made it clear that future minutes 
would detail agreed action, deadlines and who was responsible. Also it 
was this meeting which targeted the Ratepayer Report at two further key 
wards. 
(xviii) On 17 th March 1998 the Leader of the Opposition challenged the 
Council's Managing Director over various activities and stated (vol 4 
para. 55 7): 
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I have to say that I find it extraordinary that officers of the 
Council should be allocating resources and monitoring 
action on the basis of a secret party political strategy 
decided by the Majority Party members. 
This broadside did not inhibit the activities of the Chairmen's Group at 
all; 
(xlx) The Group met on 29 th March 1988 and agreed an action plan following 
receipt of the PA CEC report. In April the Group discussed progress to 
achieve budget savings of f, 500,000 on housing homeless families. Also it 
was recorded that the Director of Housing would report to a Chairmen's 
strategy weekend on designated sales. In particular what was going wrong 
and proposed solutions; 
(xx) Meetings of the Group over the next few months concentrated on 
monitoring BSC and right to buy with the Leader stressing the importance 
of achieving the targets for property sales; 
(xxi) The Group met on 18 th October 1988 and recorded (vol 4 para. 690): 
the accommodation of homeless families in Westminster 
hotels and the escalating cost of it must be dealt with by 
1990. The main priority of officers would be to find much 
cheaper accommodation outside Westminster. Although a 
target would not be set publicly there must be management 
impetus in this area reflected in the covert key tasks of the 
Director of Housing. The Managing Director would need 
to make sure this was done and to monitor progress 
closely; 
(xxii) November and December concentrated on monitoring targets, particularly 
for four of the key wards; 
(xxiii) The 17 th January 1989 meeting considered important detailed reports on 
homelessness and the financial implications. The Group decided to 
identify vacant land both within and outside the Borough for the use of 
portacabins\mobile homes for the homeless. Also it was agreed to de- 
designate four bedroom plus flats because of pressure for this type of 
accommodation. The Director of Housing actioned this decision on 6 th 
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February without any Committee authority to do so. Seven days later a 
further meeting agreed to pursue direct leasing immediately. 
(xxiv) The 9th May 1989 meeting discussed a revised business plan on 
homelessness. It clearly identified the need for f 1.78m savings if a 
supplemental estimate was to be avoided. It was this report which the 
Managing Director advised "Don't go to the Counsel - he'll want 
everything in the report" (vol 4 para. 734). Decisions included 
examination of current offers of accommodation from housing association 
but no implementation without the Group's approval, and the use of 
temporary accommodation on sites in the Borough. The notes recorded 
the point that housing association voids should be in non-key wards. 
(xxv) Over the next few months the Group were fully appraised by senior 
officers of the growing crisis of homelessness. However on 18 th July 1989 
the Group recorded that policies would remain unaltered. However by the 
meeting on 22 nd August the record shows that the Group decided that the 
matter had to be tackled which would include additional financial 
resource for the homeless issue at a possible cost of 050,000 and the de- 
designation of property earmarked for sale; 
(xxvi) Around this time the Council's Managing Director began to have 
reservations about the Chairmen's Group and wrote a confidential 
memorandum on 24 th April 1989 to the Head of the Policy Unit on the 
subject of the Group. He stated (vol 4 para. 728): 
informal meetings do not of course have formal notes 
made of them. But on occasion some informal jottings are 
made and circulated to the members present. On such 
occasions, I would very much appreciate sight of those 
jottings before they are circulated. I would be grateful if 
this could be arranged. 
This note implies that Bill Phillips did not really know about the 
workings of the Group when in reality he had been Head of the Policy 
Unit himself from July 1986 - February 1987 and therefore was fully 
aware that the Group functioned like a formal Committee with agenda, 
papers and minutes. 
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6.2.3. Audit Committees 
Unlike other parts of the public sector, such as the NHS, Local Government has 
no requirement to establish audit committees as part of the governance process. It 
is argued that Councillors are accountable in two specific ways which make the 
provision of audit committees unnecessary. Firstly each Councillor has a personal 
accountability to ensure probity with regard to the expenditure of public money 
and decision-making. Failure to do so can lead to individuals being surcharged as 
has happened in the Westminster case. Secondly Councillors are elected by the 
community through the ballot box and therefore local people can hold 
Councillors to account. These arguments have some validity but are flawed in 
practice. 
The threat of surcharge is akin to the analogy of nuclear deterrence. The fact that 
you have nuclear weapons means that you deter countries from acting 
inappropriately. The intention is never to use the sanction but the implied threat 
is sufficient to modify behaviour. Similarly the use of a surcharge is the 
deterrence to misconduct by Local Government members and officers. However 
it has had to be used in a number of Local Authorities in recent memory; 
Liverpool in the early 1980s for example. It is strange that the actual use of 
surcharging and therefore the failure of deterrence has not led to different 
mechanisms being used to ensure probity. 
The fundamental problem with the threat of the use of a surcharge is that it is a 
reactive rather than a preventative approach. Maladministration has to take place 
before formal processes are brought to bear. The time-scales are unrealistic also. 
This review of Westminster shows that inappropriate behaviour began in 1986, 
was not reported to the District Auditor before 1989 and who took until 1996 to 
publish his formal audit report which was still the subject of legal challenge until 
2001. 
The lengthy time-scales for the District Auditor's investigation also means that 
the power of the ballot box is illusionary rather than real. Several local elections 
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have passed since 1989 which means that the offending political party can claim 
to have mended its ways and that upright individuals are now In place. Coupled 
with the relative stability of voting preferences at local elections that are 
exhibited by the majority of voters, electoral punishment does not appear to be a 
serious consequence. In Westminster the Conservative Party have remained in 
control of the Council. 
In the Westminster case the heart of the matter was that the senior member , i. e. 
the Council Leader, and the senior officer, i. e. the Managing Director, promoted 
and fostered the maladministration. This meant that there were no checks and 
balances to intervene in a proactive manner. It is suggested that an audit 
committee could have undertaken this role and followed the principles adopted in 
other public sector agencies. This would have included the exclusion of the two 
senior member and officer individuals, i. e. the Leader and the Managing 
Director, from the committee, direct access for the committee to the external 
auditors, and an annual audit programme which reviewed the key policies that 
had been implemented and the decision process behind them. In addition the 
principle of the Public Accounts Committee could have been upheld, namely the 
Chairmanship of the Audit Committee is not a member of the Majority Party. 
The presence of such a corporate governance mechanism may have prevented the 
failure of probity at Westminster City Council. 
6.2.4. Agency Theo 
As stated at the start of chapter 6a principal-agent relationship exists in this case. 
The community of Westminster elected a number of individuals to manage Local 
Government affairs on their behalf. The case study demonstrates that the goal of 
the agent was to retain power and control whilst the principal's goal was the 
effective delivery of local services. The principal has very limited means of 
monitoring the efforts of the agent and therefore must rely on the incentive 
method to align the goals of principal and agent. In the Westminster case the 
implicit incentive is effective delivery of services will lead to re-election and 
thereby maintenance of position. Unfortunately this led to the issue of moral 
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hazard and the agent putting their interests before that of the principal - 
The use of Rowley's (1997) classification of stakeholders, as outlined in chapter 
4, defines Westminster Council as "Commander". There was low density of the 
stakeholder network but high centrality at the Council. The outcome was that the 
organisation was in a very strong position and controlled the flow of information. 
Mitchell's (1997) categorisation of stakeholders supports this view. The Council 
Opposition was a dormant stakeholder with the attribute of power, albeit limited, 
whilst local ratepayers are discretionary stakeholders with the attribute of 
legitimacy. Over time the Opposition became definitive stakeholders as they 
acquired both legitimacy and urgency. At that point they became stakeholders 
who could no longer be ignored and triggered the review by the District Auditor. 
6.3. Summary of the Case Study 
Local Government involves the steward demonstrating accountability to the 
principal through the democratic process. As such it is a very different context 
from that of the NHS which is an arm of national Government and has appointees 
rather than elected members of the community. Westminster has a root cause 
which is unlike either of the two NHS cases. The driving force is power with the 
ability to influence on a national stage and play to a large ego of the key figure at 
the centre of the scandal. Irrespective of the lack of similarity of backgrounds the 
identified elements from the Wessex case remain valid. Also, the application of 
agency theory to the Westminster case study is useful in understanding what took 
place. 
Chapter 6 160 
Chanter 7. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FAILURE IN THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR: THE BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE 
INTERNATIONAL 
The fourth case study is from the Private Sector. A notorious scandal has been 
selected so as to allow a broader comparison and contrast to be undertaken. As 
with the other cases the purpose of this chapter is to describe what transpired and 
identify the causes of corporate governance failure. The core source of 
information is from two books that were written independently by investigative 
journalists who had followed the unfolding events which lead to this infamous 
disaster; Kochan and Whittington (199 1) and, Truell and Gurwin (1992). 
7.1. The Story of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
The creator of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was Agha 
Hasam Abedi who was bom in 1922 in Lucknow. He was well educated with a 
degree in english literature, philosophy and law (Kochan & Whittington 1991). 
His first job was as a trainee in the Habib Bank in Bombay. However the next 
year in 1947, as a muslim, he moved to Karachi following the creation of 
Pakistan. His career blossomed and he was promoted swiftly. It appears that it 
was during this time that he discovered the importance of networking to build the 
banking business. 
In particular, Abedi cultivated the Saigol family who were wealthy textile 
producers with significant political connections. This relationship flourished to 
the extent that Abedi convinced the Saigols to invest in the creation of a new 
bank. The United Bank was launched in 1959. Eight years later Abedi began a 
new relationship which was to encompass the full life term of BCCI. In 1967 
Abedi was granted permission to open a branch of his bank in Abu Dhabi 
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following a visit to Pakistan by its ruler Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyram. 
Unexpectedly within a few years, Sheikh Zayed became one of the richest men in 
the world following the discovery of oil in his small arabic country. 
Abedi convinced the Abu Dhabi ruler to help him establish a new bank. At the 
same time he became aware that the prestigious Bank of America wished to 
expand in the Middle East. The result was that on 21" September 1972, BCCI was 
incorporated in Luxembourg with start-up capital of $2.5m of which the Bank of 
America contributed 25% (Truell and Gurwin 1992). Initially the headquarters 
was in Abu Dhabi but quickly moved to Leadenhall Street in the City of London. 
Abedi's aim was to create a global bank for the Third World. 
The wealth created by the large rise in the value of oil reserves following the Oil 
Crisis, saw Sheikh Zayed and many hundreds of others from the arab world, 
deposit their money with BCCL At the end of the first year of trading, i. e. 1973, 
BCCI had 10 branches in five countries; four branches were in the UK. Two 
years later there were 64 branches in 13 countries with 19 branches in the UK. 
Rapid expansion followed with branches in every Middle Eastern country. Often 
they were joint venture banks in partnership with other banks and\or local 
investors, for example the National Bank of Oman. The result was by the end of 
only 1977 BCCI h, -id 146 branches in 32 countries with total assets of $1.6 billion. 
A significant event took place in 1976 (Kochan and Whittington, p. 40): 
BCCI fornied a parallel company, sometimes called the bank 
within the bank, based in the Cayman Islands. Abedi would later 
claim that there was no connection between this parallel company, 
ICIC and BCCL 
This company was to be used extensively by BCCI to circumvent normal 
business practice. 
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Abedi received his first set-back in 1979 when the Bank of England refused to let 
BCCI expand to 150 branches in the UK and a limit of 45 was set. In October a 
new Banking Act came into force and defined two types of constitution. Firstly 
"recognised bank" and secondly "licensed deposit taker". The latter could not call 
themselves a baiik which infuriated Abedi as BCCI had been given this 
classification. The Bank of England were not the only organisation to be nervous 
of the rapid growth of the newcomer to the banking world. The Bank of 
America's enthusiasm of the early 1970's had evaporated. BCCI appeared to 
have large concentrations of lending with a limited number of borrowers. In the 
US a chartered bank cannot exceed 10% of capital and reserves and BCCI was 
over this mark. Bank of America had major concerns over the apparent large 
loans to insiders, i. e. directors, shareholders and officers. In addition there were 
inadequate loan-loss provisions and lax internal controls. In 1976 the Bank of 
America asked Abedi to remove its logo from BCCI letterheads and declined to 
invest new capital to finance expansion. Two years later it produced a critical 
report on BCCFs management of its loans. By June 1980 the Bank of America 
had divested itself of its holding in BCCI. The world banking community was 
suspicious of this major player's withdrawal at a time of apparent prosperity for 
BCCI (Truell and Gurwin, p. 29-30). 
The early years of BCCI saw the development of strong links between Abedi and 
the Gokal brothers. This family was also from Pakistan and had extensive 
business operations, particularly shipping, through the Gulf Group. They moved 
to BCCI from the United Bank and remained with the bank until two days before 
the close of BCCI when Gulf International Holdings went into administration on 
3 rd July 1991. During the relationship it is clear that Abedi lent money to the 
Gokals in a manner which other international banks would not have condoned. 
For example most of the ships owned by the Gulf Group were mortgaged by 
BCCI at extremely high and unrealistic valuations. 
Abedi had aspirations to break into the American banking arena. However the 
banking regulators policed the ownership of banks and would oppose BCCI 
owning a US bank. Abedi did not let this stop him and attempted to buy Chelsea 
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National Bank in 1975 by using Abass Gokal as a front man (Beatty and Gwynne 
1993 p. 148). Abedi was not deterred by his failure and in 1977 used another 
intermediary, Abdul Sami, to attempt to buy the New York Bank of Commerce. 
However the banking regulators were very suspicious and Abedi pulled out from 
making a formal offer, he had found a way to achieve his objective without 
falling foul of the authorities. 
In November of that year Abedi was introduced to Bertram Lance. This man had 
had a successful career as a banker and was a personal friend of Jimmy Carter, 
future US President, who he knew as a Georgia State Senator and then Governor. 
In fact Carter supported Lance as his successor as Governor when he left office in 
1974 however he lost the election and incurred large financial debts. In 1975 he 
became chief executive of the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) and through 
various financial improprieties, he purchased shares in the bank before moving 
on to become President Carter's budget chief Unfortunately in September 1977 
Lance's past sins caught up with him and he had to resign. It was an embattled 
and financially embarrassed Lance who was introduced to Abedi. After a 
discussion on BCCI's goals Lance saw an opportunity to rescue his personal 
financial position and he proposed two significant pieces of action. Firstly, he 
suggested that BCCI purchase his 12% holding of the National Bank of Georgia. 
The front man was a Saudi businessman who lived in the US, Gharth Pharaon. 
He paid $20 per share when a few weeks early the stock was trading at $10. 
Abedi was interested in the foothold in the US banking market and the close 
political connections of Lance with the US President. Lance received $2.4m for 
his NG13 shares and Abedi paid off an outstanding loan of $3.4m from the First 
National Bank of Chicago by using the device of creating a new loan from the 
Cayman Islands, except no paperwork ever existed. In addition BCCI's Cayman 
Islands setup hired Lance as a Consultant on a salary of $100,000. However it 
was Lance's second idea that was to have a profound effect on BCCI and would 
ultimately lead to its demise. He suggested that Abedi buy NBG's parent 
institution, Financial General Bankshares (FGB). 
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FGB was unusual in the US banking market in that it was exempt from the 
normal ban on interstate banking, with the result that in 1977 FGB controlled 
banks in the states of Maryland, New York, Tennessee, Virginia and the District 
of Columbia. The opportunity for Abedi to acquire FGB shares came about 
because of the action of the Federal Reserve Board. FGB was controlled by 
General George Olmsted through a holding company. However the Federal 
Reserve was of the view that this arrangement was illegal as the holding company 
owned other financial organisations such as an insurance company. The result 
was that all FGB stock had to be sold. Abedi began buying up stock through 
intermediaries such as Lance, Jackson Stephens (an investment banker and friend 
of Lance) and Eugene Metzger (a Washington Lawyer). The shares were recorded 
as being owned by four prominent Arab investors; Karmal Adham, the Saudi 
Head of Security, Faisal Saud al-Fulay, the former owner of Kuwait Airways, 
Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi and his money man, Abdullah Darwaish. Each held 
just under 5% of FGB's total stock and therefore under US law they were not 
obliged to disclose their holdings as long as they acted as individuals and not as a 
group. 
FGB did not sit still for the attempted takeover and sued BCCI, Abedi, the 
intermediaries and the Arab investors for the acquisition of FGB shares through 
an illegal tender offer. The SEC followed with their own legal action accusing the 
same group of violation of securities laws. Lance and Abedi turned to a 
prominent law firn-i who became significant players in the remainder of the BCCI 
saga. Clark Clifford was an eminent lawyer who had been a trusted adviser to 
Presidents Truman and Kennedy and as such he was well acquainted with both 
the political and legal environment of Washington. At his side was the up-and- 
coming Robert Altman. 
The SEC suit was quickly settled with no admission of guilt. Part of the 
agreement was that BCCI could not own stock in FGB. The result was that 
behind the backs of the regulators Abedi created a new company, Credit and 
Commerce American Holdings (CCAH), based in the Netherlands Antilles. The 
investors were a variety of Arab intermediaries such as Kamal Adham, and 
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initially they provoked serious concerns from the regulators that they worked for 
BCCI. Assurance.,, were given that BCCI was not involved and the shareholdings 
were approved. Fi-om that moment Abedi began to acquire other FGB shares in 
order to take-ovcr the bank. In April 1982 CCAH and another BCCI shell 
company, Credit and Commerce American Investment (CCAI), based in the 
Cayman Islands, had control of all the shares. Clifford was appointed chairman 
of FG13 and Altman became chairman of FGB Holding Corporation, the direct 
parent of FGB. Both measures were aimed at giving comfort to the regulators and 
were added to by the appointment of Robert Stevens, former chairman and chief 
executive of BancOhio Corporation, as president and chief executive of FGB. 
With the further appointment of former Missouri Senator, Stuart Symington, as 
vice chairman, an air of respectability had been given to FGB. However of these 
four senior appon-itments only one was a banker whilst the others were political 
operators. The transformation was completed in August 1982 when FGB was 
renamed First American Bankshares. 
By the end of 1983 (Truell and Gurwin p. 63-64) BCCI had a global network of 
360 offices in 68 countries. Acquisition played a major role in this growth e. g. the 
purchase of the 26 branch bank in Spain, Banco de Descuento S. A. However the 
approach in the US was different. BCCI did not attempt to buy banks but opened 
branches and representative offices. In addition Abedi opened agencies which 
were not full-fledged branches and were located in San Francisco, Miami, Los 
Angeles, Palm Beach, Tampa, New York and Boca Ratan. The result was that at 
the end of 1988 the network had grown to 417 offices in 73 countries. There were 
14,000 staff of 90 nationalities and total assets were $20.6 billion. 
First American Bankshares grew rapidly but there was little contact between the 
major shareholders and the bank however there was regular involvement of BCCI 
in First American's business (Truell and Gurwin p. 76); 47 BCCI branches, 
subsidiaries and affiliates had accounts with First American Bank of New York. 
The first president of this particular bank was hired after three meetings with 
Abedi, and onlý7 then was Bruno Richter introduced to Clifford and Altman who 
formally offered the appointment. Richter promptly hired two BCCI executives 
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for senior posts at First American; Aijaz Afridi as executive vice-president and 
Khusan Elley as chief financial officer. Both men continued to benefit from 
BCCI concessionary mortgages even though it was BCCI policy for such loans to 
be repaid on leaving the bank. 
First American developed strong links to the intelligence community. J. William 
Middendorf, who was president of FGB in 1978, had served on President 
Regan's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Transition Team and went on to work 
with the CIA in Latin America when he became Ambassador to the Organisation 
of American States. Richard Helms, the ex CIA Director, had been defended by 
both Clifford and Adharn when prosecuted over CIA activities. In addition the 
First American board included two other individuals with close intelligence 
community links. Firstly Robert Grey, a lobbyist, who was a close friend of the 
existing CIA Director, and secondly Karl Harr who had served on the staff of the 
Operations Coordinating Board which oversaw the CIA's covert operations. It 
was no surprise that both the CIA and Abedi saw mutual advantage in working 
together. Aid to Afghan rebels was channeled through BCCI in Pakistan and 
BCCI became involved in what became known as the Iran-Contra scandal. In 
1984 Colonel Oliver North opened three accounts of BCCI's Paris branch in the 
name of a Panamanian-registered shell company, Devon Island (Kochan and 
Whittington p. 127). The purpose was to sell $10m of arms and with the profit 
transferred to a Saudi Arabian branch of BCCI, pass the money to the Nicaraguan 
Contra rebels. The CIA used BCCI for routine business, using branches in 
London to pay a variety of British contacts. In the mid- 19 8 Os the Deputy Director 
of the CIA described BCCI as the bank of crooks and criminals international and 
said so with some satisfaction as BCCI facilitated many of the CIA's financial 
transactions. 
As BCCI grew the real financial position of the bank became more precarious. 
Much of the supposed growth was generated by different parts of BCCI lending 
to nominee investors to carry out acquisitions. The bank moved on to collect 
customers' deposits and deliberately avoided recording these liabilities whilst 
using the money to make interest payments on its loans to the nominees. Kochan 
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and Whittington (p. 139) record that it is now known that the largest unrecorded 
deposit was E246m and was owed to the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt. Truell and 
Gurwin (p. 198) state "by stealing depositors' money BCCI had become a Ponzi 
scheme". Therefore the issue for Abedi and Navqi was how to find a way to plug 
the widening hole in BCCI's accounts. They turned to the riskiest of all financial 
markets, futures and options. Effectively you bet on the future prices of 
commodities and whilst rewards can be huge so can the losses. In 1980 Sheikh 
Zayed lost $1 00m in the metals' side of the market. BCCI's Treasury Department 
led this work and was headed by Syed Ziaddin Ali Akbar who was appointed in 
1982. He claimed to make large profits however the Treasury's results were 
consolidated with those of the Grand Cayman branch which was also managed by 
Akbar. This meant that any losses on futures and options could be hidden. Akbar 
resigned from BCCI in 1985 but promptly operated Capcom Financial Services 
based in London. In reality this was the Treasury Department in another guise. 
However stories began to emerge about BCCI losses and on June 2 nd the bank 
issued a statement that it had lost $285m. When Akbar left Capcom in 1986 
Navqi was given a detailed summary of BCCI losses for the period of Akbar's 
involvement with the bank. For the period of 1982-86 accumulated losses of 
$849m and inflated profits of $108m (1982), $136m (1983) and $234m (1984) 
were the reality. Akbar had covered his tracks through use of $400m of 
unrecorded deposits, which included the Faisal Islamic Bank money and $60m 
belonging to the Cameroon Government, $250m managed by ICIC, bogus loans 
and deposits from the banks Abu Dhabi subsidiary. 
BCCI demonstrated throughout its life that it was willing to participate in a 
variety of illegal acts. One of these was laundering drug money and was to result 
in high profile arrests of BCCI staff. In April 1980 a BCCI branch was opened in 
Panama City. The following year saw the election of General Manuel Noriega as 
the leader of the Panamanian state. Noriega opened accounts at BCCI and formed 
a relationship N\Tith the branch manager, AmJad Awan, who was to become 
known as Norieoa's banker. Noriega had close connections with the major drugs 
dealers in Columbia and facilitated the flow of illegal money from these sources 
through BCCI iii Panama. So strong was the relationship between Noriega and 
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his banker, that %vhen Awan was transferred to Miami in 1984, Noriega pursued 
the issue with Abedi to seek its cancellation. Two Americans, Steven Kalish and 
Bruce Ritch, became deeply involved in smuggling drugs to the US and 
laundering the money in Panama. BCCI was used as the conduit for the money 
and for Noriega's fee for allowing Panama to be used. As the illegal business 
flourished BCCI bought a Columbian bank with branches in Medellin and Cali, 
both centres of the cocaine trade. 
Panama came wider pressure from the US in the mid 1980s to halt the drug 
smuggling. The result was a major undercover US Customs investigation called 
Operation C-Chase. In 1987 two undercover agents set themselves up as drugs 
money launderers and opened accounts with BCCI at Tampa in the US and 
Panama. During the operation the agents received the following advice from 
Awan (Kochan and Whittington p. 99-100): 
we collect cash in the US and transfer it via cable to France or 
London \vhere it is used to issue fixed term deposits. These 
certificates are used as collateral to obtain loans, which are then 
transferred by cable to Panama to be credited to our current 
account. You can continue to take funds from this current account 
as you do now. 
However as the problems mounted for Noriega, which resulted in his arrest 
following the invasion of Panama by the US and indictment in 1988, Awan 
advised the Customs agents to use an alternative location to Panama. In June a 
switch was made to use Tampa and Europe, in particular London. The practice 
that was used was to send the money from the US to BCCI London via 
Liechtenstein. A certificate of deposit was created and a comparable loan to the 
same value was made from Nassau in the Bahamas. The loan was never repaid 
and the certificate of deposit moved to Nassau so the books balanced. BCCI 
continued to help Noriega and attempted to thwart the US Authorities who were 
trying to trace his financial assets. In August 1988 BCCI established an account, 
in the name of Finley, at their satellite company Capcom. $20m of Noriega')s 
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money was moved through various banks and accounts in Europe and New York 
over a six month period. 
By October 1988 the US Customs' operation had gathered enough evidence to 
arrest the various individuals involved in the illegal activities. The undercover 
agents invited all concerned to a wedding and once gathered the arrests were 
made. Ten current and former BCCI employees, including Akbar and Awan, 
were indicted by a federal grand jury. In addition four corporate entities were 
involved in the indictment; BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) - the main holding 
company, BCCI SA (Luxembourg) - the flagship bank of the group, BCCI 
(Overseas Limited) - the holding group in the Cayman Islands, and Capcom. All 
were accused of conspiracy to possess with intent to aid and abet others with the 
distribution of cocaine, conspiracy to defraud the US Inland Revenue Service 
(IRS), and conspiracy to launder the proceeds of cocaine sales. In addition many 
of the individuals were charged with knowingly laundering $14m of cocaine 
revenues (Truell and Gurwin p. 247-248). BCCI decided not to fight the case and 
went for plea-bargaining. BCCI (Overseas Limited) pleaded guilty to money 
laundering conspiracy charges and 30 specific acts of violating federal laws. The 
company was fined $14.8m, put on probation for five years and subject to 
increased regulation by the Federal Reserve. However no other investigation 
would take place and therefore the linkage between BCCI and First American 
was not pursued. Charges against BCCI's other companies were dropped as part 
of the deal. BCCI individuals did not fare so well as on 29th jUly 1990 five former 
employees were found guilty and sentenced to prison. Awan received 12 years 
which was reduced later because of his willingness to testify against Noriega. 
Two other BCCI officers, Akbar and Asif Baakza, were tried in London, found 
guilty and sentenced to prison in the autumn of 1990. 
Involvement with the drugs trade was not the only illegal activity in which BCCI 
became involved. In the late 1970s, Ben Banerjee, a legally registered arms 
dealer, opened a BCCI account in London. In 1981 he introduced Samir 
Najmeddin, supposedly an Iraqi Government representative, to BCCI so that an 
account could be opened. $48m was promptly transferred into BCCI. A further II 
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accounts were set up and the bank organised an offshore trading company for 
Najmeddin which was registered in Panama with headquarters in Warsaw. The 
company had three directors; Najmeddin, Adnan al-Banna and Shakir Farhan. In 
reality Shakir Farhan was the Palestinian terrorist leader Abu Nidal and 
Najmeddin was not an Iraqi Government official but the financial controller of 
Nidal's organisation (Kochan and Whittington p. 113-131). Over the next five 
years Najmeddin completed numerous transactions at the Hyde Park branch of 
BCCI. For example a $30m letter of credit was opened with Banerjee for the 
purchase of arms. Najmeddin used BCCI for all his letters of credit and each one 
over the value of half a million dollars was approved by a group of senior BCCI 
managers which included Abedi's right-hand man, Swaleh Naqvi. When in 
London Najmeddin used BCC1 offices and staff as if they were his own. For 
example in 1985 Najmeddin completed the purchase of Israeli made Uzi machine 
guns at the Hyde Park offices. This activity continued until 1985 when 
Najmeddin's role with Nidal was exposed in a French magazine. The result was 
that despite his public protestations of innocence he transferred all the money in 
BCCI accounts to Poland and Switzerland. 
By the mid-1980s concerns about BCCFs activities had grown considerably. The 
losses of the Treasury Department, the emerging picture of a bank with 
connections to the drugs trade and the involvement of the US and UK's security 
services meant that BCCI was a marked organisation. The diverse nature of the 
various components of the BCCI entity with differing legal jurisdiction meant 
that the official regulators did not act swiftly or in a coordinated manner. The first 
to act was the Luxembourg Monetary Institute (LMI) as the overarching BCC1 
holding company was registered in that country. Their concern was that BCCFs 
assets had grown by 800% in just eight years and stood at $1.6 billion. There was 
a belief at LMI that such growth would challenge the best-run organisations. Also 
evidence was beginning to emerge about the losses BCCI were incurring on the 
options and futures markets. Pierre Jaans, the head of LMI, attempted to get the 
attention of other regulators such as the Bank of England but to no avail. 
Therefore in 1985 he asked Price Waterhouse, BCCFs external auditors, to 
review the Treasury Department's work. The auditors found that BCCI had 
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incurred large losses which had not been recorded properly but this was put do', X, -n 
to incompetent staff. LMI asked Abedi how the losses were to be covered and 
how the regulator's expected solvency ratio would be met. Abedi promised LMI 
that a new source of funding was imminent and he approached the prominent 
Saudi family of bin-Mahfouz who controlled the National Commercial Bank of 
Saudi Arabia. Abedi was in a poor negotiating position and the proposed new 
investors drove a hard bargain which included indemnity against loss if they 
wanted to sell their shares. The bin-Mahfouz bought 10% and then 20% of the 
shares and then began a campaign to oust Abedi and take over the bank (Kochan 
and Whittington p. 142-144). 
Until 1987 BCCI had a variety of external auditors for different parts of the 
organisation. However in this year Price Waterhouse became the sole auditor for 
the BCC1 Group. In 1988 the regulators began to act more cohesively to oversee 
the activities of this bank. They formed the College of Supervisors which 
included representatives from Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland and the UK, and 
met for the first time in May. Additional countries joined subsequently; Hong 
Kong and the Cayman Islands in 1989, United Arab Emirates in 1990 and France 
in 1991 (Truell and Gurwin p. 288). 
Abedi had always managed BCCI as a large extended family with himself as the 
patriarch but the continuous stresses of operating in this manner together with the 
ongoing financial difficulties took their toll in February 1988. Whilst in Pakistan 
where he had arranged a dinner with President Zia in honour of Sheikh Zayed, he 
had his first heart attack. The result was surgery and ongoing health problems 
which in time confined Abedi to a wheelchair and effectively removed him from 
the helm of BCCL 
The public concerns about BCCI were growing as the bank's problems in the US, 
with regard to money laundering, were given extensive coverage. Price 
Waterhouse qualified the 1988 accounts because of the likely financial 
consequences of the US criminal proceedings. At the same time the bank reported 
a net loss of $49m for the year. The outcome was in October 1989 the bin- 
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Mahfouz family chose to extricate themselves from BCCI and activated the exit 
clause in the legal agreement which had brought them into the bank. Despite his 
health problems Abedi arranged for the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi to buy the 
shares for $528m. The majority of this equity was bought by Sheikh Zayed's son 
Khalifa and the finance department of the Abu Dhabi Government. The Bank of 
England finally stirred itself in the autumn of 1989 and asked Price Waterhouse 
to conduct a special audit. The report was available in January 1990 and made 
awful reading. Its key points were: 
" there were no loan agreements on many of its largest loans; 
" in many cases there were no official third party witnesses; 
" in many cases improper appraisals had been used for the basis of loans. 
Subsequent reports found: 
" frequent absence of critical information to support very large loans; 
" irregularities in loan approval procedures; 
" unreliable management responsibilities; 
" improper servicing of loans e. g. Khalil's loans had not been serviced for 
five years. 
The external auditors discovered that BCCI made very large loans to some of its 
shareholders who used BCCI stock as collateral. Price Waterhouse's report of 3 rd 
April 1990 demonstrated that the bank had apparently lent $1.48 billion to its 
own shareholders against 60% of BCCFs equity. Approximately half of this sum 
had been loaned to the Gokal brothers' shipping operations and BCCI was unable 
to call in the loan as the Gokals would have collapsed and so would have the 
bank. At the same time BCCI faced other difficulties in both the UK and the US. 
In Britain the Inland Revenue warned the bank that it had failed to file correct tax 
returns. Price Waterhouse expressed their concern to BCCI on this issue and on 
the others which had been exposed by their ongoing audit work. One 
consequence was that some of the bank's clients who realised that they had been 
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used by the bank, e. g. annotating large loans against clients' names when they did 
not exist, began to cause problems. The heads of the Gulf States of Aiman and 
Fujairah repudiated $270m worth of loans 
Meanwhile in the US the true ownership of First American had been exposed. 
The Bank of England had uncovered the information and immediately informed 
its fellow regulator, the Federal Reserve. They wrote to Robert Altman on 13 th 
December 1989 and asked if First American's shareholders had borrowed money 
from BCCI. Nearly two months later he responded that he did not have access to 
that information but enclosed a letter from Naqvi. This correspondence denied 
that BCCI had any part in the financing of First American purchase and no 
further action was taken. 
Price Waterhouse would only sign BCCI's 1989 accounts without a major 
qualification unless new equity could be obtained; the losses for the year were 
$498m. The auditors were reassured by Ghanim al-Mazrui, Sheikh Zayed's 
adviser and a BCCI investor, that the Abu Dhabi Government would provide the 
necessary financial support to cover the losses. The accounts were signed without 
any qualification. In May 1990 further capital was required and the Abu Dhabi 
Government responded by injecting $400m into the bank for a controlling 77% 
stake. Immediately the new owners attempted to sort out the bank. Naqvi was 
replaced as chief executive at BCCI and a plan to restructure the bank was made. 
A public limited company would be established in London and would be wholly 
regulated in the UK, a company in Hong Kong would deal with the Far East and 
Abu Dhabi would handle everywhere else. The bank's headquarters moved to 
Abu Dhabi in September which resulted in a large reduction in the UK branch 
network and the loss of some 800 jobs. 
Meanwhile in the US a damaging article was written by Larry Gurwin in the 
publication Regardie in May 1990. It alleged close ties between BCC1 and First 
American but only circumstantial evidence was produced. This was followed by 
an article in the Wall Street Journal which argued that BCCI was a rogue bank. 
One of the events to trigger this damning article was the failure of CenTrust 
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Savings Bank which had been taken over by the regulators at a cost to the 
taxpayer of more than $2 billion. It eventually emerged that Pharaon had been a 
front man for BCCI. Later that summer in France the Bank BAII, which had 
strong links with BCCI, had to be taken over by the Banque Nationale de Paris at 
a cost of over $1 00m (Truell and Gurwin p. 28 8-296). 
During the attempted restructuring of the bank Price Waterhouse was undertaking 
further investigations into BCCFs affairs. They found the special files kept by 
Naqvi which revealed the full extent of the manipulations by the special duties 
department. The auditor's report of 3 rd October 1990 presented the real picture of 
activity at BCCI. The following day at a full BCCI board meeting Abedi and 
Naqvi resigned and Sheikh Zayed launched his own inquiry led by Ernst and 
Young who had been pushed aside by Price Waterhouse as auditors three years 
earlier. In January 1991 BCCFs new chief executive, Zafar Iqbal informed Price 
Waterhouse of $600m of unrecorded deposits. Despite this further evidence of 
illegal operating, the bank was allowed to continue. Two months later the Bank 
of England approached Price Waterhouse and instigated an independent 
examination of BCCI under Section 41 of the Banking Act 1987. In April the 
BCCI board approved the 1990 accounts and in May Sheikh Zayed agreed to 
cover the unrecorded deposits and the dubious loans at a value of $4 billion. 
The Price Waterhouse report arrived at the Bank of England on 22 nd June 1991 
and made for extremely uncomfortable reading. It articulated the case that 
systematic fraud had been ongoing in all areas of the bank for many years. 
Meanwhile in the US, BCCI's affairs had received another major setback. In 
December, William Ryback, head of the Fed's international supervision division, 
flew to London and Nvent to BCCI headquarters where he demanded to see the 
auditor's report of October. Unfortunately the report belonged to the Bank of 
England who refused to let Ryback have a copy as it knew that the American 
would use it for legal purposes in the US at a time the Bank of England were 
trying to persuade Sheikh Zayed to cover all losses. However, later that month in 
Washington Sheikh Zayed's American lawyer, Sandy Martin, paid an 
unannounced visit to the Fed's general counsel, Virgil Mattingly. Full details of 
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the hidden control of First American by BCCI were given. It was stated that 60% 
of First Americai-i's parent holding company, CCAH, shares were pledged and 
the loans were noiiperforming (Beaty and Gwynne p. 103-104). The Fed began a 
formal investigation into the control of First American and received further 
assistance from Sandy Martin in the form of documents that were part of the 
Naqvi files. Both Clifford and Altman denied any involvement but documentary 
evidence proved otherwise. On 4 th March 1991 the Fed issued an order stating 
that BCCI had illegally acquired control of First American and must produce a 
plan for the divestiture of the stock. In addition BCCI was to cease all banking 
operations in the US. 
The June report to the Bank of England made senior officials quickly conclude 
that BCCI had to be seized. An emergency meeting of the College of Supervisors 
was called for 2"" July but Abu Dhabi was excluded and representatives from 
both the Fed and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York were invited. The aim 
was to coordinate the seizure. It was agreed to shut down BCCI on Friday 5 th 
July 1991 after the close of US West Coast markets, however due to legal 
requirements in Luxembourg the seizure was arranged for I p. m. London time 
which preceded the opening of US markets. Sheikh Zayed's representative, 
Mazrui, would be told on Friday morning in Luxembourg. Whilst this planning 
was taking place BCCI 's biggest debtor went bust. The Gokal family Gulf 
International Holdings was put into administration by the Luxembourg authorities 
on 3 rd July. During 18 years as customers of BCCI the Gokals had amassed loans 
of $2 billion. 
At I p. m. on 5 th July 1991 liquidators Touche Ross descended on all 25 branches 
of BCCI in the UK and took control. The same action occurred in France, 
Luxembourg, Spain and Switzerland. In the Cayman Islands a receiver was 
appointed by the Governor of the colony to take over BCCI operations. In the UK 
approximately 120,000 residents had deposits of f250m at the bank whilst some 
30 Local Authorities had f8lm on account of which the Western Isles Council 
based on Skye ývas the biggest loser with f23m on deposit (Truell and Gurwin 
p. 305-319). In the US proceedings moved on at a fast pace. On 29th July, Robert 
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Morgenthau, New York District Attorney, announced a 12 charge indictment. He 
stated (Kochan and Whittington p. 14): 
this indictinent spells out the largest bank fraud in world history. 
BCCI was operated as a corrupt and criminal organisation 
throughout its entire nineteen-year history. It systematically 
falsified its records. It knowingly allowed itself to be used to 
launder the illegal income of drug sellers and other criminals, and 
it paid bribes and kickbacks to public officials. 
The indictment iniplicated all the major players in the BCCI affair. Abedi and 
Naqvi were accused of swindling up to $20 billion from depositors around the 
world. The action asked for a $200m fine against the bank and a permanent ban 
on any involvement with US banks for anyone involved in the covert takeover of 
First American. The list included Abedi, Naqvi, Adham, Pharaon, Kazmi, al- 
Fulay, Khalil and Elley. Clifford and Altman resigned from First American in 
mid-July but continued to deny any knowledge of BCCI's involvement in First 
American. Back in the UK angry depositors led by the MP Keith Vaz, increased 
the pressure on national politicians for an inquiry. The Bank of England's 
Governor, Robin Leigh-Pemberton, played down the need of such action but the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, acceded to the demands and Lord 
Justice Bingham was appointed to review the supervision of BCCI. However 
proceedings would be in private. 
Sheikh Zayed was furious with the Bank of England's actions on 5 th jUly, 
particularly as there had been no consultation with the Abu Dhabi Government 
which was a member of the College of Supervisors and the majority shareholder 
in BCCI. The Slieikh took the highly unusual action of placing full page 
advertisements iii newspapers to vent his displeasure. One of the targets for his 
anger was Price Waterhouse who it was pointed out had been involved with 
BCCI as an external auditor for 15 years and sole auditor since 1987. On 2 nd 
December 1991 in London the winding up order for BCCI was postponed in 
court until January 1992. Touche Ross had found assets of $1.159 billion but 
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liabilities of $10.641 billion which meant creditors would receiN, e a payout of 
less than 10% of the sums owed. Investigations in the US continued and on 29th 
July 1992 the Federal authorities made an indictment against Clifford and Altman 
on charges of- 
* misleading the Fed about the BCCI - First American relationship; 
0 obstructing the Fed's inquiries; 
* seeking to gain favour with BCCI by arranging for First American to buy 
NBG and depositing $45M in ICIC; 
* lying about BCCI loans to First American shareholders. 
At the same time Morgenthau also made a separate indictment against the two 
men for participating in a scheme to defraud (Truell and Gurwin p. 407-408). 
7.2. Failinis of Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
7.2.1. Conflict of Interest 
In the rush to build the business there was no obstacle for obtaining new 
customers. Ghassan Qassem, a senior branch manager in London stated (Kochan 
and Whittington p. 37): 
they made the staff open an account for anyone, just for the sake 
of reaching targets. They never went through proper opening 
procedures, and that was an invitation for crooks to join the bank. 
The bank grew rapidly using this approach such that in just four years assets grew 
from $200m to $2.2 billion, deposits went from $335,000 to $25m. The basis of 
the growth was the large number of accounts from overseas private individuals. 
The bank became a haven for money to be hidden from tax or law enforcement 
agencies. In particular BCCI organised a specific operation to facilitate the 
movement of illegal cash between the Indian sub-continent and the UK. The I 
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system is widely known as Hundi or Hawalla and circumvents foreign exchange 
rules. The basic principle is that the bank allows a deposit in local currency in 
one country and a withdrawal in the local currency in another country. There is 
no paperwork or audit trail. 
Abedi had the dilernma of wanting to build an international bank but at the same 
time wishing to avoid the prying eyes of the various national banking regulators. 
His solution was to develop a network of offshore companies of which ICIC was 
at the heart. Rahmann, BCCI's chief financial officer, described ICIC as "a secret 
bank within the bank" (Beaty and Gwynne p. 58). The Cayman Islands had been 
chosen by Abedi because of a number of important factors. Firstly, there is no 
personal or corporate income tax, nor inheritance or death duties. Secondly, there 
is no tax disclosure treaty with the US. Thirdly, the strict secrecy laws are policed 
by the Caymans Protection Board which controls citizenship, visas and work 
permits, and therefore controls the various professionals who make large sums of 
money from the banking system. The Cayman Islands operate a form of virtual 
banking as of the 548 registered banks in the early 1990s only 6% had actual staff 
and offices on the Islands. The majority booked accounts to the Caymans from 
their main operating base such as the UK or US (Beaty and Gwynne p. 113-114). 
Abedi would claim on many occasions that there were no connections between 
BCCI and ICIC. However such a link was proved by the Fed and included in the 
indictment against BCCI was the following statement (Kochan and Whittington 
p. 40): 
ICIC Overseas operated under the control of and at the direction 
of senior BCCI management, including Abedi and Naqvi, to 
further the business interests of BCCI, and acted as the alter ego or 
agent for BCCI in connection with the acquisition of CCAH and a 
number of other transactions ........................ The two groups 
generally operated as a single entity. 
However in the early days of the bank when this relationship was not understood 
ICIC was a significant shareholder in BCCI and appeared as an independent 
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investor (Truell and Gurwin p. 27). Clearly this deception was a major conflict of 
interest that was well illustrated by the withdrawal from BCCI of the Bank of 
America which had become increasingly nervous of the questionable practices of 
BCCI and felt it should distance itself from BCCI. This began in 1976 with the 
removal of the Bank of America from the BCCI letterhead and the unwillingness 
to invest new capital in Abedi's expansion plans. In 1978 the Bank of America 
issued a press statement which indicated that it would divest its BCCI 
shareholding by 1980. By July of that year the shares had been acquired by the 
ICIC Staff Benefit Fund, in reality BCCI bought its own shares whilst giving the 
false impression that two independent investors had conducted a trade without 
any BCCI involvement. 
Corporate hospitality takes place in international business throughout the world. 
Similarly hospitality is a key aspect of eastern culture and would be natural to 
individuals from the Indian sub-continent. However BCCI took both the 
corporate and cultural perspective on hospitality to extremes. When overseas 
clients arrived in London they were met by BCCI Rolls-Royce cars which were at 
their disposal. As part of the arrangement the bank would arrange and pay for all 
the accommodation and whatever entertainment was required. In addition 
members of the bank's staff were delegated to accompany the client or his family 
on shopping trips and pick up the bills with the cash that they had brought with 
them from the bank. This level of service meant that it was not uncommon for 
bank officials to be summoned in the middle of the night to sort out some 
problem. Whilst it can be argued that this high level of service was no more than 
excellent customer care there is no doubt that elements of the service would be 
classed as illegal in the UK and included procurement of individuals for sexual 
favours (Beaty and Gwynne p. 143). 
The take-over of FGB was a blatant example of Abedi's disregard for rules and 
regulations xvhich he saw as obstructions to his goals. US banking regulations 
were clear that a foreign bank could not own a US bank but Abedi's aim was to 
achieve that ob jective. Because he knew that he could not purchase the shares 
Abedi chose to use his favourite device of nominee shareholders. Using Sheikh 
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Zayed, Abdullah Darwaish, Kamal Adharn and Faisal al-Fulary, nearly 20 percent 
of FGB's shares were obtained between December 1977 and February 1978. As 
the shares were to be used as a single block rather than four individual holdings, 
a violation of Federal law had been committed. It is at this point that legal 
proceedings began by a number of parties and both Clifford and Altman became 
engaged for the first time with BCCL Because BCCI was not supposed to be 
involved the two lawyers became the front men for all legal proceedings and 
discussions with the Fed and the various state banking regulators. Unfortunately 
for Abedi the fight for control of FGB dragged on into 1980. Many observers 
believed that the goal of the FGB shareholders was to force up the share-price 
which by this time was nearly double the original offer of $15 per share. In early 
1981 Clifford received a telephone call from an old acquaintance and FGB 
investor, Armand Hammer, the chairman of Occidental Petroleum. He suggested 
a roundtable discussion to broker a deal. After a day and a half of negotiation it 
was agreed that the Arab investors would buy out all of the FGB shareholders for 
a considerable premium, in most cases double their original investment. The 
remaining problem was to convince the banking regulators to approve the 
proposal. 
A public hearing was held on 23 d April 1981. Clifford and Altman presented 
their case along with Kamal Adharn and some of the Arab investors. Clifford was 
a skilled presenter and highly regarded as a man with the utmost integrity and a 
long career of successful public service. Therefore when he said 'There is no 
function of any kind on the part of BCCF and I know of no present relationship. 
I know of no planned future relationship that exists", these statements were 
highly influential. Altman gave further support when questioned on the dummy 
companies that would be the vehicle for the FGB purchase, by stating "There is 
no connection between these entities and BCCF (Beaty and Gwynne p. 159-16 1). 
The regulators relented and the acquisition was approved and took place in 1982. 
The original group of investors had grown to fourteen and now included Sheikh 
Zayed and his son Khalifa; Adharn and his assistant Sayed Jawhary; Saudi 
businessman Abdul Khalil; Rashid al-Maktoum, ruler of Dubai; Rashid al- 
Naomi, crown prince of the emirate of Ajman; and Sheikh Hamad bin 
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Mohammed al-Sharql, ruler of Fujairah. All had been recruited through Abedi's 
extensive network however not all were BCCI intermediaries. Those that were 
given BCCI loans to purchase shares in CCAH were Adham (16.32%), Fulaij 
(8.58%), Khalil (8.49%), Jawhary (0.5 1 %), Sharqi (6.56%), Shorafa (6.5 1 %) and 
Naomi (6.06%). These seven nominees covered 53.03% of the total CCAH 
equity and thereby gave Abedi a majority control from the outset. This constitutes 
a major conspiracy and a clear violation of US law. 
The use of nominee shareholders and companies was a habitual mechanism used 
by BCCL It became a vital mainstay to create the illusion of financial health and 
a robust balance sheet when the opposite was true. Jack Blum, an investigator for 
the US Congress, did much to uncover the BCCI scandal in the US. He describes 
what occurred (Kochan and Whittington p. 85-86): 
it's a shell-game, because you have several off-shore entities, 
BCCI in the Cayman, BCCI in Luxembourg, and ICIC, and they 
were able to lend money one to another and capitalise each other. 
One morning a loan would be created and you would wind up as a 
shareholder, jtist having borrowed millions of dollars. The paper 
would follow showing you as a shareholder and a loan where you 
would neither have to pay back the principal nor the interest 
because they would simply increase the amount of the loan as the 
interest increased. There was no substance in it, it was all high- 
flying paper. 
A good example of the practice took place in August 1982 when CCAH wanted 
to raise new equity through the issue of FGB shares. Sheikh Khalifa bin-Zayed al 
Nahyan, the Crowii Prince of Abu Dhabi appeared to purchase the shares but the 
money came from the Sheikh's personal BCCI account. The only security for the 
loan to Khalifa was the shares themselves. The same process was used to fund 
extra share purchases in FGB by al-Fulaij, Khalil and Shorafa. Adharn built up a 
nominal investmerit of 16.8% of CCAH shares through loans with either BCCI or 
ICIC. Each time BCCI promised that he would have "no liability for any 
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deficiency". Al-f`ulaij, meanwhile, gave his name to various ICIC investments 
and in return he was to receive 25% of the profits, an incentive he renounced in 
1985. At that time he told ICIC to do what they wanted with the shares and 
enclosed blank share transfer deeds. Between 1986 and 1989 al-Fulaij received 
$100,000 every year and in 1990 he was given $606,000 for his services as a 
nominee. In 1986 CCAH had another rights issue supposedly to generate new 
funds for First American. A company called Mashriq, owned by Sheikh Sharqi of 
Fujairah, was to buy the proposed 15,292 share offering, however BCCI arranged 
that it only took 8,550 shares even though the price was less than the current 
market value. The remaining shares were picked up at the below market price by 
Clifford and Altman. The other key nominees in the CCAH acquisition received 
significant finaiicial rewards. Khalil was paid $15m for the use of his name; 
Jawhary was paid $150,000 per year; Shorafa received double that sum; and 
Sheikh Naomi was given $6.5m for CCAH shares which were worth no more 
than $4m. Further evidence that BCCI controlled the holdings of various 
investors such as al-Fulaij and Shorafa, was provided with the involvement of the 
Saudi banking family bin-Mahfouz. The shareholder register was dramatically 
reshaped with this large investment however when they withdrew after three 
years, the CCAH shares reverted to the original nominees. 
At the time that BCCI became a prominent banking force in Florida in the 1980s 
the CenTrust Savings Bank of Miami, under the leadership of David Paul, 
showed incredible growth similar in style to BCCI. Paul ftinnelled depositors' 
money into high-risk real estate loans, junk bonds and unusual investments. 
Through Pharaon, Paul caught the attention of Abedi who helped him to 
circumvent the regulators when CenTrust began to come apart. They insisted that 
Paul produce new investment to support his deposits. Originally the regulators 
wanted $200m of new capital but agreed on $150m. Paul turned to Drexel 
Burnham Lambert to find the finance but the investment bankers could produce 
no more than $12-5-in in junk bonds. The solution was provided by Abedi. He 
used Pharaon to purchase $25m of CenTrust debentures with BCCI money. Less 
than one year later Paul secretly repurchased the bonds through a CenTrust 
subsidiary but had to pay substantially more as the value of the bonds had 
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dropped significantly. However Paul and Abedi were pleased with their 
arrangement and over two years BCCI acquired a 28% holding in CenTrust 
though Pharaon \vas the nominee. Unfortunately in 1990 CenTrust was seized by 
Federal authorities and on 15 th November 1991 Pharaon, Abedi and BCCI were 
indicted by the US Justice Department for their role in the bond manipulation at 
CenTrust (Beaty and Gwynne p. 184-187). 
One of Abedi's other covert forays into the US banking system was the purchase 
of the Independence Bank of Encino, California for $23m. Pharaon acted as a 
nominee for Abedi and had money channelled secretly from BCCI through the 
Parisian Banque Arabe et Internationale d'Investissement (BAII), a bank run by a 
BCCI board member. BAII, using language given by BCCI, told the Californian 
bank regulators that Pharaon had clear funds to buy the Independence Bank. 
Pharaon immediately put in place BCCI personnel including a senior officer, 
Kemal Shoaib,, as president. The bank's capital was raided and it had to be 
rescued in 1991. The US Justice Department indictment of November 1991 
included prosecution of BCCI for the secret ownership of the Independence Bank 
(Beaty and Gwynne p. 178-179). 
Abedi developed strong links with the leaders of Pakistan. He knew many of 
them when he operated his United Bank but when it was nationalised by 
President Ali Bhutto in 1972 Abedi was forced to seek his fortune elsewhere. 
Despite the early Success of BCCI Bhutto prevented Abedi from opening 
branches in Pakistan. However in 1977 there was a military coup and Bhutto was 
arrested and ultirnately executed. From the time of his arrest Abedi was back in 
favour in Pakistan and swiftly forged a strong relationship with the new military 
leader, General Zia ul-Haq. In 1978 BCCI's major partner, the Bank of America, 
hired Ijaz Zin-al-Haq, the General's son, even though it would appear he was 
completely unqualified for the position. Abedi became vital to the new Pakistani 
Government as the country was in poor financial health. There was a shortage of 
hard currency and the World Bank wanted the rupee to be devalued. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) were monitoring Pakistan's central bank and 
made it clear that Pakistani banks could not extend further credit to the 
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Government without Pakistan increasing its US dollar reserves. Abedi arranged 
for a$Im loan to the Pakistani Government which was portrayed to the IMF by 
the Pakistan authorities as an increase in the dollar reserves. The IMF deferred 
the imposition of further restrictions and the threatened devaluation. Further help 
was needed in 1979. Abedi used Kuwait International Finance Company 
(KIFCO) to make a $1 00m deposit in BCCI's Karachi branch. KIFCO received 
$100m in exchange from a loan from BCCI's Cayman Islands operation. $50m 
was held by Pakistan's central bank as part of its hard currency reserves for three 
months. The IMF had agreed that if the central bank increased its reserves by at 
least $50m for ninety days, it could raise lending limits for commercial banks. 
The central bank held out the incentive that the lending limits of any bank 
bringing in such a deposit would increase by 50%; BCCI's new branches were 
limited to $750,000. Abedi used his fund of $100m to pump phoney deposits into 
the central bank to increase BCCI's local lending limits to $100m. These 
manipulations of international banking regulations were included in the various 
indictments that followed after BCCI's collapse (Beaty and Gwynne p. 285-293). 
For Abedi to maintain the false image of a successful international bank he had to 
depend on a select group of people to undertake the detailed work. Naqvi t) 
provided the financial brains behind the operation and together with Abedi they 
established the Special Duties Department of the London headquarters. Picked 
employees, with unquestionable loyalty to Abedi, manned the Department which 
was separated physically from the rest of the headquarters so as to minimise 
interactions between the two groups of staff. The Department dealt regularly with 
the Cayman Islands operation which by the mid-1980s had grown to $2.5 billion 
or approximately 15% of all BCCI assets. Unfortunately the high use of nominees 
began to take their toll. To compensate the nominees Abedi and Naqvi agreed to 
buy back shares at particular prices so that nominees would receive specific rates 
of return on their investments. By the end of 1989 as much as 45% of all equity 
in BCC1 was licid by nominees and a further 11% by ICIC. The Special Duties 
Department began collecting customers' deposits without recording these 
liabilities in the bank's accounts. The money was used to pay the interest 
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payments on its loans to nominees but clearly a massive illegal operation had 
begun (Truell aiid Gurwin p. 190-197). 
The losses of BCCI through its treasury activity had come to the attention of the 
Luxembourg regulator, LMI. Its head, Pierre Jaans, asked Abedi how he was 
going to plug the gap in the bank's finances. $150m arrived and the impression 
given was that it was Abedi's benefactor Sheikh Zayed. However many years 
later investigators discovered that it came from the Staff Benefit Fund which was 
part of ICIC. Abedi had plundered the BCCI staff pension fund (Truell and 
Gurwin p. 206). 
BCCI attempted to portray the Tampa drugs money fiasco as the wrongdoing of a 
small number of employees in one local branch of the bank. The response of 
BCCI should have been to disown these individuals to reinforce the impression 
of an isolated instance of criminality. The reality was that BCCI's lawyers came 
to an arrangement with the Department of Justice whereby the defendants were 
held in comfortable private accommodation and guarded by off-duty Tampa 
police officers; the bill was picked up by BCCI. Clifford and Altman oversaw the 
defence team which was made up of fifty lawyers from twenty law firms. They 
represented some of the best legal expertise available in the US and by the time 
of the trial in 1990 had cost over $20m in fees (Beaty and Gwynne p. 329-330). 
The Tampa Scandal did not only illustrate a conflict of interest for BCCI but it 
raised major issues with regard to Clifford and Altman. Firstly both men were 
lawyers for First American which was supposedly an independent bank but at the 
same time they were senior officers of the bank. This is a conflict of interest 
between executive and legal responsibilities. Secondly they were lawyers for 
BCCI but how could [hoy carry out legal responsibilities for one bank when in 
the same industry they were running a competitor bank. Thirdly they acted as 
paymasters and co-ordinators for the Tampa defence team. As $7m of the drug 
money involved in this case had been laundered through a BCCI account at First 
American the), should have been outraged at this illegal activity which involved 
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an organisation for which they were responsible (Kochan and Whittington p. 253- 
254). 
Abedi strenuously denied any linkage between BCCI and First American, 
evidence shows otherwise. When First American wanted a new chief executive, 
the proposed candidate Bruno Richter travelled twice to London to be 
interviewed by Abedi. A third meeting followed in New York before Richter was 
passed on to Clifford for hiring. When Richter began recruiting senior staff the 
same process occurred. For example David Palmer went to London to meet 
Abedi and was offered a position on his return to New York. Abedi made 
recommendations that First American should hire two senior BCCI managers and 
they were taken on immediately. When Robert Stevens was interviewed by 
Clifford for the senior executive position at First American, Abedi was present. 
In 1982 First American wanted to buy two branches from Bankers Trust. The 
negotiation was led by Khusro Elley, a BCCI executive, which led Bankers Trust 
to believe that 13CC1 were acting on behalf of a subsidiary. Elley, at Abedi's 
behest, became a senior vice-president at First American. 
It is arguable whether Manuel Noriega could have been so successful in making 
money from criminal activities without the willing co-operation of a bank. On 
I 9th January 1982 AmJad Awan, the BCCI Panama manager opened an account 
in Noriega's name but using $1.3m of National Guard funds; further sums were 
added to the account. The money was laundered through accounts in London, in 
particular, the Cromwell Road branch which then saw over $3m moved to 
another branch in Edgware Road. Large shopping bills in excess of $200,000 
were paid from these accounts. The accounts moved on to BCCI Luxembourg 
where in February 1988 the balance was nearly $15m. From there BCCI 
facilitated their transfer to the Union Bank of Switzerland in Zurich and the 
Deutsche Sudamerikanische Bank in Hamburg, Germany. To cover the 
movement of National Guard monies an account was opened by the National 
Bank of Panaiiia in the name of Finley showing a false deposit of $23m. The 
balance of oN er $12m was moved from Germany to BCCI in London and joined 
by $11 m froni Switzerland. The account was in the name of Finley. It is clear 
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that BCCI were a willing accomplice in this money-laundering operation 
(Kochan & Whittington p. 109-111). 
Abedi was a MLislirn and wished to extend influence in many countries which 
were Islamic, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. The Koran is clear that 
Muslims are not allowed to earn interest as it is classed as usury. The common 
way round the problem is to call interest profit and use Murabaha transactions. 
An investor lends money to a bank which agrees to buy goods from a third party 
who will use the money to buy raw materials for production. The bank agrees to 
buy at a rate normally linked to existing interest rates and the profit is made when 
the goods are sold. The risk is that the manufacturer will fail and be unable to pay 
off the debt so a letter of credit is often given by another bank for which the 
manufacturer pays a fee. This system is a form of Islamic banking. BCCI set up 
its own Islamic banking unit in London and it was within this department that 
much of the serious false accountancy occurred. BCCI chose not to go to a 
second bank for a letter of credit but issued their own with the result that they 
bore all the risk if the debtor went bust. At its peak in 1989 $1.4 billion had been 
placed with BCC1 by Islamic customers. Western bankers do not regard such 
funds as deposits as defined under the Banking Act, but a form of asset 
management which should be kept completely separate. These customers were 
unaware that their money was being used elsewhere in the BCCI Group. The lack 
of proper management was picked up and severely criticised by the auditors in 
their key report Of Rine 1991 (Kochan and Whittington p. 56-57). 
Abedi spent a fair arnount of his time trying to obtain political influence 
sometimes through a direct bribe sometimes through more oblique payments 
which had an illtision of respectability, and sometimes by appealing to 
philanthropic issues close to the heart of individuals. In Nigeria, head of the 
global oil producers group OPEC for much of the 1980s, Abedi recruited a well 
connected indiNidual to oversee his operation. Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki was a 
member of the poNA-crful royal family of Sakoto in the north of the country and 
became Sultan in 1988. His son was a chief aide to the ruler of Nigeria, General 
Babangida. Dasuki received very large sums of money in exchange for access to 
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the enormous Muslim deposit base, some 55m people. BCCI became a major 
player in the country's foreign-exchange market and a conduit for flight capital 
out of the country. This was money, often illegal acquired by influential 
individuals in Nigeria, which was moved to a safe haven abroad. The usual 
approach was to over invoice for imports. The importer would change the 
inflated figure from Nigerian currency to US dollars and pay the invoice. The 
difference betweeii the real and inflated sums was banked at BCCFs Cayman 
Islands branch. Elsewhere in Africa similar illegal systems operated. In 
Cameroon BCCI btiilt up its share of export financing to 80% because of the 
speed at which it moved money around the globe. In Zambia Abedi had 
cultivated President Kaunda who turned to BCCI in 1987 when the fall in copper 
prices plunged the country into recession. Abedi arrived in a corporate BCCI 
Boeing 727 jet having sent on ahead a loan to tide over Zambia. Kaunda met him 
with the words "The money arrived just in time" (Lascelles et al 1991 p. 11). 
Alongside Abedi was the former UK Prime Minister, Lord James Callaghan who 
was a paid BCCI consultant. Activities in Pakistan and Panama have been 
covered in other sections of this case study. 
The oblique approach was that used by Abedi to reward Clifford and Altman. In 
1986 CCAH had a rights issue but it was arranged that only 8,550 of 15,292 
shares were taken up by Sheikh Sharqi. Clifford borrowed $9,960,920 from 
BCCI under a nonrecourse note which meant that if Clifford failed to repay the 
debt, the bank had no charge against his personal assets. For that sum of money 
Clifford received 4,495 shares. Altman received a similar deal for the balance of 
shares. In August 1987 Clifford borrowed another $2,310,930 from BCCI for an 
extra 951 shares, aýyain on the same terms. In February 1988 both Clifford and 
Altman wanted to sell their shares and approach Naqvi as Abedi was 
convalescing, to fiiid an interested buyer. Very quickly Mohammed Hammoud 
said that he would offer $6,800 per share, more than three times the purchase 
price. In March Clifford sold 3,200 shares for $21.76m. He paid off his BCCI 
loans of $12,271.8-50, $1,411,831 in interest and $1,500,000 in commission to 
BCCL This latter payment was highly questionable as no broker had been 
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involved. At the end CI. Ifford had $6,576,319 in cash and 2,246 in shares worth 
$15,272,800 (Beaty and Gwynne p. 181-183). 
In other cases Abedi was far more subtle. BCCI funded an annual $100,000 prize 
which was awarded to the individual who contributed most to the Third World. 
Abedi was not only interested in who received the award but who presented it as 
the presenters received much international recognition as well as the recipient. 
Presenters included Kurt Waldheim, UN secretary-general; Indira Gandhi, Prime 
Minister of India; Zhao-Ziyang, the Chinese Premier; Belisario Betancur, 
President of Columbia; Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN secretary-general; Mahathir 
Mohammed, Prime Minister of Malaysia; Jose Samey, President of Brazil; and 
Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. Recipients included Julius 
Nyerere, President of Tanzania; Willy Brandt, former German Chancellor; 
Nelson Mandela; and Gro Harlem Brudtland, the Norwegian Prime Minister 
(Kochan and Whittington p. 60-62). Another major political figure Abedi 
managed to get alongside was Jimmy Carter, the former US President. He met 
Carter after his defeat by Ronald Regan through Bart Lance who had worked for 
Carter. Nor was it a coincidence that the biggest single lender to the Carter 
family's peanut farm was the National Bank of George which was secretly owned 
by BCCI. Abedi played on Carter's interest in the Third World, particularly the 
issues of financial and technological assistance. As they got to know each other 
Abedi donated $500,000 to help establish the Carter Presidential Centre at Emory 
University in Atlanta, Georgia. This was followed by a further $300,000 when 
the centre was dedicated in 1986 (Truell and Gurwin p. 83-84). In 1985 Carter 
established Global 2000 Foundation to provide health care to the Third World. 
During the 1980s BCCI gave $8.1m to Carter and Abedi arranged a further 
$2.5m from Sheikh Zayed via the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. Abedi 
offered Carter the use of the BCCI corporate jet and offered Global 2000 office 
space at BCCI headquarters, both offers were accepted. In 1987 there was a 
world tour by Cartcr aboard the jet accompanied by Abedi. Stops included 
London, Hong Kong, Tibet, Peking and Moscow. It was no coincidence that in 
many of the countries BCCI was pursuing business developments. Carter claims 
that he did not knoNv Abedi was corrupt nor that he was being exploited though 
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he still accepted at least $11.5m from BCCI after the bank was convicted in 
Florida. As the pLiblic criticism mounted the Foundation ceased taking money 
from BCCI. However up until that time Abedi had garnered a large amount of 
influence and prestige through his long association with the former US President 
(Beaty and Gwynne p. 194-196). 
7.2.2. Management Control 
In 1978 the Office of the Controller of the Currency (OCC) of the US 
Government decided to examine the books of the Bank of America with regard to 
its BCCI investment. A bank examiner, Joseph Vaez, was sent out with a team of 
auditors. His report concluded that the extremely complex conglomerate structure 
meant that it was impossible to ascertain how much money had been borrowed 
by BCCI or its associates. He was also worried about the doubling of the total 
loan sum5 from $511 m to $1080m over some eighteen months. He believe that it 
indicated poor risk assessment, and risk concentration with a small number of 
borrowers. He notes that BCCI did not use the interbank market where banks 
deposited money with one another. Vaez highlighted other concerns such as 
delays in reporting loans to its board, weak credit analysis and loan 
documentation and highly personal relationships with major clients. Also there 
was no bank policy on a maximum lending limit when the industry norm was a 
maximum of 10% of capital to one borrower. As BCCFs total capital was $63m 
in 1978 it should have had loaned no more than $6m to any one client. The 
reality was that the Gokal's Gulf Group had a massive $185m set of loans which 
was three times the bank's total assets and thirty times the accepted maximum 
lending limit. In addition Vaez was of the view that BCCI was carrying $226m of 
questionable loans, i. e. substandard and liable to default. Over half this sum, 
$122.5m, was to the Gokals (Truell and Gurwin p. 187-189). 
In the mid-1980s as BCCI began to have problems with both questionable loans 
and servicing the interest payments to nominees, the bank turned to its Treasury 
Department to seek for solutions. Normally such departments raise and lend 
money to other banks, invest in short-term investments and deal in financial 
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markets. The aim is to use skill, knowledge and experience to produce a profit. 
Unfortunately the Treasury head, Akbar, convinced Abedi that trading in the 
futures market Would produce the sums of money that BCCI required. It appeared 
that a separate departi-nent within the Treasury Department was set up. It used 
customer's names, money and companies for its own account. These were known 
as Number Two accounts and escaped normal audit scrutiny but posed major risk 
and cost BCCI very large sums of money in losses. Number Two accounts were 
used to cover the losses but just before the auditors arrived Akbar and his team 
would sell options from BCCI. The money would then appear as profit rather 
than as part of a transaction which might produce a loss rather than a profit. 
Between 1977 and 1985 the estimated total loss and fictitious profits were 
$633m, but a further adjustment of $225m had to be made to the 1985 accounts 
by Price Waterhouse as a result of their treasury review (Kochan and Whittington 
p. 138-139). As the BCCI entrails were picked over after its demise the scale of 
the risk taking was seen to be astronomical. The bank exposed itself to $11 
billion in the futures and options markets. This was eleven times the maximum 
exposure that BCCYs treasury committee had set for investment in these markets. 
Akbar used the Grand Cayman branch to mask his activities and was assisted by 
the usual practice of these markets to only have to pay 10% of the investment 
when the position is taken. The downfall of Akbar was in the period of 1983-85 
when he lost heavily taking large bets on the US Treasury bond options market 
(Truell and Gurwin p. 201). 
In the heady days of the start of BCCI Abedi had been keen to be seen as a major 
player in the international world of finance. He established a relationship with the 
Gokal family which gave him credibility in the Middle East and Indian sub- 
continent. Ultimately the huge debts, which BCCI allowed the Gokals to amass, 
were the key issue that undermined the financial health of the bank. Because 
BCCI could not afford the Gulf Group to default, as that would bring down the 
bank, larger aiid larger loans were allowed when it was clear that the Gokals were 
unlikely ever to be able to repay their debts. Naqvi was the technical, financial 
genius behind BCCl and he knew how to hide the exact exposure the bank had to 
the Gulf Group. Even when Sheikh Zayed tried to save the bank in 1991 the 
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picture he was given was not real. Naqvi inflated the Gokal loan with penal 
interest which overstated BCCI assets. In truth the Gokals had been unable to pay 
any of their debts for a number of years. Price Waterhouse discovered that Naqvi 
and Abbas Gokal had spread over $1 billion loans around 750 companies. Over 
the fifteen year association with BCCI the Gokals had 750 accounts whose 
turnover was $15 billion. Even towards the end of the Gulf Group when it was 
evident to the international business community that it was only a matter of time 
before collapse, BCCI continued to support the Gokals. They started using 
"charter parties" which are agreements between two parties whose 
documentation can be used at the bank as a guarantee for an upfront loan. 
Normally banks will only engage in such arrangements with shippers who are 
trustworthy and where there is no risk of non-payment. The Gulf Group did not 
meet these criteria but many charter parties were done in the days leading up to 
the failure of the Gokal empire. Even when the first agreement failed it must have 
been obvious that fraud existed but BCCI went through with further agreements 
(Kochan and Whittington p. 158-159). 
7.2.3. Auditors 
One of the key parties to come out of the BCCI scandal with its reputation 
damaged was the firm Price Waterhouse. As one of the world's leading audit 
companies it had a lot of experience in auditing large, complex organisations. Yet 
for the first thirteen years of BCCI's existence it had audited BCCI's accounts in 
conjunction with another major audit firm, Ernst and Whinney, without a 
murmur. In fact Price Waterhouse had been responsible for auditing the Cayman 
Islands operation which was used extensively by BCCI to hide much of the 
illegal and questionable activity. In fact the cleared BCCI's accounts for this 
branch inchided the following statement dated 18 th October 1985 (Beaty and 
Gwynne P. 60): 
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customer deposits consist of confidential accounts which are not 
conducted as open accounts requiring periodic dispatch of 
statements. Furthermore because of company policy we have not 
been able to confirm any deposit balances directly with customers, 
and therefore it is not possible for our examination of such 
accounts to extend beyond the amounts recorded. 
At its simplest this stateinent means that Price Waterhouse agreed the accounts 
without confirmation or checking of any kind. 
In 1987 Price Waterhouse became the sole auditor for BCCI. The first sign of 
Price Waterhouse taking any action did not occur until they reported on the 1988 
accounts which they qualified because of the future possible penalties over the 
Tampa affair, however iio other action was taken. This was also the first year 
BCCI had made a loss \\hich leapt dramatically from $49m to $498m in 1989. 
Throughout this time BCCI's senior management worked very hard to reassure 
the auditors of their determination to control bad debts. Loan loss provisions had 
risen from $145m to $600m from 1988 to 1989. By March a further $150m had 
been added to the outstanding loans. 
In the autumn of 1989 the Bank of England and LMI commissioned a special 
audit from Price Waterhouse on BCCL The report in January 1990 began to show 
the real position within the bank. On many of the largest loans there were no loan 
agreements, in many cases there were no official third party witnesses and often 
there were improper appraisals for the basis of the loans (Truell and Gurwin 
p. 289). Around the same time the UK's Inland Revenue was indicating that BCCI 
had failed to file correct tax returns. The auditors took up some of these issues 
and wrote to the bank on 14 th March 1990. The letter expressed major concerns 
that nothing was what it appeared, loans which were recorded as assets had never 
existed or were being repudiated by the alleged borrowers. As this information 
became more widely known some of the borrowers realised that BCCI had used 
their names to create bogus loans. The rulers of AJman and Fujairah in the Gulf 
rejected any responsibility for loans totalling $270m. Christopher Cowan, Price 
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Waterhouse partner, took a tough line with BCCI as the auditors had finally 
uncovered a $750rn exposure to the Gokals, a number of disputed loans valued at 
$870m to CCAH and other questionable loans of $477m to other BCCI 
shareholders (Koclian and Whittington p. 148-149). 
As the auditor carried out further work further failures came to light. There were 
frequent absence of critical information to back up huge loans, irregularities in 
loan approval procedures and unreliable management representations. In addition 
some of the questionable loans were in the names of Adham and Khalil of which 
the latter had not properly serviced his debts for five years. Price Waterhouse's 
report of 3 rd April 1990 showed that BCCI had lent its own shareholders $1.48 
billion against 60% of the banks shares. The auditors advised BCCI that "certain 
accounting transactions had been either false or deceitful". Despite these major 
findings the auditor in discussion with the Bank of England believed that BCCI 
could be turned around. 
Price Waterhouse did threaten to qualify the bank's 1989 accounts which would 
have been a disaster for BCCL The auditor explained that an injection of new 
capital would prevent this action. Naqvi and a wheelchair-bound Abedi went to 
see Sheikh , ýaiyed. The result was that Price Waterhouse were assured that the 
Abu Dhabi L, overnment would underwrite any losses. On 3 oth April 1990 BCCFs 
annual report for 1989 was issued and included a Price Waterhouse endorsement 
that the acCOLints were "true and fair" (Truell and Gurwin p. 290-292). However 
there was sorne small print in that Price Waterhouse included the following 
(Kochan and Whittington p. 153): 
they [the Government of Abu Dhabi] have advised the directors of 
their iiitention to maintain the group's capital base whilst the 
reor, ()aiiisation and restructuring necessary for its continuing 4: ) 
development is undertaken. 
This statenient NN'Lis used in the aftermath of the BCCI scandal by Price 
Waterhouse to indicate some form of oblique qualification of the accounts 
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without causmg a run on the bank. However many commentators, such as 
Timewell (1991 b), argued quite strongly that it was disingenuous for the auditor 
to claim that tli-y had warned investors. 
In the surnmer of 1990 Sheikh Zayed moved the headquarters of BCCI to Abu 
Dhabi. In this transfer went Naqvi and all his paper files which recorded the true 
position of BCCl as the bank did not use a corporate computer system. The 
auditors finally had access to the real situation and they outlined thirty pages of 
inappropriate transactions and led to the Price Waterhouse report of 3d October 
1990. They concluded that $5 billion of new capital would be required to cover 
potential losses (Truell and Gurwin p. 303). Sheikh Zayed continued to 
implement his restructuring plan and the auditors continued to allow the bank to 
trade even when in January 1991 the new chief executive, 1qbal, told Price 
Waterhouse of $600m of unrecorded deposits. On 4 th March 1991 the Bank of 
England asked Price Waterhouse for a secret, independent review of BCCI under 
section 41 of the Banking Act 1987. This action in asking the incumbent auditors 
to carry out this work, has to be questionable as it constitutes a conflict of 
interest. Price Waterhouse will have known that a request for a formal audit from 
the banking regulator under a banking statute represented a serious step down the 
road to seizure of BCCI. Price Waterhouse had been an auditor for the whole life 
of BCCI and sole auditor for five years. They will have recognised the precarious 
position in which they were situated but were given an ideal opportunity to 
produce a tough audit which allowed them to also show how the auditors were 
deceived. Price Waterhouse appear not to have a problem with this ethical 
dilemma. 
Whilst Price Waterliouse went about this new audit the BCCI board met in early 
1991 and approved the 1990 accounts. The audit report was presented to the 
Bank of England oii 22 d June 1991 and spelt out the reality of BCCI. It stated 
"accounting records had been falsified for a substantial number of years" (Truell 
and Gurwin p. 306). The regulators moved in and seized BCCI but questions 
began to be asked about Price Waterhouse not least by Sheikh Zayed. He was so 
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incensed by the seizure that he took out full-page newspaper advertisements 
which indicated hi s displeasure and included (Kochan and Whittington p. 178): 
the majority shareholders feel that they cannot absolve Price 
Waterhouse from all responsibility since they have been auditors 
of a major subsidiary (BCCI Overseas) for fifteen years and 
auditors of the whole group since 1987 .............. . 
Since the seizure Price Waterhouse have attempted to defend their position. They 
argue that in law aLiditors owe a duty to members of the company and to no one 
else. If they discovcr fraud they are not obliged to report it to the regulators but 
may do so if they wish. Auditors have a duty of confidentiality to their clients and 
it is from behind this particular principle that Price Waterhouse defended itself 
Ian Brindle, the new senior partner of Price Waterhouse, who took up post five 
days before the seizure of BCC1 agreed that qualifying accounts of a bank can 
only be done on solid evidence as half-measures can lead to major problems. 
7.2.4. Regulators 
The most strikim) issue in the case of BCCI was the failure of the various 
authorities to act despite early information of illegal activities. In the US it is now 
known that the CIA knew that BCCI was involved in criminal activity as early as 
1979. By 1983 the Agency was distributing information to a variety of key 
government departments such as Treasury, Customs, Justice, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI), and the Fed. The following year the CIA described 
BCCI's money-laundering activities to the Treasury Department. A further 
twelve months on the CIA informed fellow government agencies that BCCI 
secretly owned First American. The OCC was informed but took no action even 
though the deputy controller was given the information. In 1986 the CIA told the 
State Department about BCCI's links with Abu Nidal and in 1987 BCCI's role in 
illegal weapons sa1cs. Also in that year the FBI, the US Attorney in Miami and 
the IRS receiN, ed a full criminal referral from the Fed concerning large-scale 
money- launderin () in BCCI's Miami branch. There was no response from the 
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Justice Department even though by now the C-Chase undercover operation was 
in full swing in Florida. In 1988 the Fed made another criminal referral to Justice 
about BCCI's New York office; no action was taken. The Justice Department 
failed to act on another occasion when it had explicit information from the 
Tampa investigation which described BCCI's secret control of three US banks, 
bribes paid to politicians and systematic attempts to fix a congressional 
investigation. 
The evidence available to government agencies was substantial and sufficient to 
take action under the severe Racketeering, Influenced and Corrupt Organisations 
(RICO) Act which would have allowed the Justice Department to seize all of 
BCCI's assets. In fact the deal done between BCCI and the authorities over 
Tampa was aimed explicitly at avoiding an indictment under the RICO statute. 
Much of the $20ni of legal fees went on hiring former Justice Department 
officials to defend BCCL The bank succeeded until July 1991 when the full force 
of RICO was used against BCCL Despite various senate hearings after the demise 
of BCCI answers for the failure to act have not been forthcoming as many of the 
details have been classified (Beaty and Gwynne p. 325-344). However for 
America the impact of BCCI was much less than elsewhere as Norton (1991 
p. 92) points out. The Fed had never allowed BCCI to accept retail deposits or 
make bank loans in the US so the regulator, with hindsight, did make an astute 
decision when the bank set up in the US. Other writers were not so charitable, 
King (1991) reminds readers that for the preceeding thirteen years Euromoney 
been voicing its concerns about BCCI and back in July 1978 had described them 
as "that cowboy bank in the Middle East". 
Authorities on the east side of the Atlantic were equally to blame as their US 
colleagues. In 1984 Pierre Jaans of the LMI had tried to engage his fellow 
regulators, particularly the Bank of England, in tackling BCCI. He failed as he 
did again the following year. In that year LMI asked Price Waterhouse to carry 
out a detailed investigation into BCCI. Though they found significant losses 
which were unrecorded, incompetent management was blamed. LMI suggested a 
new approacli Lo ensure better regulation of BCCI. It was proposed that the bank 
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be incorporatcd in its three main locations of business; the UK, the US and the 
Cayman Islands. The proposal never went beyond the planning stage. There were 
signs of problems with BCCI in other areas. The Johnson Mattey banking failure 
in 1984 led to a police investigation. Individuals who had defrauded that banking 
institution li, -, d accounts with BCCI who were less than co-operative with the 
police inqulr%. In that same year it is suggested that Bank of England officials 
were quietly warning against involvement with BCCI. In 1986 there were 
problems in India where BCCI had been allowed to establish a branch in the 
previous year. The director-general of India's Revenue Intelligence at the time, B 
V Kumar, statcs that BCCI had tried to circumvent foreign exchange rules which 
prohibited the transfer of foreign exchange out of the country without the explicit 
agreement of 11he Reserve Bank of India. The bank breached the Conservation of 
Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act. The BCCI 
general manager and three of his staff were arrested. It was found that BCCI was 
selling unsigned and unrecorded traveller's cheques to people leaving the country 
and thereby avoiding foreign exchange controls. BCCI quickly engaged the top 
Bombay law\ _ýr to defend itself Further difficulties followed in India as Kumar 
states that the authorities acquired evidence that BCCI was assisting the Pakistan 
government to spy on India but it was decided to maintain a watching brief on the 
bank. 
Back in the UK Ghassan Qassem began supplying the security service, M15, with 
information on the Palestinian terrorist connection with BCCL Qassem went on 
to give much more information on many other BCCI accounts. By 1989 M15 
went to the Baiik of England with the evidence gained over a two year 
investigation. Together with the auditors, Price Waterhouse, the regulator 
mounted the Pro - Ject 
Q financial examination of BCCI. The team included a 
partner in Price ýN`aterhouse, two senior Bank of England officials and a Special 
Branch officer from the police. They found unauthorised transfers of large sums 
of money for illegal arms deals and numerous financial irregularities. Details 
were sent to the Bank of England. However as the regulator along with LMI, 
Price Waterhouse and BCCI thought the bank could be saved by Sheikh Zayed, 
no formal mo\ e was made. By the middle of 1990 Sheikh Zayed had taken action 
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to try and save BCCI. In the UK 800 of the 1460 workforce was made redundant. 
One of the embittered staff, Vivian Ambrose, wrote to Labour MP Tony Benn 
and accused BCCI management of widespread corruption and nepotism. The 
letter was passed to the Treasury who passed it to the Department of Employment 
and so on. A game of pass the parcel had commenced amongst ministers, none of 
whom wanted to have to act. The UK government was able to stall for a few 
months more but once the Bank of England appointed Price Waterhouse in 
March 1991 to undertake a special examination of BCCI books, it was inevitable 
that real action would have to be taken (Kochan and Whittington p. 132-13 8). 
Following the seizure of BCCI the Bank of England took a low profile stance and 
implied that there was no need for an inquiry. Unfortunately for Robin Leigh- 
Pemberton, Governor of the Bank of England, the British government was under 
pressure from livid depositors and disgruntled employees. The charge was led by 
MP, Keith Vaz, who had a legal background. Eventually the government 
conceded and announced an inquiry by Lord Justice Bingham into the 
supervision of BCCI but evidence would be heard in private. This action 
contrasted very starkly with the US where televised congressional hearings were 
taking place (1<ýochan and Whittington p. 172). It was from one of these hearings 
that a stinging criticism of the Bank of England was made. The Senate's Foreign 
Relations Sub-committee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations 
was chaired by Senator John Kerry and had been interested in BCCI since the 
mid-1980s. In its final report on 3 Oth September 1992 the sub-committee stated 
(Beaty and Gwynne p. 106): 
by agreement, the Bank of England had in effect entered into a 
plan with BCCI, Abu Dhabi and Price Waterhouse in which they 
would keep the true state of affairs at BCCI secret in return for co- 
operation \\ ith one another in trying to avoid a catastrophic multi- 
billion dollar collapse. From April 1990 forward, the Bank of 
England had now inadvertently become partner to a cover-up of 
BCCI's criminality. 
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One of the perceived failings of the Bank of England involved the large sums of 
money lost by various Local Authorities in the UK. They argued that BCCI was 
on a Department of Environment list of financial institutions and therefore by 
implication deemed to have official approval for the public sector to use. The 
Bank of England argued that they were obliged to formally list banks with a 
license to take deposits. However from the banking regulator in the UK this 
argument seems to lack substance as at the time of issuing the list, BCCI was 
under investigation for fraud. It can be argued that if you cannot depend on the 
banking reoulator to protect public money then there is a major failing in the 
system. Leeniiiig (1995 p. 549) would argue that 6,018 former BCCI depositors 
agreed with this view and brought a negligence claim against the Bank of 
England. A number of commentators, Jones (1988), the editorial in Business 
Weekly (1991), Herring (1993) and Passas (1996), all ask the same fundamental 
question. HoAx did the Bank of England allow BCCI to continue to operate when 
the depth and breadth of the problems appear to be so well known ? In an 
interview with Skeel (1991) Brian Quinn, the Bank of England director in charge 
of banking supervision, defended the regulator and stated very forcefully that 
there had been no delay or political interference, and the Bank of England had 
reacted correctly when required. The biggest loser was the Western Isles 
authority in the Outer Hebrides who had invested f23m, the last fl. 3m was 
deposited ordy f1fteen minutes before BCCI was seized. Whilst York City 
Council invested f 1.3m after taking advice from their brokers and checking if the 
bank was ori the Bank of England list. In total f8 Im of poll tax payers money 
was lost (Kochan and Whittington p. 195-197). 
7.2.5. Aizencv Theor 
BCCI has the classical principal-agent relationship with the company's 
shareholders beiiiO the principal and the chairman/chief executive as the agent. 
Agency theory Hidicates that there are two methods by which the principal 
controls the agent. The first is to have extensive monitoring systems in place so 
that the principal has detailed information on which to judge the actions of the 
agent. At BCCI no such systems were implemented and the agent controlled the 
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flow of information and the picture that it painted. The second method is to 
incentivise the agent to deliver the principal's goals. Abedi created the illusion 
for many years that BCCI was a success and therefore the shareholders did not 
ask pertinent questions. Weir (1997) points out that where there is a weak group 
of non-executive directors and a combined chairman/chief executive position, the 
potential for problems to occur is high as is the likelihood that they will be 
undisclosed. As with the other cases the matter of moral hazard is relevant as the 
agent pursued his own rather than the principal's agenda. 
Mitchell's (1997) work supports the view as his classification illustrates that 
stakeholders from customers to regulators were discretionary stakeholders, they 
had the attribute of legitimacy. As the problems became known the regulators 
became definitive stakeholders through the acquisition of power and urgency, 
whereas customers and staff were expectant stakeholders as they possessed 
legitimacy and urgency however without power they were dependent on other 
players. As with Westminster, using Rowley's (1997) work BCCI was in a 
"Commander" position through the control of information and the fragmentation 
of the network of stakeholders. 
7.3 Summary of the Case Stud 
An international bank with business in many parts of the world is far removed 
from either Local Government or the NHS in the UK. However there is a clear 
link to agency theory with both agent, Abedi, and principals, mainly Sheikh 
Zayed, as key players in the situation. It might have been expected that little 
corroboration for the identified elements from Wessex would emerge from the 
world of high finance. This case was similar in aspects to Westminster as it 
involves power and personal influence but as with the West Midlands scenario it 
also suggests that personal gain was not unimportant. The manifestation of the 
root causes are rci-riarkably consistent with the other cases and once again 
accountability. directors and management control, and conflict of interest are 
high on the list with the abserice of audit committees notable. Similarly, the use 
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of agency theory to explore BCCI have demonstrated their relevance to a broad 
range of organisational environments. 
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Section C 
Public Responses to Corporate Governance Failures 
Chapter 8. 
PUBLIC REPORTS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FAILINGS 
The analysis of the four major corporate governance failings is complete but a 
further test of the emerging theoretical framework is possible. The 1990s saw an 
upsurge in corporate governance initiatives in the UK from a variety of 
significant players in the field, such as Government, the accountancy profession 
and the Confederation of British Industry. These have been followed by official 
NHS guidance on corporate governance. This chapter examines four generic 
initiatives whose reports are invariably known by the name of the chairmen of the 
group scrutinising various aspects of corporate governance; Cadbury (1992), 
Greenbury (1995), Hampel (1998) and Nolan (1995). Chapter 9 will examine the 
recent NHS responses to these reports and its development of guidance. By the 
end of this overall section it should be clear as to whether the theoretical 
framework is supported by the extensive work which was taking place around the 
same time the case studies came into view to a wide audience through the 
publication of the various source documents. 
The aim of this chapter is to see how far the reports pick out corporate 
governance elements that have been identified in the framework. Also the reports 
will be examined to explore how they reflect agency theory. Each report is 
analysed to understand the main issues that were deemed to be pertinent. 
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8.1. Cadbury 
8.1.1. Introduction 
A review of the history of the development of corporate governance in the UK 
shows that it evolved slowly over time with the main drivers being the various 
statutes of company law. However in the second half of the 1980s the UK 
business arena was subjected to a number of scandals which were seen as good 
examples of poor or no corporate governance. Boyd (1996) highlights the 
numerous notorious cases that are quoted regularly in academic texts. Relatively 
simple cases of fraud by founding chief executives include Barlow Clowes and 
Brent Walker who both stole investors' money. A more complex scandal was the 
transfer of funds from the conglomerate, Polly Peck, to offshore companies 
owned by the founder and chief executive, Asil Nadir, who subsequently fled the 
country whilst on bail. The Maxwell case was an even more complicated scenario 
and involved the theft of over fI billion in employee pensions by Robert 
Maxwell to support his various businesses. Other cases involved stock 
manipulation. In the infamous Guinness scandal, a number of prominent 
individuals went to jail for attempting to inflate the value of Guinness shares 
during the takeover fight for Distillers. Similarly in the Blue Arrow affair the 
merchant bank, County Natwest, was accused of inflating the success of a rights 
issue of Blue Arrow shares. Finally, there was the spectacular collapse of BCCI 
which has been covered in detail in this thesis but raised major concerns over the 
detection of fraud and the role of external auditors. At the same time society saw 
the business community pay large salaries and bonuses to senior managers which 
caused much public disquiet. Firstly the proportionate size of increases was out 
of line with the prevailing economic circumstances and secondly, often the 
company was not performing and therefore high payments to individuals 
appeared to be based on greed. 
The outcome vvas that in May 1991 the Financial Reporting Council, the London 
Stock Exchange. and the accountancy profession in the UK established a 
committee to examine financial reporting and accountability for companies in the 
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private sector. The committee's chairinan was Sir Adrian Cadbun', a successful 
businessman and chairman of a large public company. 
To consider the following issues in relation to financial reporting 
and accountability and to make recommendations on good 
practice: 
The published report of the Committee is entitled the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance (I December 1992) and is commonly known as the 
Cadbury Report. In its preface (p. 9) Cadbury emphasises that the work of the 
Committee was necessary because of public concern over BCCI, Maxwell and 
directors' pay. 
8.1.2. The CadbuKy Report 
This report has three main sections. Firstly the structure and responsibilities of 
boards of directors, secondly the role of auditing, and thirdly the rights and 
responsibilities of shareholders. Each section will be examined in turn. 
9 Board of Directors 
The Committee decided to tackle this subject through the development of a Code 
of Best Practice and made explicit the three principles which underpin the Code; 
openness, integrity and accountability. To encourage companies to adopt this self 
regulatory Code, the Committee recommended that companies should record in 
their report and accounts whether they complied with the Code and any areas of 
non-compliance. It was further envisaged that external auditors should review 
statements by companies, and if non-compliance was not disclosed properly by 
the company, to draw attention to it in their report on financial statements. 
There was explicit reference to two key functions of non-executive directors. 
Firstly revieitlng the performance of the board and the executive. Secondly non- 
executh, e directors should take the lead where conflict of interest may occur. 
Directors' pay. executive succession and takeovers are examples where there is I 
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the possibility for divergence of view between the needs of the company and 
individual executive directors. The role of chairman in leading the board and 
achieving effective corporate governance was recognised as vital. The Committee 
recommended that there should be a separation of the roles of chairman and chief 
executive otherwise there is a concentration of power which can lead to 
unchecked decisions. 
The Cadbury Report went further with regard to non-executive directors. 
Independence ofjudgement was seen to be crucial and therefore they should not 
have any dependant relationship with the company such as a supplier of service 
to the organisation and there should be a minimum of three outside non-executive 
directors of whom one should ideally be the chairman. 
Boards need to have in place internal control mechanisms which include the 
minimisation of the risk of fraud. The Committee expected to see statements of 
the effectiveness of the control system to be made in the annual report and 
accounts, and auditors should confirm the accuracy of these statements. 
Cadbury recommended that all listed companies should have an audit committee 
which should have clear terms of reference and an explicit relationship with the 
board. Membership was defined as a minimum of three non-executive directors 
and they should meet at least twice a year. The Committee outlined the duties 
that audit committees would undertake normally: 
* making recommendations to the board on the appointment of the external 
auditor, the audit fee, and any questions of resignation or dismissal; 
9 review of the half-year and annual financial statements before submission 
to the board; 
9 discussion with the external auditor about the nature and scope of the 
audit, co-ordination where more than one audit firm is involved. any 
problems or reservations arising from the audit, and any matters which 
the external auditor wishes to discuss, without executive board directors 
present, 
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* review of the external auditor's management letter; 
e review of the company's statement on internal control systems prior to 
endorsement by the board-, 
* review of any significant findings of internal investigations. 
It is clear that the Committee saw the appointment of a separate audit committee 
as crucial. The Report states (p. 29): 
it enables the non-executive directors to contribute an 
independent judgement and play a positive role in an area for 
which they are particularly fitted, and it offers the auditors a direct 
link with the non-executive directors. The ultimate responsibility 
of the board for reviewing and approving the annual report and 
accounts and the half-year report remains undiminished by the 
appointment of an audit committee but it provides an important 
assurance that a key area of a board's duties will be rigorously 
discharged. 
To support the function of the audit committee and to monitor the effectiveness 
and integrity of the internal control systems, the Committee saw the 
establishment of an internal audit department as good practice. 
The Report has several recommendations on board remuneration and included 
the disclosure of directors' total emoluments and those of the chairman and 
highest-paid director, the length of time for a director's service contract, and the 
establishment and membership of remuneration committees. 
The final main section of work covered by the Code concerned financial reports. 
The Committee emphasised the point that the use of different accounting 
treatments together with various presentational techniques did not allow for 
transparency and openness. Therefore included in the Code is a requirement for 
boards to present a balanced and understandable assessment of the company's 
position. 
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o Auditing 
A significant part of the Report is devoted to this subject as the annual audit is 
described as "one of the cornerstones of corporate governance" (p. 36). The 
Committee made the point that the board report on their steI4, ardship to the 
company's owners through the annual report and financial accounts. The audit is 
an external and objective view on the validity of these key documents and is a 
safeguard for the shareholders. 
The Report highlighted an expectations gap that existed between what audits do 
achieve and what it is thought they do or should achieve. In 1990 the House of 
Lords gave a judgement in Caparo Industries p1c v Dickman and Others which 
clarified the position of auditors. The company and the shareholders as a body are 
owed a duty of care by auditors but not individual shareholders, third parties or 
subscribers to new shares. The Companies Act 1985 places specific duties on 
auditors at sections 235 and 237: 
235 
(1) a company's auditors shall make a report to the company's members on 
all annual accounts of the company ; 
(2) the auditors' report shall state whether in the auditors' opinion the annual 
accounts have been properly prepared in accordance with this Act, and in 
particular whether a true and fair view is given: 
(a) in the case of an individual balance sheet, of the state of 
affairs of the comPany as at the end of the financial year; 
(b) in the case of an individual profit and loss account, of the 
profit and loss of the company for the financial year; 
(c) in the case of group accounts, of the state of affairs as at 
the end of the financial year, and the profit or loss for the 
financial year, of the undertakings included in the 
consolidation as a whole, so far as concerns members of 
the company. 
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(3) the auditors shall consider whether the information given in the directors' 
report for the financial year for which the annual accounts are prepared is 
consistent with those accounts; and if they are of the opinion that it is not 
they shall state the fact in their report. 
237 
(1) a company's auditors shall, in preparing their report, carry out such 
investigations as will enable them to form an opinion as to : 
(a) whether proper accounting records have been kept by the 
company and proper returns adequate for their audit have 
been received from branches not visited by them and; 
(b) whether the company's individual accounts are in 
agreement with the accounting records and returns; 
if the auditors fail to obtain all the information and explanations which to 
the best of their knowledge and belief are necessary for the purposes of 
the audit, they shall state that fact in their report. 
Under section 4 of the same Act, accounts have to be prepared on the 
presumption that the company is a "going concern". This concept is defined in 
accounting standards as the assumption that the organisation will operate for the 
foreseeable future. This vague period of time is not made any clearer, however 
auditing guidance states that it should normally extend to a minimum of six 
months following the date of the audit report or one year after the balance sheet 
date which ever is later. 
The audit report is based on the concept of reasonable assurance, it cannot be 
seen as a guarantee of no fraud. With regard to reporting detected fraud, the issue 
is not as many expect. Confidentiality is an implied term of the auditors' contract 
and therefore usually the auditor reports fraud to senior management. An auditor 
can report fraud to a proper authority and is encouraged to do so if there is a lack 
of confidence that management will deal adequately with the issue. The Report 
summarised the auditors' role (p. 40): 
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to report whether the financial statements give a true and fair 
view, and the audit is designed to provide reasonable assurance 
that the financial statements are free of material misstatements. 
The auditors' role is not to prepare the financial statements, nor to 
provide absolute assurance that the figures in the financial 
statements are correct, nor to provide a guarantee that the 
company will continue in existence. 
The Report examined the area of conflict of interest for auditors. Potentially this 
can arise if the auditor undertakes non-audit work and it is thought that the 
auditor might take a softer line with management in order not to jeopardise the 
non-audit source of income. The usual scenario is where the auditor is part of an 
organisation which supplies consultancy services. The Committee recommended 
that there should be full disclosure of non-audit fees paid to auditors. 
The Caparo judgement exploded two major misconceptions around auditors' 
liability. Firstly that the audit report is a guarantee both to the accuracy of the 
accounts and the viability of the business. Secondly that the report can be relied 
upon by a wide range of parties, such as investors and creditors, not only in a 
general sense but also specifically for negligence claims against auditors. 
e Shareholders 
The shareholders are the owners of the company and elect the directors who 
report on their stewardship to the shareholders. In addition they appoint the 
external auditors to provide an independent view on the directors' financial 
statements. Cadbury believed that the issue for corporate governance was how to 
improve the accountability between agent and principals. The Report commented 
that shareholders have the opportunity to call their stewards to account at the 
AGM. Unfortunately often shareholders fail to do so and boards do not offer 
encouragement. The Committee stated that both agents and principals should 
explore how to improve the effectiveness of AGMs 
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Finally in its conclusion the Cadbury Report stated (p. 53): 
no system of corporate governance can be totally proof against 
fraud or incompetence. The test is how far such aberrations can be 
discouraged and how quickly they can be brought to light. The 
risks can be reduced by making the participants in the governance 
process as effectively accountable as possible. The key safeguards 
are properly constituted boards, separation of the functions of 
chairman and of chief executive, audit committees, vigilant 
shareholders and financial reporting and auditing systems which 
provide full and timely disclosure. 
8.1.3. Post Cadbuly Comments 
Publication of the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee prompted much 
written comment. In general business was broadly supportive however some 
businessmen and academics raised varying concerns which can be grouped into 
five issues; self regulation, prevention, external directors, auditors and company 
size. 
Morris (1995 p. 48) spoke to a number of leading, successful industrialists for 
their views. Sir Owen Green, former chairman of the conglomerate BTR, was 
sceptical about self-regulation at a time when there was a generation of high 
earning directors who had come to the fore in the era of Thatcher's free market. 
He stated: 
Cadbury's non-executive directors were supposed to sit on 
remuneration committees and control executive pay, and anyone 
can see that that hasn't worked. All it has meant is that your 
average non-executive director has three or four directorships 
instead of one or two. 
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The Economist (I 992b p. 78) expressed its concern at the lack of enforcement and 
noted that whilst the London Stock Exchange would require company accounts to 
identify whether the Code was being observed, delisting was not regarded as an 
appropriate sanction for non-compliance. Finch (1992), Osman (1992) and Short 
et al (1998) expressed similar opinions. An interesting perspective came from a 
director who had been involved in one of the cases which prompted the creation 
of the Cadbury Committee, the Maxwell affair. Phillips (1992 p. 2) wrote: 
as a former director within the Maxwell empire who must admit to 
taking the shilling gladly (for a while, at least) may I be permitted 
one observation about the pension scandal ? If the fate facing the 
directors for not standing up to Maxwell had been worse than the 
prospect of his wrath or the sack then much of what occurred 
would have been avoided. Directors have legal and moral 
obligations to shareholders, employees and suppliers. Until 
officeholders are made through the imposition of the severest 
penalties (such as the confiscation of assets) to understand that 
power and responsibility must go hand-in-hand there will always 
be the risk that the desire for the trappings of power and will 
overwhelm the requirement of responsibility. The flea goes where 
the dog wishes; if it doesn't fancy the prospect, it should jump off. 
Staying is eloquent testimony of satisfaction. 
A balanced and arguably a pragmatic view was articulated by Laurence (1992 
pi2): 
the notion of self-regulation in the financial services industry has 
become a bit of a joke. The British seem to favour the idea, yet it 
has done little for the likes of Maxwell pensioners and Barlow 
Clowes investors. But before we become too carried away with 
the idea that any regulation is useless unless underpinned by law, 
bear this in mind: Peter Clowes did break the law; so did Robert 
Maxwell. The threat of being imprisoned didn't stop them. 
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A complementary argument was made by Bain (1992) who was of the opinion 
that attempts to make the issue one of mechanisms which involved rigid rules. 
legislation and complex accounting standards, was flawed. He said (p. 30): 
the truth is that corporate governance is more about commitment 
than compliance. The real solution resides with the board which 
must lift its integrity and raise its standards and its performance. 
The second area of concern was that of prevention. Morris (p. 48) reported the 
findings of a Coopers and Lybrand survey of medium-sized and smaller listed 
companies in November 1993. Only 12% agreed with the Cadbury Committee 
that if the Code had been in existence then a number of business failures and 
frauds would have been spotted earlier. Martin (1992 p. 20) put it more starkly 
when he said "where was the magic bullet that would rid the world of future 
Robert Maxwells ? ". 
The Cadbury Committee put great faith in the non-executive director. David 
Barber, chairman and chief executive of the highly successful HalmaGroup, was 
very sceptical when talking to Morris (p. 48-49). He said: 
as a full-time, committed manager, I think it's illogical to believe 
that a non-executive director can perform a useful function with a 
limited knowledge of the company. Part of my job is to act as a 
non-executive director and when I sit in on a meeting that I'm not 
chairing the more I understand about the business, the more I can 
contribute. The thing that always troubles me about non- 
executives is that they are not well enough briefed. 
Some commentators quote the evidence of continuing business failings to pour 
scorn on the role of the non-executive director. Brummer (1993) points out that 
six independent external directors and an audit committee failed to detect the 
problems at the Queens Moat House hotel chain and did not prevent a write- 
down of $1.5 billion just after the company received an unqualified audit report. 
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One of the most scathing critics was Corrin (1993). In his article he is derisory in 
the elevation of the non-executive director by the Cadbury Committee to 
sainthood whilst portraying the executive director as the villain and the auditor as 
a tarnished angel. He argued that every scandal had non-executive directors 
involved and they served no useful purpose. Boyd (p. 174) lists some of the 
pejorative descriptions used by the press and commentators to depict outside 
directors. They include decorations on a Christmas tree, maraschino cherries, the 
parsley on fish, and management's pet rocks. 
Boyd calculated that for each of the 6,000 listed companies on the London Stock 
Exchange, at least 18,000 outside director positions were required if the Code's 
minimum three non-executive directors were to be met. His legitimate question 
was, "is the stock of available suitable candidates big enough if multiple 
directorships were to be avoided T' In addition with the recommended rotation of 
external directors so that they have a maximum of three years, additional strain is 
added to the supply of candidates. Finally with regard to outside directors there is 
evidence to suggest that chief executives receive higher pay in companies with 
remuneration committees and not the reverse (Main and Johnston 1993). 
The Code placed a responsibility on auditors to check for compliance on eleven 
out of nineteen items, of those most were relatively uncontested however two 
provoked concern amongst auditors. Firstly the auditor is expected to comment 
on the effectiveness of the company's internal control systems and secondly on 
the 'going concern' statement. Auditors were reluctant to be involved in the 
detection of fraud and in taking a stance on the future viability of the company. 
Behind this unhappiness was the fear of an explosion in legal liability claims. 
However as standards were being formulated by the UK's Auditing Practices 
Board these two elements of the Code had been deferred. 
The final issue was that of size of company. The Cadbury Report treated all 
businesses as the same with the result that smaller firms faced proportionately 
larger costs than the big companies in enacting the Code. Doble (1997) surveyed 
a range of companies in the period of 1990-1994 and found that the smaller 
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company was having difficulties in meeting the demands of the Code. The 
proportion of companies in 1993/94 with three or more non-executive directors 
was only 60% and he concluded that even small new companies that went 
through the listing process were not being forced to adhere to some aspects of the 
Code such as three outside directors. 
8.2. Greenbury 
8.2.1. Introduction 
The early 1990s saw increasing pressure on the UK Government with regard to 
executive remuneration in public companies. Headlines in newspapers such as 
the Financial Times (26 1h November 1994) with "Executive Gluttony Under 
Attack" were becoming more frequent. Cheffins (1997) records that a survey of 
top managers in key UK businesses in 1994 found that the average total 
remuneration for chief executives was f 351,000. The Government contemplated 
introducing legislative changes but was grateful when in January 1995 the UK 
employers' organisation, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), stepped in 
with the offer of an independent review of executive pay. A study group was 
established under the chairmanship of Sir Richard Greenbury, at the time he was 
chairman of the major retailer Marks and Spencer. The Study Group's findings 
were published on 17 th July 1995 and inevitably they are known as the Greenbury 
Report. 
8.2.2. Greenbury Repo 
The approach taken by the Study Group was to adopt the codification route as 
had Cadbury. The Code of Best Practice has four sections; the remuneration 
committee, disclosure and approved provisions, remuneration policy and, service 
contracts and compensation. It was noted that whilst the Code had been prepared 
predominantly for large companies the principles would apply to smaller 
organisations. 
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* The Remuneration Committee 
The Code was unequivocal that there should be a remuneration committee which 
had been established by the board. The committee should have agreed terms of 
reference and should develop, on behalf of the board and shareholders, executiVe 
remuneration policy and individual packages for each executive director. 
Membership of the committee should comprise of non-executive directors who 
are independent which Greenbury defines as having no personal financial interest 
other than as a shareholder, no potential conflicts of interest arising from cross- 
directorships, nor any involvement in the daily operation of the company. 
* Disclosure and Approved Provisions 
The Code introduced a new requirement for an annual report of the remuneration 
committee to the shareholders on behalf of the board and is the main mechanism 
for accountability to the company's owners. In presentational terms the report 
should form part of or be an annex to the company's main annual report and 
accounts. Disclosure should be made for each director of the remuneration 
package, broken down into the key components such as basic salary, benefits and 
long-term incentive schemes as well as service contracts with notice periods in 
excess of one year or predetermined early termination compensation of more than 
one year's salary and benefits.. 
e Remuneration Policy 
The Code started off by recognising that remuneration committees must develop 
reward packages which recruit and retain directors of the required standard but 
must avoid paying more than is necessary. With regard to performance-related 
components of remuneration, Greenbury effectively argued for adherence to 
agency theory and the need to align the interests of the directors with that of 
shareholders. With that in mind it was recommended that remuneration 
committees should consider very carefully whether annual bonuses should be 
paid and if so, the criteria should be clear and designed to enhance the company. 
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9 Service Contracts and Compensation 
Remuneration committees should work through what compensation 
commitments should apply if a director's service contract is terminated early and 
in particular take into account the issue of unsatisfactory performance. Within 
legal obligations, approaches to early termination should be tailored to individual 
circumstances so as to deal fairly with directors whose departure is not for poor 
performance but to avoid rewarding unsatisfactory performers. 
8.2.3. Post GreenbuKy Report Comments 
Merrick (1995) pointed out that following the publication of the Greenbury 
Report, the Study Group had been lampooned in the popular press as a group of 
"fat cats". The seven industrialists earned in excess of f 3.5 million and declined 
to recommend placing limits on executive pay. It was argued that this outcome 
was inevitable considering their backgrounds. Merrick reported that John Monks, 
the Trades Union Congress (TUC) General Secretary, said the report did not go 
far enough, "voluntary disclosure backed up by a voluntary code will not stop 
greedy executives paying themselves double-figure pay increases". 
Pickering and Mayho (1995) examined some aspects of the Report and concluded 
that the costs to companies would rise. The Report strove to reduce the financial 
burden on organisations which had occurred when large pay increases were given 
to directors in the last three years before retirement but higher basic salaries for 
longer periods or the introduction of equity-based investment plans would end up 
costing the company more. 
In October 1995 the London Stock Exchange issued Amendment 6 to its Listing 
Rules which put the bulk of the Greenbury recommendations into effect. The 
outstanding issues such as long-term incentive schemes followed as Amendment 
8 in September 1996. 
Chapter 8 218 
Chandler (1996) was of the view that greater disclosure was the best method for 
curbing excessive pay awards. He said (p. 132): 
there seems to be no doubt that the statutory disclosure 
requirements (little changed since 1967) are woefully inadequate 
in a modem context. 
The Economist (I 995b p. 17) wrote an article immediately after the publication of 
the Report and effectively concluded that it was like a curate's egg. It liked many 
of the recommendations such as those for share options, service contracts and 
remuneration committees. However it thought that on the likeliest cause of 
market failure, the indifference of shareholders, Greenbury did not go far enough: 
true, it says that remuneration committees should consult big 
shareholders on major changes to pay policy, and report at every 
annual general meeting. But it should also have recommended that 
executive pay be put to an annual vote of shareholders, and that 
the votes of the biggest shareholders be disclosed. This might 
cause hostile headlines and a louder outcry, but the gain would 
more than outweigh this nuisance. Disclosure, combined with a 
requirement to vote, would make it harder for institutional 
shareholders to evade their duty to the investors whose savings 
they manage. If "bosses' pay is 'excessive", it is because big 
shareholders have let it be so. The remedy must work through 
them. 
In the following year the publication Accountancy (1996) reported that a number 
of major companies had rapidly implemented the Greenbury Code, in fact ahead 
of the required date of the Listing Rules. However many of the critics knew that 
Cadbury 11 was imminent and would include a review of the Greenbury Code. 
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8.3. Hampel 
8.3.1. Introduction 
The third review of corporate governance in the 1990s was undertaken by a 
committee chaired by Sir Ronald Hampel. Both the Cadbury and Greenbury 
Committees had recommended that a review of the implementation of their 
findings should be carried out in due course. The result was that in November 
1995 the Hampel Committee was established by the London Stock Exchange, the 
Confederation of British Industry, the Institute of Directors, the Consultative 
Committee of Accountancy Bodies, the National Association of Pension Funds 
(NAPF), and the Association of British Insurers (ABI). At the time Hampel was 
the chairman of the major industrial company, ICI. The Preliminary Report of 
the Hampel Committee was published in August 1997. 
8.3.2. The Hampel Report 
The Report was split into a number of sections; principles, directors, directors' 
remuneration, shareholders and the AGM and, accountability and audit. 
9 Principles of Corporate Governance 
The Report commenced by articulating a number of principles of corporate 
governance which were seen to be different from the guidelines of the Cadbury 
and Greenbury Codes. 
A chairman is required to lead the board and a chief executive to run the 
company's business. The firm should decide how to apportion these 
responsibilities and explain publicly the reasoning behind their decision. The 
board should include a balance of non-executive and executive directors so that 
the board is not controlled by any one group. Appointments to the board should 
be made via an open and formal process, and all directors should re-submit 
themselves for re-election at least every three years. 
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Remuneration of directors should be at the level necessary to recruit and retain 
good calibre managers but it should be associated with individual and corporate 
performance. Remuneration packages should be derived from an organisational 
policy on executive remuneration which has been developed in an open and 
formal manner. The company's annual report should outline the remuneration 
policy and give the remuneration of each director. 
On the issue of financial reporting, the board should present a balanced and 
understandable view of the firm's position and future prospects. Internally there 
should be effective control systems to protect investors' equity and the 
organisation's assets. To assist in this process the board should arrange explicit 
arrangements with external auditors to establish an appropriate relationship. The 
auditors will report to the company's owners in accordance with statutory and 
professional requirements and thereby independently assure the board with 
regard to their duties under financial reporting and internal control. 
0 Directors 
The Committee concluded that there should be no change to the duties of 
executive and non-executive directors under the law. On the appointment of 
executive directors, boards should recruit only those individuals whom they 
assess able to take a broad view of the company's overall interests. The 
Committee was of the view that there should be no prescription of length of 
service or age of non-executive directors. The Report concluded that the majority 
of non-executive directors should be independent, irrespective of the size of the 
company. Finally the Committee believed that diverse backgrounds of non- 
executive directors gave the best contribution to the board. With regard to board 
structure the Committee concluded that the unitary approach was clearly 
supported in the UK. 
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* Directors' Remuneration 
The Committee was clear that companies should have remuneration committees 
chaired by a non-executive director. They should develop an overall 
remuneration policy and packages for individual executive directors. No further 
changes to the Greenbury Code with regard to performance related pay were 
recommended. 
Disclosure is at the heart of Hampel's work and this was the case with directors' 
remuneration. The requirement to include a statement on remuneration policy in 
the annual report was recommended for retention and the Committee commented 
that it hoped that these statements would become more informative. 
e Shareholders and the AGM 
Notice of the AGM together with the related papers should be sent to 
shareholders at least twenty working days before the meeting. At AGMs boards 
should make a full business presentation and have a question and answer session 
for shareholders who should have access to the chairmen of the audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees. 
9 Accountability and Audit 
The Report had a number of recommendations with regard to audit. Firstly there 
should be an audit committee with at least three non-executive directors of whom 
one should be the chairman and two should be independent. Secondly no 
additions or removals were recommended to the existing requirements on 
auditors for reporting on governance issues. Thirdly it was recommended that the 
appropriate bodies should consider reducing from 10% the limit on the 
proportion of audit income which an audit firm may earn from one audit client. 
Fourthly the audit committee should keep under review the range and depth of 
non-audit services provided by the auditors to ensure a continuation of objectivity 
in dealing AA-ith the company. Finally there was recognition that auditors could 
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not go beyond their existing functions because of concerns over the law on 
liability which should be taken into account by those relevant bodies responsible 
for statutory changes. 
Away from audit, the need for directors to have internal control processes was 
extended from purely financial to a whole system approach. The Committee 
recommended the modification of point 4.5 of the Cadbury Code to drop the 
word effectiveness and would say 'the directors should report on the company's 
system of internal control' but also recommended that auditors should report 
privately to the directors on this matter. There was retention of the 'going 
concern' statement in the annual report and a firm recommendation that 
companies without an internal audit function should keep the matter under 
review. 
8.3.3. Post Hampel Comments 
As with Cadbury the Hampel Report drew its share of criticism. One of the most 
strident was Tricker (1998) writing an editorial in the academic publication, 
Corporate Governance. He argued that the principles articulated by the 
Committee reflected conventional wisdom but completely missed the longer term 
view. He said (p. 2): 
corporate governance is about power - the wielding of power over 
corporate entities, which are now the most significant organs of 
the modern developed and developing world. Nothing less than a 
complete re-think of the nineteenth century concept of the 
corporation will fit it for the next century. Failure to face this 
reality can only lead to further dissatisfaction in societies around 
the world (including Britain) with the wielding of corporate 
power. 
He was highly cynical that a committee with its membership drawn from major 
public companies and their professional advisers, could criticise contemporary 
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corporate governance, nor introduce constraints on the powers of directors and 
broaden the scope of accountability. Tricker went on to express concern that the 
findings of the Committee did not seem to be rooted in the extensive body of 
research and academic knowledge from around the globe. Instead wide 
consultation has taken place with groups and individual of directors or 
professional advisors, and therefore these were vested interests. In particular, 
Tricker was scathing about the lack of consideration of the wider notions of 
stakeholders rather than shareholders which he believed was based on opinion 
and belief rather than argument and an articulation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each position. He argued passionately (p. 3): 
societies' expectations of companies are also changing, currently 
seen in demands for better consumer, environmental and societal 
behaviour, but expect wider and more penetrating demands in the 
future. Investigative journalism is becoming ever more inquisitive. 
The inexorable rise of the litigious society is set to continue and to 
accelerate. Corporate and investor regulation - both self- 
regulation and government legislation - is converging globally. 
International standardisation of accounting and financial reporting 
is approaching. Information technology offers new governance 
challenges and opportunities to governance practices. There is 
none of this in Hampel. 
Elsewhere others criticised the Hampel Report. Percival- Straunik (1997) 
interviewed a number of individuals working in the corporate governance field 
and found a variety of responses. Anthony Carey from the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants believed that broad principles needed to be supported by a fairly 
robust code. John Kay, director of London Economics consultancy, was of the 
view that Hampel had missed the point that there is no real accountability of 
management. Peter Butler from Hermes institutional pension fund thought that 
Hampel had now made it more difficult to separate the key posts of chairman and 
chief executive. However similar to Cadbury, Percival- Straunik concluded that in 
the short term the basic findings of the Committee were sound and sensible. 
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8.4. Nolan 
8.4.1. Introduction 
The early 1990s in the UK did not only see concerns with the governance of 
public companies, e. g. Polly Peck and Maxwell, and the size of executive pay but 
also the standards of behaviour of individuals working in the public sector, be it 
as full-time employee or in some part-time role. The Prime Minister of the time, 
John Major, established the Committee on Standards in Public Life in October 
1994 under the chairmanship of Lord Nolan, a distinguished appeal judge 
Its first priority was to consider what standards of conduct were appropriate for 
Members of Parliament, Ministers, Civil Servants, executive Non-Departmental 
Public Bodies (NDPBs) and NHS Bodies. The First Report was published in May 
1995 and was followed up by the publication of the Committee's Fourth Report 
which reviewed progress on implementation of recommendations made in the 
First Report but concentrated on NDPBs and NHS Bodies. The Government 
published its response to the First Report (UK Government) in July 1995. 
8.4.2. First Repo 
This Report was underpinned by the articulation of the seven principles of public 
life which were defined as: 
Selflessness holders of public office should take decisions solely in 
terms of the public interest. They should not do so in order 
to gain financial or material benefits for themselves, their 
family or their friends; 
Integrity holders of public office should not place themselves under 
any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or 
organisations that might influence them in the performance 
of their official duties; 
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Ob . ectivity Ic j in can-ying out public business, including making publi 
appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending I 
individuals for rewards and benefits, holders of public 
office should make choices on merit; 
Accountability holders of public office are accountable for their decisions 
and actions to the public and must submit themselves to 
whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their office; 
Openness holders of public office should be open as possible about 
all the decisions and actions that they take. They should 
give reasons for their decisions and restrict information 
only when the wider public interest clearly demands; 
Honesty holders of public office have a duty to declare any private 
interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to 
resolve any conflicts arising in a way that protects the 
public interest; 
Leadership holders of public office should promote and support these 
principles by leadership and example. 
As the aim of this overview is also to examine the Fourth Report, it will 
concentrate on NDPBs and NFIS Bodies as ongoing issues around Members of 
Parliament, Ministers and Civil Servants did not allow Nolan to follow up on his 
initial Report. Twelve recommendations were made concerning appointments 
and eleven recommendations on the topic of propriety. The majority were 
accepted by the Government and only where there was disagreement will any 
comment be made. 
Nolan began by recommending clarity on the issue of ultimate responsibility for 
appointments which should remain with Ministers and that all such appointments 
should be made based on the overriding principle of merit. 
Any appointment to NDPBs or NHS Bodies should only be made after advice 
from an interview panel or committee which includes at least one independent 
member and such individuals should form at least one third of the membership. 
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At national level to oversee the appointments process a new independent 
Commissioner for Public Appointments (CPA) should be appointed who may be 
one of the Civil Service Commissioners; in 1996 the scope of appointments for 
NDPBs and NHS Bodies encompassed some 8,000 posts. 
Nolan was of the view that there was a need for a review by the Government to 
produce a more consistent legal framework for propriety and accountability in 
public bodies. At the same time a code of conduct for board members and staff 
should be mandatory and when new appointees take up post they should 
undertake to uphold and abide by the relevant Code, with compliance being a 
condition of the post. 
With regard to independent scrutiny Nolan recommended that the Audit 
Commission should be able to publish public interest reports on NHS Bodies at 
its own discretion. Also the Treasury should review the arrangements for external 
audit of public bodies in order to ensure best practice is applied universally. 
Finally NDPBs with support from their sponsor Department should develop their 
own codes of openness and publicise their existence. The Departments should 
work to bring all bodies up to the highest standards whilst the Cabinet Office 
should periodically update guidance on good practice. 
8.4.3. Fourth Report 
This Report reviewed the implementation of the recommendations of the First 
Report but focused on NDPBs and NHS Bodies. The Committee believed that 
there was merit in returning to previously considered matters as it wanted to 
confirm the favourable impression it had received from Government and NDPBs 
after the First Report. 
The review commenced with questionnaires being sent to sixty high-spending 
NDPBs and to three regional health authorities (Anglia and Oxford; South 
Thames; and North Thames) in which NHS Trusts had a role in their own 
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appointments. In addition questionnaires were sent to all Establishment Officers 
in Government Departments and a number of organisations interested in the 
Committee's work. NHS Trusts were only asked for their views on the 
appointments system as propriety in the NHS was now covered by the Code of 
Conduct: Code of Accountability (1994) and the Code of Practice on Openness in 
the NHS (1995). 
There were a number of observations and conclusions which arose following an 
analysis of the completed questionnaires. Advertising of posts was generally 
thought to be helpful as it increased the range of candidates but Nolan concluded 
that advertisement of positions should not be the sole mechanism for finding 
suitable candidates but should be complementary with other methods. The key 
issue was selection on merit. 
Whistleblowing produced a patchy response as it appeared that some 
organisations were struggling to implement clear practical procedures. Nolan re- 
emphasised the need for all NDPBs and NHS Bodies to institute codes of 
practice on whistleblowing, appropriate to their circumstances, so as to enable 
concerns about malpractice to be raised confidentially inside and, if necessary, 
outside the organisation. 
The re-appointment process received criticism as individuals have to go through 
the same procedure as on first appointment. The CPA had issued guidance that 
re-appointments should not be automatic and that performance of the individual 
should be reviewed. The Committee considered the rule that re-appointments to 
the same post should not be automatic should be clarified so that Departments 
and NDPBs are aware that candidates for re-appointment do not have to undergo 
the whole appointment process. Similarly on the matter of second re- 
appointment, Nolan observed that the CPA's rule that such appointments should 
be exceptional, went further than the Committee recommended originally and 
had caused problems. Nolan argued that the issue is the effectiveness of the body 
concerned and therefore the appointment process should have some flexibility. 
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8.5. The Conceptual Framework and the Reports 
8.5.1. Accountabilily 
Cadbury was very clear that accountability is at the heart of corporate 
governance. Specifically, the report argued that stewards could exercise part of 
their accountability through the annual board report which was supported by an 
external, objective view through audit. Whilst Greenbury was concerned 
primarily with remuneration, the recommendation to have an annual report of the 
remuneration committee to shareholders was seen as an accountability 
mechanism. Hampel argued for well notified holding of the AGM so that 
shareholders could receive a full business presentation followed by a question 
and answer session with the board. Nolan began his report by defining the seven 
principles of public life which included accountability. He went on to argue for a 
mandatory code of conduct by boards and for the development of a more 
consistent legal framework under which boards should operate. 
8.5.2. Directors and Management Control 
Cadbury had a number of specific points on this issue. Boards should work to a 
code of best practice and have clear internal control mechanisms in place. A key 
function was to review performance of executive directors. Greenbury's sole 
observation was to stress the need of independent non-executive directors to 
operate the remuneration committee. Hampel had the most comments and began 
with recommendations on board structures and the balance between executive 
and non-executive directors with the latter in the majority. Similar to Greenbury, 
Hampel highlighted the role on the non-executive director on the remuneration 
committee. Additionally the need for effective control systems was made and that 
they should be extended from a concentration on finance to a whole system 
approach. Nolan's contributions were in two areas. Firstly the requirement for 
transparent systems of recruitment of non-executive directors, and secondly the 
importance of whistleblowing processes so that the organisation could be warned 
of undetected impropriet),. 
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8.5.3. Conflict of Interest 
Cadbury made an explicit statement on this topic. Non-executive directors should 
take the lead where conflict of interest might occur but emphasised the need for 
the independence of judgement of non-executive directors if they were to 
exercise this function. Greenbury continued this theme and specified the need for 
non-executive directors to have no cross -directorships, nor any involvement in 
the day-to-day running of the organisation. Hampel makes no explicit comment 
on conflict of interest but many of the recommendations were aimed at good 
corporate governance and therefore by implication the prevention of conflicts of 
interest. Nolan's contribution is through the seven principles of public life. 
Selflessness, integrity, objectivity, openness and honesty have definitions which 
aim to avoid conflicts of interest. 
8.5.4. Audit Committees 
Cadbury had a clear opinion on the need for audit committees. The report 
articulated the structure of the committee and the main functions that should be 
undertaken. Hampel endorsed this view and stressed the role of independent non- 
executive directors in the running of the committee. At the same time the report 
raised the need to keep the non-audit services of the external auditor under 
review to ensure that no conflict of interest occurs. Both Greenbury and Nolan 
are silent on the subject of audit committees. 
8.5.5. Agency Theoly 
Cadbury referred directly to agency theory. The report saw corporate governance 
as the method for improving accountability between agents and principals. 
Effectively the mechanisms recommended in the report were aimed at achieving 
this end. Greenbury made an explicit reference to agency theory as well. The 
report argued specifically for adherence to agency theory and the need to align 
the interests of agents (directors) with principals (shareholders). Hampel made no 
observation explicitly on organisational theory. However the report developed 
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further the work of Cadbury and therefore it is reasonable to assume Hampel 
agreed with the agency theory model. Similarly Nolan is silent on the subject of 
organisational theory but by implication supported the need for agents to account 
to principals for their actions. 
8.6. Summary 
The four reports were significant pieces of work in the field of corporate 
governance and responded to growing concerns in Government, professional 
bodies, business and the general public following a number of high profile 
corporate governance failures. Examination of the reports has shown that the 
elements identified in the Wessex case tend to occur in one form or another. 
There are clear discussions of accountability and a recognition of the need to 
discharge the function of stewardship. Directors and management control, audit 
committees,, and conflict of interest featured in the reports which confirms the 
identified key elements in this thesis as relevant. At the same time it is possible to 
argue that two of the reports are based explicitly on agency theory and an implicit 
assumption that the same applies to the other two reports. 
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Chapter 9. 
NHS RESPONSE TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The development of corporate governance in the NHS started in the 1990s in 
response to three separate stimuli. Firstly, two significant NHS corporate 
governance failures, both of which have been discussed in this thesis. Secondly, 
the perceived need by the UK Government to react to a number of failures in 
other sectors, such as BCCI and Westminster. Thirdly, the publication of the 
various reports and initiatives which were outlined in chapter 8. DoH (1997b) 
stated "the NHS has responded positively to the principles of sound corporate 
governance as recommended by Cadbury, Nolan and others". 
The aim of this chapter is to assess what responses the NHS has made to the 
need to develop corporate governance and whether the conceptual framework of 
this thesis is congruent with the developments. 
9.1. Financial Manaizement 
Since "corporate governance" appeared as a recognised topic on the agenda of 
the DoH initially it was under a financial heading. One of the first official 
communications, that can be found on reviewing DoH publications, was issued 
in 1995 in the form of a Finance Directorate Letter (FDL) which meant that it 
was circulated within the finance community of the NHS and therefore was not 
disseminated widely. This meant that a corporate governance issue had been 
raised within a finance document which seems to imply that corporate 
governance was viewed as part of financial management and not the other way 
round. The limited distribution of this letter and its associated annex would have 
been seen as the business of the finance departments of NHS trusts and nothing 
to bother the general management of hospitals. 
By the following year this approach had changed. The mid- I 990s was the period 
when the DoH (1994) introduced its Code of Conduct and Accountability for 
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NHS Boards and began to invest time and effort into the subject of corporate 
governance. In March 1996 the DoH (1996a) issued Directions on Financial 
Management in England through the publication of a Health Service Guidelines 
(HSG) which is a form of communication circulated widely in the NHS. The 
document defined responsibilities and parameters and as such set part of the 
corporate governance picture of the NHS at that time. 
The financial trend in publications continued that year with the Review o the ?f 
Trust Framework Regime published by Tinston (1996). He reviewed the first 
five years of the internal market of the NHS which had been introduced by 
Goverment in 199 1. In particular, he examined a range of issues which included 
the primary financial duty of NHS trusts, financial management of the system, 
and how hospitals costed and priced services. Also in 1996 the NHS Executive 
undertook a scrutiny of the bureaucracy of the NHS with the aim of saving 
significant sums of money. Much of what was recommended for abolition or 
reduction effected the corporate governance systems of NHS bodies. 
Communications from the DoH could be on individual technical accounting 
issues but key to corporate governance. In HSC 1998\144 (DoH 1998e) 
alterations were made to the financing structures of NHS trust balance sheets and 
involved early repayment of interest bearing loans and the issue of new public 
dividend capital. The significance of this HSC was to effect the delivery of 
trusts' statutory financial duties so the change affected how responsibilities were 
discharged. Similarly at the end of that year the DoH (1998f) altered one of the 
three duties in a fundamental way. NFIS trusts were expected to make a six 
percent annual return on average net assets. The drive behind this particular duty 
was to ensure that when taken with depreciation, NFIS trusts absorbed the full 
cost of their capital. Unfortunately there were a number of difficulties which 
meant that this duty could be breached through no fault of a NHS trust. The HSC 
introduced a revised arrangement of the capital cost absorption duty of six 
percent. The following year further guidance (1999g) was published on the 
statutory financial duty of break-even. Whilst another technical document 
relating to whether deficits sit in the accounts of trusts or health authorities, it 
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represents a key piece of guidance which dictated the delivery of a corporate 
governance responsibility. 
In 1998 the financial theme encompassed the new, specific subject of fraud 
which has continued to the present day. The DoH (1998h) published its Counter 
Fraud Strategy as it was perceived that this area of corporate governance in the 
NHS was weak and open to abuse. The strategy launched the establishment of 
Counter Fraud Services with its own national director and dedicated staff who 
were professionally trained and accredited. Further HSCs followed with 
1999\057 (DoH 1999c) identifying a timetable for action in different parts of the 
NHS, NHS bodies had to nominate staff to receive training, and information on 
proposed new legislation to introduce new criminal offences to facilitate 
prosecution where appropriate. Later that year HSC 1999\175 (1999h) took the 
subject on further by discussing the Professional and Ethical Approach to 
counter fraud. 
9.2. Accountability - Individuals and Groups 
A different strand that runs through the DoH publications is that of 
accountability as applied to key individuals or groups rather than structures or 
organisations which will be addressed separately. 
Health authorities have always held their regular board meetings in public, 
usually but not mandatory on a monthly basis. When NHS trusts were created in 
1991 they were exempt, if they chose, from meeting in public. With the change 
of Government in 1997 a HSC was published quickly (DoH 1998g) which 
compelled NHS trusts to fall into line with health authorities. This HSC 
summarised the introduction of the Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) (NHS 
Trusts) Order 1997-- No 2763 which came into effect on 6 February 1998. The 
HSC provided for meetings to be open to the public, for public notification of the 
date and venue of the meeting at least three days in advance and, enablement of 
the media to report on the meetings and be given agenda and papers. The circular 
went further and included good practice at the meetings. This included details 
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about seating, nameplates, audio loops, availability of agenda and papers, public 
viewing of presentation material, and pre-meeting press briefings. 
The same year saw the publication of HSC 1998\010 (DoH 1998a) which 
pronounced on the personal liability of non-executive directors of NHS bodies. It 
specifically gave advice on the issue of suitable indemnities based on the 
following text: 
a chairman or non-executive member or director who has acted 
honestly, reasonably, in good faith and without negligence will 
not have to meet out of his or her own resources any personal 
civil liability which is incurred in furtherance, or purported 
furtherance, of the execution of the NHS Acts. 
The circular makes plain that the law is unclear on the whole issue and at 
paragraph 7 states: 
in most cases, non-executive directors ........ will probably be 
personally liable for their decisions or actions whether acting as 
an individual or as a member of a board. 
The document goes on to indicate that NHS bodies do have the power to issue 
indemnities and NHS trusts could take out commercial insurance if they chose 
but it was suggested that such actions were unnecessary and expensive. 
Interestingly the Secretary of State, who at the time appointed non-executive 
directors, has no statutory power to indemnify or reimburse a trust which had in 
turn indemnified or reimbursed a non-executive director but could do so if he/she 
chose for a health authority. Final advice was to stick to the actions allowable 
under the board's standing orders and if in doubt, seek formal legal advice. 
With the change of Government in 1997 came the publication in the following 
year of a new, broad strategic direction document, The NHS, Modern and 
Dependable (DoH 1998d). From this work emerged the concept of clinical 
governance which is seen as the systems and processes that ensure clinical 
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services are of sufficient quality and are appropriate. A number of circulars 
followed and detailed how clinical governance should be implemented. The DoH 
(1999a) told the NHS what it had to do over the succeeding twelve months. As 
part of the introduction of this concept chief executives had had their personal 
accountabilities expanded so that in addition to being accountable to Parliament 
for the use of public money, they were designated as Accountable Officers for 
the quality of clinical care that is provided within their organisations. 
On a different tack the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 became law on 2 July 
1999 and saw the DoH (1999j) issue HSC 1999\198 on the subject. The thrust of 
this legislation was to protect employees who disclose information reasonably 
and responsibly in the public interest and may be victimised as a result. The 
Government was keen to ensure that staff had confidence to speak out if they 
perceived serious concerns were not receiving attention. The circular tasked 
NHS bodies to put in place systems, policies and procedures which would enable 
"whistleblowing" and to remove any confidentiality "gagging" clauses from 
contracts of employment and compromise agreements which seek to prevent 
disclosure of information in the public interest. 
The performance management of chief executives is a key corporate governance 
function of chairmen and non-executive directors. However there are difficulties 
often with how to handle an individual where one of a number of scenarios has 
occurred. This can encompass loss of competence, loss of confidence, lack of 
direction, a breakdown of relationship with the chairman, or 
organisational/system failure resulting from actions involving the chief 
executive. Historically there has been no written guidance on how to approach 
these issues which has meant that individuals have been dealt with on a 
continuum which ranges from fair and sensitive through to unfair and brutal. In 
June 2001 Nigel Crisp, chief executive of the NHS and permanent secretary at 
the DoH, issued a protocol with detailed advice on how to tackle these difficult 
scenarios. 
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Guidance has been issued on changes to the appointment system for chairmen 
and non-executive directors of NHS bodies. The NHS Executive (2001) 
published information on the establishment of the NHS Appointments 
Commission which began operating as from April 2001. This body is at arms 
length from Government and took over from ministers the responsibility for 
appointments of chairmen and non-executive directors to all NHS bodies. As a 
fundamental tenet the Commission is expected to build on the work of Lord 
Nolan's First Report (UK Government 1995). The Commission has a chairman 
and eight regional commissioners, and their remit is broader than appointments 
but takes in mentoring and supporting appointees once they are in post. 
Finally, in this section, additional responsibilities have been placed on chief 
executives with the passage of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
on to the statute book. The DoH issued some guidance (2001h) which outlined 
that the Act had been introduced to ensure that public bodies are regulated and 
comply with the Human Rights Act 1998 with regard to covert surveillance 
activities. If the issue involves suspected fraud then the matter lies with the 
Counter Fraud Service however if theft of money or property on NHS premises 
is suspected the decision as to whether covert surveillance is authorised lies 
personally with the chief executive and cannot be delegated. Authorising officers 
may be required to justify their decision and all activities are subject to 
inspection by the Office of the Surveillance Commissioners 
9.3. Accountability - OrIzanisations and Structures 
Many of the available documents fall into the category of defining new 
organisations or new structures, or focusing on core organisational corporate 
governance. The NHS Trust (Consultation on Establishment and Dissolution) 
Regulations 1996 (DoH 1996c) is an early example. This statutory instrument 
lays out the basis on which an organisation could apply to become a NFIS trust 
or equally how a trust could apply to be dissolved, usually because of merger 
with another NHS organisation. In the same year under FDL 1996\18 (DoH 
1996b) health authority example standing orders were released to be used by all 
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health authorities to produce their own local versions. This document set the 
governance framework for the work of health authorities. It defined the 
composition of the authority, the appointment of the chairman and members, 
their terms of office, and appointment and powers of the vice chairman. 
However it went on to lay down how the meetings of the authority should be 
conducted. So clear guidance was available on calling meetings, setting agenda, 
notices of motions, withdrawal of motions, chairman's ruling, voting, minutes. 
and quorum to list some of the key subjects. However it went further in defining 
the delegation of functions to both committees and officers whilst there were 
explicit sections on declarations of interests and conflicts of interest where 
pecuniary involvement was concerned. The wide area of tendering and contract 
procedure were detailed as were the custody of the seal and the sealing of 
documents. The FDL also included model standing financial instructions. This 
type of centrally issued document ensured consistency across the NHS and 
prevented the wastage of time and effort through all NHS bodies starting from a 
blank sheet of paper. 
Public bodies can only operate within powers given to them by statute and to do 
otherwise means that the body is acting ultra vires. With the advent of the 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) into the public sector in the mid-1990s, it was 
discovered that trusts did not have the authority to enter into private finance 
contracts. These arrangements encompass the building of whole or part hospitals 
or purchase of major equipment by the private sector who recover their outlay 
and profit over an extended time period such as twenty five years. The DoH 
(I 998b) issued a circular which allowed the amendment of the establishment 
orders of NHS trusts, if required, and advised that PFI schemes would require 
application for this discretion. 
Circulars are used to launch corporate governance arrangements for new types of 
organisation. HSC 1998\139 (DoH 1998d) introduced primary care groups 
(PCG). They were local organisations that brought together GPs, community 
health professionals and social care workers. Their governance was not as a 
stand alone statutory body but as a sub-division of the local health authority. The 
circular addressed how PCGs would be formed and governed. With regard to the 
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former, consultation was required with the staff who would form part of the 
prospective PCG. The views of GPs were seen as vitally important such that a 
ballot of all GPs in the area was expected. External consultation had to be 
pursued with the public and stakeholders through a formal consultation exercise. 
The circular defined the composition of the PCG board and specifically gave the 
GPs the position whereby they would have a majority if they so chose. As one of 
the aims of the creation of PCGs was to begin to bring health and social care 
closer together, the local social services department was given a seat on the 
board. At that time it was unclear as to whether the person was to be nominated 
or to be appointed after interview. Boards also had to have a lay member who 
were seen as the patients' advocate in a different way than non-executive 
directors who sat on the boards of other NHS organisations. In addition because 
PCGs had no statutory authority of their own, health authorities were given a 
position on the boards through the nomination of one of their non-executive 
directors. 
This particular circular went further and addressed the issue of accountability. It 
laid down the ground rules for the relationship between health authority and the 
PCG, the PCG and its stakeholders, and for dealing with cross border patients 
who were individuals who might live in one PCG area but whose GP practice 
was in another. As part of the overarching arrangements annual accountability 
agreements were specified. In addition clear statements were made about probity 
and financial governance as concerns existed in the NHS at that time over the 
possible conflicts of interest between GPs as independent businessmen and GPs 
as PCG board members making financial allocations and decisions. Financial 
risk management was also covered in the circular as were incentives to 
encourage PCG staff, in particular GPs, to innovate and save money, e. g. 
prescribing expenditure. Finally explicit guidance was given on how much a 
PCG could spend on management costs as against the provision of clinical 
services. Overall HSC 1998\139 can be seen as a significant corporate 
governance framework and is a good example of how the DoH can use this 
mechanism to set parameters for organisations. 
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Despite the detail on PCG governance with the 80 plus pages of the circular. 
some loose ends had been left. The GP community nationally had concerns over 
who would control PCGs and therefore had raised issues on chairmanship and 
the make-up of boards. In addition Local Government was very unhappy at the 
suggestion that the social services seat on the board should be anything other 
than their nomination. The result was a further circular, HSC 1998\230 (DoH 
1998i), four months later. It pronounced on the exact composition of the board 
which was to be: 
4 to 7 GPs; 
I to 2 community or practice nurses; 
I social services nominee; 
I lay member; 
I health authority non-executive director; 
I PCG chief executive. 
With regard to chairmanship the circular gave the right to GPs to decide if they 
wanted to hold this post. If so, the four to seven GPs on the board would 
nominate the GP chairman and the health authority would be the approving 
agency. Interestingly the PCG chief executive and the health authority non- 
executive director were deemed not to be eligible to become chairman if the GPs 
chose not to exercise their right. The issue with Local Government was resolved 
by giving them nomination rights for an officer but not an elected member. 
This circular introduced a different twist to accountability arrangements. The 
chief executive of the PCG, a full-time NHS employee, was made accountable to 
the PCG chairman, a part-time post. This setup appears to mirror both NHS 
trusts and health authorities except in the PCGs' case the chairman would 
normally be a GP who is an independent businessman with a significant personal 
interest in the decisions of the PCG. In addition the part-time chairman was 
designated as the "Responsible Officer" which was meant to be analogous to the 
"Accountable Officer" role of chief executives of NHS trusts and health 
authorities. This arrangement struck many people inside the NHS and 
commentators outside, as inconsistent. 
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Finally, HSC 1998\230 introduced an amendment to the Health Authority 
(Membership and Procedure) Regulations 1986 which originally would have 
excluded a sub-committee of a health authority from having a majority of 
membership who provided services to that authority. The amendment allowed 
GPs to have a majority on PCG boards. 
A few months later the DoH (I 999b) issued HSC 1999\048 which gave PCGs 
further corporate governance instructions. Model standing orders and standing 
financial instructions were made available and expected to be used by all PCGs. 
Health authorities were expected to action this guidance which would be audited 
by local internal audit departments as part of their annual programme. As PCGs' 
main focus was primary and community services, which were the areas where 
the DoH had most concern about fraud, an example fraud policy and response 
plan was made available with the expectation that it should be used as the basis 
for a local version. 
Though PCGs had just been established in April 1999, they were seen as an 
interim step on the road to the development of stand alone statutory bodies, 
primary care trusts (PCT). The DoH wanted to see a move from PCG to PCT 
within a couple of years. They would allow a pioneering tranche of PCGs to lead 
the way by becoming PCTs in April 2000, with a second tranche in October 
2000,, and a much larger group in April 2001. In reality PCGs ceased to exist 
after April 2002 as they had become PCTs or joined with other PCGs to become 
PCTs. 
In mid-1999 the DoH (1999d) published Primary Care Trusts: Establishment, 
the preparatory period and their Functions. This document covers how the PCT 
would operate between the agreement from the DoH to become established and 
the operational date, usually a period of two to four months. The governance 
arrangements are detailed and are different to that of a PCG. The PCT board is 
similar in make-up to a NHS trust with a non-executive lay chairman and a 
ma ority of non-executive directors appointed, at that time, by the Secretary of 
State for Health, but now the Appointments Commission. A NHS trust has one 
discretionary and four compulsory executive position on the board; chief 
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executive, director of finance, medical directorý and director of nursing. A PCT 
would have only a chief executive and director of finance prescribed. with the 
other three executive seats being filled from the professional executive 
committee (PEC) and must include the PEC chairman. The PEC was seen by the 
DoH as the engine of the organisation and was in reality the same group of 
people that had formed the PCG board. This difference takes into account the 
wish by Government to have a less involved role by the PCT board in the 
running of the organisation. The board was expected to provide strategic 
oversight and verification of the work of the PEC. As a model it is more akin to a 
board of governors or trustees rather than that of a NHS trust which is based on 
private sector business organisations. 
The document offered at paragraphs 14-16 for prospective PCTs to suggest 
alternative governance arrangements if it could be demonstrated that they would 
contribute to the PCT's ability to improve the health of local people. Explicit 
guidance on the appointment of the chief executive was made and includes 
details of who should comprise the selection panel. Similarly the same approach 
was taken for appointment of professional members to the PEC which was a 
marked change from that of PCGs, however the social services representative 
remains the prerogative of Local Government. With regard to chairing of the 
PEC the chief executive was barred from taking on this role. The remainder of 
the document outlined the key functions that the new organisations would 
undertake. These were confirmed by the DoH (2000b) through the issue of the 
Primary Care Trust (Functions) Directions 2000. 
The establishment of PCTs created a new type of governance relationship within 
the NHS. Historically whatever the label attached to differing NHS bodies there 
has been a lay non-executive chairman and a professional chief executive or 
equivalent. The relationship has been clear with the chairman running the board 
to set policy and strategy, and performance manage the chief executive. His/her 
role was to run the organisation and to deliver the agreed objectives and targets. 
With the advent of various corporate governance failures discussed elsewhere in 
this thesis, the mid-1990s saw the introduction of the role of "Accountable 
Officer" with the additional accountability, for both NHS trust and health 
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authority chief executives, to Parliament for the stewardship of public money. 
Within a PCT there are not two at the top but three. In addition to the chairman 
and chief executive has been added the PEC chairman who is accountable to the 
trust board chairman and not the chief executive. However the Corporate 
Governance Frameworkfor Primary Care Trusts issued in August 2001 (DoH 
2001d) is clear that the PCT chief executive is the organisation's Accountable 
Officer. The jury is still out as to whether this form of accountability will work 
and will stand up to be seen as effective especially if serious errors are made. 
The framework is quite comprehensive and runs to 171 pages. For the first time 
in such a publication there is a specific section on the role of Accountable 
Officer within the PCT, as well as the usual delegation of powers and functions. 
The substantial part of the document covers internal financial control and 
includes the expected annexes on standing orders, standing financial instructions 
and, fraud and corruption. However there are separate annexes on audit 
committees,, remuneration committees and internal audit. In addition advice on 
systems to ensure control of both the day to day budget and fixed assets with a 
link to financial and performance reporting. 
Even though the NHS has only created both PCGs and PCTs within the past two 
years, a third new organisation is on the horizon. The Government has the view 
that health and social care should operate as one holistic system rather than the 
two separate systems that have operated for the past fifty years. The involvement 
of social services in both PCGs and PCTs was a first step which is to be taken 
further through the establishment of care trusts. The aim is to take the range of 
services that can exist in a PCT and combine them with a range of local authority 
services. The starting point for consideration will usually be social services but 
could encompass other services if integration would be seen as advantageous. To 
promote local discussion the DoH (2001 f) issued Draft Guidance on Governance 
of Care Trusts. This presents a difficult corporate governance challenge as the 
NHS is centrally controlled by the DoH through quasi-autonomous non- 
governmental organisations (quango) whereas Local Government is locally 
controlled through the election of councillors. The statutory framework 
governing the two systems are very different but the purpose of the guidance was 
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to create the first care trust from April 2002; in reality this turned out to be 
unrealistic as the deadline passed without a single care trust. The guidance 
overcomes some of the problems by spelling out that care trusts will be NHS 
organisations with accountability to strategic health authorities (SHA). However 
it states also at paragraph 9: 
The care trust will be corporately responsible to the local 
authority for its activities as a whole, and accountable for the 
functions which have been delegated to the care trust. The 
accountability for the delegated functions from the local 
authority will be set out in a locally determined agreement, and 
set out in the corporate governance framework. This will include 
the scheme of delegation, how services will be monitored, what 
standards and targets are to be aimed for, and what information 
will be made available on outputs, outcomes and expenditure, as 
well as other issues about resources, and managing them, etc. 
The possible composition of the body varies depending on whether the 
prospective care trust is emerging from a PCT or NHS trust. If it is the former 
then the board can have up to seven non-officer members whereas if it is the 
latter, it is up to seven non-executive directors. In addition there will be a chair 
and up to seven officer members for both scenarios. From within the seven non- 
officer/non-executive director contingent, there must be at least one local 
authority member, and it is for the local authority to nominate to that position. 
They have the right also to change the individual in consultation with the care 
trust chair. However this individual will not be the formal line of accountability 
for delegated local authority functions. The guidance goes on to cover the role 
and appointment of the chief executive, and the appointment of other members 
of the care trust board. In addition there is a discussion of the implications on the 
PEC if the care trust emerges from the PCT model but, at the time of publication 
of the guidance. there is no comment as to whether the three at the top structure 
would be transplanted to the new organisation. 
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Alongside the publication of directives on how to implement new organisations 
there is often a need to clarify the role and functions of existing agencies. HSC 
1999\92 (DoH 1999i) fulfilled that purpose in clarifying the health authority role 
following the creation of PCGs and with the imminent arrival of the first tranche 
of PCTs. In corporate governance terms it emphasised that PCGs were part of 
health authorities who remained accountable for the performance and actions of 
PCGs. 
Circulars have a role in notifying changes to core corporate governance 
functions. The DoH (1999e) issued amendments to standing orders and, fraud 
policy and response plans, to reflect a number of policy changes that occurred in 
the preceeding twelve months. 
Corporate governance has grown year on year as to the breadth of subjects that 
have come under this general heading. As has been shown the mid-1990s saw 
financial management as the major issue for corporate governance. By 2001 the 
extensive PCT corporate governance framework had moved the subject in the 
NHS on to a different level. In the same year the boundaries were pushed out 
even further. Many NHS organisations undertake clinical and/or scientific 
research and the manner in which they do so can help or hinder the quality of the 
patient experience. This is a clinical governance issue which is a key subset of 
0 corporate governance for NHS bodies. Accountability for research has been 
problematic as it normally involves a number of agencies from NHS trusts to 
universities to major charities such as Imperial Cancer Research. A good 
example of difficulties with accountability arose in 2000 with the retained organs 
scandal at Alder Hay Children's' Hospital. This NHS hospital has university 
academics working within it and one of them chose to retain a collection of 
organs removed from deceased children but without their parents' consent. In 
February 2001 the DoH (2001a) issued Research Governance Frameworkfor 
Health and Social Care. For the first time the NHS has a framework which lays 
down the responsibilities and accountabilities for individuals and organisations 
undertaking research. For example, there are sections on the responsibilities for 
researchers, the principal investigator, the research sponsor, universities, and 
research ethics committees. With regard to the latter subject specific guidance on 
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Governance Arrangements for NHS Research Ethics Committees was issued in 
July 2001 (DoH 2001c) and tackled significant subjects such as working 
procedures of the committee, multi-centre research, and the process of ethical 
review of a research protocol. 
9.4. Audit 
Scrutiny of the vast DoH publications' list is more illustrative of what is not 
present rather than what is. Over the past seven to eight years only three 
documents have been issued on the subject of audit. The first was issued in 1998 
by the NHS Executive and was on the topic of audit risk assessment. It was a 
technical paper aimed at internal audit practitioners and produced by an internal 
audit practitioners group under the aegis of the NHS Executive. The second 
document Governance in the NHS: The Role of Internal Audit issued by the DoH 
(2000a) will be examined in a later section. 
The only substantial piece of work was published by the DoH (2001g) and is the 
Audit Committee Handbook. It is an overview of the membership, accountability 
and broad remit of the committee and offers specimen terms of reference, self 
assessment checklist for the committee, and an example annual committee 
timetable. 
9.5. CorpOrate Governance Frameworks 
The DoH decided to approach the overall subject of corporate governance 
through the development of the NHS National Controls Assurance Project. 
HSG(97)17 (DoH 1997b) gave the following summary: 
The NHS has responded positively to the principles of sound 
corporate governance as recommended by Cadbury, Nolan, and 
others. A range of measures has already been implemented 
which provides a clear framework for corporate governance. The 
intention of the Controls Assurance Project is to bring all of 
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these measures together ......... Put simply the concept of 
controls assurance requires that boards of health authorities and 
trusts are satisfied that systems are in place within the 
organisation to ensure that risks are assessed and properly 
managed. The requirement to produce a statement accompanying 
the annual report and accounts is confirmation to the general 
public that the board of directors believes these systems are in 
place and operating effectively. 
The NHS Executive (I 997b) launched controls assurance into the NHS through 
the release of a pack containing video, booklets and circular. The first stage was 
for the annual report and accounts for both NHS trusts and health authorities for 
1997\98 to carry a statement of internal control by the board. HSG(97)17 gave 
guidance on what the statement should cover and indicated that a model 
disclosure statement would be issued by the DoH. In essence the statement 
would address: 
safeguarding of assets; 
the maintenance of proper accounting records; 
" the reliability of financial information; 
" confirmation that appropriate internal financial control systems existed; 
" confirmation that minimum control standards had been in existence for 
the financial year in question. 
At this time these control standards covered basic corporate governance subjects 
and included standing orders, standing financial instructions, fraud and 
corruption policy and response plan, audit and remuneration committees, internal 
audit, control of assets, and budgetary control systems. The next step was the 
issue of HSC 1998\070 (DoH 1998c) which discussed controls assurance 
statements for the subsequent two financial years, 1998\99 and 1999\2000. 
Between 1997\98 and 1998\99 it was proposed to amend the minimum control 
standards. The first statement had contained a requirement to identify and 
evaluate business risks but for 1998\99 this standard was dropped. Two 
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additional standards were included. The first required NHS bodies to reassure the 
public that the impact of the "millennium" had been assessed and, -where 
necessary, contingency plans developed. In particular there was a real concern 
that information technology systems would fail to function on I" January 2000. 
The second new standard involved assurance that mandatory requirements 
within the NHS Executive costing guidance had been followed. 
The circular went on to give advance warning of an additional assurance 
statement for 1999\2000 and to consult on its probable content. The new 
statement would be introduced to confirm that the organisation had a 
comprehensive risk management strategy to cover all significant non-clinical 
areas. The statement would appear in the annual report and the NHS trust or 
health authority would have to have evidence that the strategy was being 
implemented, that systems/procedures were reviewed regularly, and that 
improvements and developments were taking place. It was proposed (paragraph 
15) that the statement would cover: 
9 business planning; 
corporate strategy; 
enviromuent (property and estates); 
e human resources; 
9 service management. 
The outcome was the issue of HSC 1999\123 (DoH 1999f) which was titled 
Governance in the new NHS and dealt with controls assurance statements for 
1999\2000. Effectively this document took the outline of the advance 
notification and expanded it to cover organisational controls and risk 
management. It argued that issues to do with the quality of care would be dealt 
with under clinical governance but the link between this area of activity and 
organisational controls would be risk management. The circular argued 
(paragraph 12) that the benefits would be: 
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reduction in risk exposure through more effective targeting of 
resources to address key risk areas; 
improvements in economy, efficiency and effectiveness resulting 
from a reduction in the frequency and/or severity of incidents, 
complaints, claims, staff absence and other loss; 
demonstrable compliance with applicable laws and regulations; 
enhanced reputation through public disclosure of achievements 
in meeting objectives and managing risk; and, consequently, 
increased public confidence in the quality of services provided 
by the NHS. 
However for the first time controls assurance would move away from self- 
regulation. Internal audit would be responsible for the verification of 
organisational controls assurance statements and the Audit Commission would 
take on an external review role. To allow judgements to be made on how 
effective NHS bodies tackled the expanded controls assurance agenda, a new set 
of control standards were introduced under two broad headings. 
Firstly, there were a group of standards against which organisations could assess 
their approach to risk management. Leadership and commitment, and policy and 
strategy were two of them. In total there were ten in number and covered a 
variety of subjects such as incident reporting and investigation, claims 
management, audit, and risk management process. The second group established 
standards for seventeen risk areas. They covered a very diverse range of topics 
from catering and food hygiene to medicines management to records 
management to waste management. 
The director of finance for the NHS confirmed the role of internal audit in the 
verification process through the issue of Misc(2000)3 (DoH 2000a). This 
correspondence laid out a number of practical support measures that he was 
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putting in place to ensure internal auditors throughout the NHS were prepared to 
take on their additional role. He wrote again a year later under the title 
Governance in the NHS (DoH 2001 i) in which he discussed governance 
convergence: 
we are committed to achieving a fully integrated approach to 
governance where clinical and corporate governance sit side by 
side - clinical governance focusing on continuous improvements 
in quality and corporate governance focusing on having the 
necessary systems in place to minimise risk. I am confident that 
by 2004\05 we shall have achieved our level 3 milestone under 
controls assurance with fully operational clinical systems in 
place and working effectively. These systems will be based on 
controls assurance standards incorporating the NHS Litigation 
Authority's clinical risk management standards supported by the 
recommendations coming out of NICE and the National Service 
Frameworks. 
This letter added an additional control standard, which had arisen out of the 
national concern over "mad cow" disease with the possible link to humans, and 
concerned the decontamination of medical devices. A few weeks later a further 
circular emerged in the form of HSC 2001\005 (DoH 2001b) and covered 
controls assurance statements for the forthcoming financial year of 2000\01. The 
key development was the introduction of a control and risk maturity matrix 
which comprised of three levels: 
level I- minimal; 
level 2- moderate; 
level 3- expected. 
These gradings have between 12-14 criteria per level which allow organisations 
to make an assessment of their position. Misc(2000)3 indicated clearly that the 
goal is for all NHS organisations to achieve level 3 by 2004\05. 
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A further document (DoH 2002a) was published on the controls assurance 
website of the DoH in March 2002. This guidance outlined that the statement on 
internal control for 2001\02 and onwards, would be underpinned by three core 
standards of governance, financial management and risk management. 
Additionally it was stipulated that chief internal auditors had to give boards an 
opinion of the effectiveness of the internal control system and copy the opinion 
to the DoH. Also the control and risk maturity matrix was downgraded for 
internal use by NHS bodies as internal audit no longer had to report on 
compliance. In the same month the DoH (2002b) issued supplementary guidance 
on the internal control statement. 
9.6. The Conceptual Framework and the NHS Respons 
9.6.1. Accountability 
The NHS has focused a great deal on accountability. On an individual basis there 
was the introduction of the Accountable Officer, and the guidance on the 
personal liability of non-executive directors. At the organisational level many 
documents spelt out the accountabilities and responsibilities of new and existing 
organisations. Also the introduction of the Code of Conduct and Accountability 
for NHS bodies (DoH 1994) clarified the purpose of the board of each statutory 
organisation. 
9.6.2. Directors and Management Control 
Each of the documents, which established new organisations e. g. PCTs, 
contained clear guidance on what mechanisms were to be put in place to ensure 
corporate governance; for example the requirement to have a remuneration 
committee made up principally of non-executive directors. Without doubt the 
main initiative to assist boards in the exercise of management control was the 
establishment and ongoing development of the Controls Assurance Project. This 
holistic approach is designed specifically to ensure that effective management 
control systems of NHS organisations are in place. 
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9.6.3. Conflict of Interest 
The organisational structure documents in this chapter contain mechanisms put 
in place to minimise conflict of interest. There is no possibility of combined 
chairman/chief executive roles and non-executive directors are always external 
appointments, now made by the independent Appointments Commission. The 
introduction of the whistleblowing policy had as one of its key purposes the 
reduction of conflict of interest. Similarly the establishment of the counter-fraud 
service has had the purpose to achieve the same aim. The Alder Hay Hospital 
scandal exposed a conflict of interest between the NHS and the university sector 
which the subsequent guidance (DoH 2001 a) sought to remove. 
9.6.4. Audit Committees 
An examination of publications made by the NHS on this topic gives a false 
impression. The issuing of the Audit Committee Handbook (DoH 2001g) was to 
provide explicit guidance to all NHS organisations and updated a previous 
version. Within the various documents establishing new organisations always 
there is a reference to the mandatory requirement to have an audit committee and 
lays out its membership and purpose. The NHS Code of Conduct and 
Accountability is clear that audit committees are required by every NHS body as 
a formal sub-committee of the board. 
9.6.5. Agency Theor 
When the NHS response to corporate governance is examined with regard to 
organisational theory there are no explicit references, however implicit links 
with agency theory is common. Section 9.1 covered guidance on financial 
management that has been issued over the years by the DoH. It can be argued 
that this is the principal setting out boundaries in which the agent must operate. 
Similarly the many publications on organisational structures and responsibilities 
fall into the same category. The introduction of the role of Accountable Officer 
is a clear example from agency theory and is the classic principal-agent 
relationship defined within the NHS context. 
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At the same time the publications articulate that within princIpal-agent 
environment of the NHS stakeholders have a place. Specific guidance on public 
meetings and the need to have whistleblowing policies and procedures brings 
into play a variety of stakeholders which include the general public., the media, 
staff and trades union. The establishment of the Appointments Commission is 
aimed at the removal of political patronage and the broadening of stakeholders 
who can apply to become chairmen and non-executive directors. In a different 
vein,, the guidance on research governance covers a number of stakeholders 
outside the NHS and include universities, charities and, pharmaceutical and 
medical equipment manufacturers. 
9.7. Summary 
This chapter has shown that the predominant theme for NHS corporate 
governance has been accountability. The majority of the documents deal with the 
accountability of organisations in the main but do touch on that of key 
individuals. There is a strong coherence with the theoretical framework with 
regard to management control and the need for the board to ensure that internal 
control systems exist. Audit committees, as a subject, have little comment but 
this could be because they have been a compulsory corporate governance 
requirement throughout the time period in question. The issue of conflict of 
interest received no individual attention as an issue but many numerous 
documents included specific references as time has progressed. With regard to 
organisational theory it can be seen that agency theory provides the backdrop in 
the various initiatives and publications that have been reviewed. In general the 
evidence of this chapter is to support the theoretical framework. 
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Section D 
Conclusion 
Chapter 10. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
This thesis started with a preliminary case of significant corporate governance 
failure in chapter I from which some possible concepts were identified. Through 
the use of academic literature these concepts were articulated and a conceptual 
framework was suggested. Due to the nature of the command and control system 
which operates in the NHS an exploration of the most appropriate major theory 
of how organisations work completed the development of a theoretical 
framework which was tested by reference to three further cases of corporate 
governance failure, four corporate governance reports, and a review of how the 
NHS has approached corporate governance. The outcome is the delivery of four 
products; the definition of corporate governance in the NHS, the recognition of 
organisational theory around the relationship of agent and principle which can 
underpin corporate governance in the NHS, the identification of the key elements 
of corporate governance in the NHS and the development of practical advice for 
use of the key elements by practitioners in the NHS. The chapter articulates the 
four products and concludes with a brief reflection on how the research 
methodology for this thesis has worked. 
Definition 
The easiest way to define "corporate governance" is to examine the two words 
separately and then derive one definition. As shown in chapter 2 corporate is a 
word normally associated with an organisation or body, and as such it implies as 
much relevance to the public sector as to companies in the private sector. 
Governance is to do with organisational control and therefore the processes, 
systems and procedures for the exercise of that control. Therefore at its most 
simplest corporate governance in the NHS could be defined as "the processes, 
systems and procedures through which individual NHS organisations exercise 
control". Unfortunately such a definition would be deficient in three major areas 
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which were identified in the literature review in chapter 3; the issue of 
accountability, the importance of stakeholders, and governance by principles. 
As shown in chapter 4, with the exception of the owner-manager, all other 
organisations have stewards who have to account for their actions to their 
principals. In the private sector the principals are shareholders, in the voluntary 
sector it is the membership, and in the public sector it is the community, though 
in the NHS the route is indirect. Within local government there is the direct 
principal -steward relationship between a council and the local community which 
forms the electorate. The NHS is controlled ultimately by central government and 
its Department of Health. This means the steward-principal relationship is 
between a NHS organisation and the Department. The community is one step 
removed and calls health ministers to account through the general election 
process. In business parlance the Department is the customer whereas the public 
is the consumer. An appropriate analogy is family shopping where the parent is 
the customer and the children are the consumers. The parent makes the decision 
and receives feedback from the consumers on the wisdom of their actions. Whilst 
accountability in the NHS is to the Department of Health, three separate 
initiatives in chapter 9 have sought to increase greater perceived public 
accountability. 
Firstly in 1995 the role of "Accountable Officer" was introduced for all chief 
executives whether from health authorities or NHS trusts. An explicit link was 
formed between each NHS organisation and Parliament, usually exercised by the 
Public Accounts Committee. A standard memorandum for chief executives of 
trusts was drawn up and issued on I't November 1997. It had to be signed by 
incumbent post-holders and since, by any new chief executive taking up his\her 
position. It states: 
the essence of your role as accountable officer is to see that the 
trust carries out these functions in a way which ensures the proper 
stewardship of public money and assets. 
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It can be argued that any chief executive of an organisation has the same 
responsibilities to their principals. However the Accountable Officer role goes 
further. Under a section of the memorandum concerned with advice to the board, 
the chief executive is given the following instruction: 
if the board or the chairman is contemplating a course of action 
which you consider would infringe the requirements of propriety 
and regularity, you should set out in writing to the chairman and 
the board your objection to the proposal and the reasons for it. If 
the board decides nonetheless to proceed, you should seek a 
written instruction to take the action in question. You should 
ensure that the audit committee, which has specific terms of 
reference and delegated powers to inquire into matters of propriety 
and regularity, and which may require your attendance before it 
any time, receive copies of the document which describe your 
objections. You should also inform the NHS Executive, if 
possible before the board takes its decision or in any event before 
the decision is implemented so that the Executive can if necessary 
intervene with the board and inform the Treasury. 
The second initiative built on the first following the election of the new 
government in May 1997. It believed that the role of Accountable Officer did not 
go far enough and argued that the focus was primarily on money when the NHS 
was in the business of care and people. The mid 1990s had seen the public 
scandal at Bristol Royal Infirmary where a significant number of children had 
died following surgery by heart surgeons who were not competent to undertake a 
particularly complicated technique. Despite the expression of concerns by a 
variety of interested parties, surgery continued as did the deaths. When the case 
became public knowledge the surgery stopped and an investigation was held. The 
chief executive, even though by chance he was a doctor, tried to argue that he 
was not responsible for the clinical performance of doctors. This view did not 
find widespread support and the incoming government took the action of adding 
the responsibility of the quality of clinical care to the role of Accountable Officer. 
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The third initiative introduced, by the DoH (1997b) under HSG (97)17, the 
concept of controls assurance to the NHS. It required NHS organisations to 
assess themselves against explicit standards for the risks to which the 
organisation was exposed. Whilst in the first year most of the standards were of a 
financial nature, by 2000 they had grown to encompass the complete range of 
organisational life, such as emergency planning. External auditors are required by 
the Department of Health to audit the assessments against the standards and to 
make explicit statements, which are published in the trust's public annual report, 
on compliance. Effectively, failure of the auditors to accept the trust's views on 
this matter, can mean that the final accounts for that financial year may be 
qualified. The trust is required to include controls assurance statements in the 
annual report and these must be signed by the chief executive. The approach to 
controls assurance is that of risk management linked to internal control systems 
which is mirrored in the private sector by the recommendations of Turnbull 
(1999). 
In addition in chapter 9 there are other actions required of NHS organisations 
aimed at public accountability. Since 1997 all board meetings must be held in 
public where normal business is to be conducted unless there is discussion 
around a named patient or member of staff which is allowed to take part in a 
closed part of the meeting. The NHS Plan (Department of Health 2000) has 
introduced the concept of the patients' forum which has to be in place in 2003. 
They will comprise of former patients and members of the community to monitor 
the performance of a trust in the delivery of patient services; a member of the 
patient's forum will have a seat on the board. The conclusion that must be drawn 
on the issue of accountability is that whilst NHS organisations have to account to 
ministers through the established bureaucracy of the NHS stakeholders are 
important. 
The key stakeholders have been explored in chapter 4 but there are others and all 
want involvement and the ability to influence how services are developed and 
delivered. The sum of these demands from all stakeholders will far exceed any 
NHS organisation's ability to meet those demands even if it wished to do so. The 
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tools in chapter 4 gave some examples of how managers could tackle the issue of 
prioritisation of stakeholders. However it would appear to still mean that the 
organisation will allow itself to be influenced by some stakeholders and not by 
others, and as such represents a "how long is a piece of string" type issue. The 
crux of the matter is how do you meet stakeholder expectations and the logical 
answer has to be when they are reasonable. The accusation that can be made 
immediately is reasonability is a subjective concept and depends upon your view 
point. In reality reasonability is set by a range of environmental factors such as 
finance, staff, buildings and equipment and, changing societal attitudes. 
Effectively it can be argued that pleasing all of the people all of the time is 
impossible but pleasing most of the people most of the time, is achievable 
The high profile cases in both the public and private sector in the late 1980s\early 
1990s in chapters 5,6 an 7 involved individuals who did not appear to have been 
guided by any set of fundamental principles. For a definition of corporate 
governance in the NHS to be useful it must tie up with some principles to which 
individuals can be held. As shown in chapter 8 the Cadbury Report identified 
three key principles which should be applied. 
The first is Openness and implies transparency of decision making and actions 
which includes the rationale that has been employed. This norm should be in use 
most of the time with restrictions applied only when they can be justified. The 
second principle is that of Integrity which means avoidance of conflicts of 
interest and thereby ensuring the performance of any individual is not influenced 
by financial inducement or obligation to any individual or organisation. Thirdly 
Accountability which as discussed previously, means that an individual must 
account to their principal for their actions. 
These three principles were proposed for the private sector but were deemed by 
Nolan to be suitable for the public sector. In addition he added four other 
principles. Selflessness is at the heart of public service and implies the notion of 
taking decisions and actions to benefit the public and not for personal gain. 
Objectivity involves the concept of equal opportunity so that individual rewards, 
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appointments or awarding of contracts is based on merit. Honesty requires the 
declaration of any private interest that may lead to a conflict of Interest. Finally, 
Leadership is to act out the other six principles as a role model and ensure 
compliance from others. These seven principles, articulated by Nolan, appear to 
be consistent with the furtherance of good corporate governance and should be 
used as the underpinning guiding principles. 
It follows that a definition of corporate governance for the NHS could be: 
underpinned by the Nolan seven principles of public life, 
corporate governance in the NHS involves the processes, systems 
and procedures through which control of the organisation is 
exercised, public accountability is satisfied, and reasonable 
stakeholder expectations are met. 
10.2. Theoretical Base 
This thesis examined in chapter 4 agency theory whose proponents would argue, 
is the basis for most modern organisations in the developed world and seems 
appropriate for the command and control system of the NHS. 
In the UK , as the 
2 Is' century begins there are many that would put forward the 
view that the Conservative Government of the 1980s and a large part of the 
1990s, created a "Me" culture. This was epitomised by a drive for personal gain 
and the acquisition of material possessions. Some have unflatteringly called this 
approach as greedy and selfish because it is based on self-gratification. If this 
culture is examined from an organisational theory perspective, agency theory is a 
good fit. Davis et al (1977) are clear that agents are motivated by personal gain. 
The studies in chapter 3 of Gomez-Meija (1987), Abrahamson and Park (1994), 
Tosi and Gomez-Meija (1987) and, Stroh et al (1996) provide consistent 
evidence that positive outcomes occur for organisations that target the motivation 
of agents for personal gain. 
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: The description of agency theory as a nexus of contracts immediately focuses 
attention on the mechanism by which the relationship of agent - principal 
operates. In the real world of the practitioner, the key issue is relationships 
between people as they dictate the progress or not of business. Eisenhardt (1989) 
describes the agency problem that flows from this arrangement. Firstly the need 
to align goals between the two parties and secondly, verification of the agent's 
actions is both difficult and expensive. In addition there is another dilemma for 
the relationship around risk sharing with potentially the agent varying with the 
principal on the degree of risk to be taken. On some occasions the agent may 
expose the organisation to higher risk than the principals would like, and in 
effect, is risking someone else's money. However at different times the agent 
may be risk adverse so as to avoid the possibility of loss of employment. Under 
both scenarios the principals' welfare will be reduced. For example in Wessex 
there is no doubt that the agent exposed the organisation to significant risk 
without the knowledge of the principals. A similar observation can be made of 
the other three cases. Therefore the important contribution from agency theory is 
not that it is contractually based but that it is founded on a relationship between 
agents and principals. In reality in the NHS this is a changing scenario. Ministers 
are principals and senior civil servants are agents but at the next level the latter 
become principals and SHAs are agents. Downward again the SHAs are now 
principals with NHS trusts and PCTs as agents, and finally, boards of NHS trusts 
and PCTs are principals and their staff are agents. It confirms that the NHS is a 
hierarchical command and control system which can be explained by agency 
theory but also it confirms that relationships are fundamental. 
When stakeholders are considered as in chapter 4 it can be seen that relationships 
are key as well. Agents are employed to maximise the benefits of the organisation 
for their principals. In most scenarios the best way for agents to achieve their 
objective is to recognise the validity of stakeholder interests. For example, in a 
high skills industry where there is a scarcity of appropriate labour, it is not in the 
agent's interest to ignore the concerns of the employees; enlightened self-interest 
will motivate the agent to interact positively with stakeholders. However not all 
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occasions align the goals of agent and stakeholders, and at that time the needs of 
the principal will come first. 
If it is established that agents need to consider stakeholders, Quinn and Jones 
(1995) introduce the issue of agent-morality into the debate. They believe that 
efficient markets have in-built moral minima. Firstly, the principle of honouring 
agreements which is fundamental to agency theory. If one or both of the agent 
and principal chooses to avoid delivery of their agreed contractual commitments 
then the agent-principal relationship is built on sand. Similarly the second 
principle involves the avoidance of lying. If the relationship is to prosper it must 
be based on trust otherwise chaos would ensue. The third principle requires the 
prevention of harm to others whilst the fourth needs respect for the autonomy of 
others. Both these principles are necessary for constructive agency and business 
relationships. 
The in-built principles help understand one of the major assumptions behind 
agency theory. It is argued that the alignment of agent-principal goals is a 
significant problem as both parties can be morally hazardous. However it has 
been pointed out that effective relationships cannot exist without observance of 
the moral minima and if a trusting partnership is not present, then in the short 
term the costs of monitoring the agency relationship are very high, and in the 
medium to long term, the relationship is unsustainable. It can be seen from the 
case studies that moral hazard was a fundamental issue. In each situation it 
appears that a trusting relationship was present between agents and principals. 
However once the agent chose to pursue their own agenda the absence of detailed 
close monitoring by the principals meant that the actions, for example, of John 
Hoare could not be detected. 
It has been suggested that agency theory concerns relationships between people. 
Examination of the NHS response to corporate governance in chapter 9 reflects 
this perspective. Many of the initiatives and guidance involve defining 
relationships both within NHS organisations, e. g. between executive and non- 
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executive directors, and with outside stakeholders such as local government.. 
Agency theory is a valid model for considering the key relationships in the NFIS. 
10.3. Framework of Corporate Governance 
The case studies and the literature review illustrate the need for boards to actually 
control their organisations. In both Wessex, chapter 1, and West Midlands, 
chapter 5, cases the absence of any board involvement in the key strategic 
decision-making and the monitoring of the implementation of plans were major 
factors in the disasters that followed. Clearly Westminster, chapter 6, had a 
different accountability environment but the statutory body, i. e. the Council, 
failed to check the excesses of the Majority Party Leader. In the case of BCCI, 
chapter 7, there is no evidence of an effective board at all. With the exception of 
West Midlands the cases demonstrate the dangers of strong individuals 
dominating organisations without any checks and balances. Cadbury, Greenbury, 
Hampel and Nolan in chapter 8 are clear that boards are the cornerstone for 
effective corporate governance. Both controls assurance and Turnbull (1999) 
have indicated that a focus on risk management with clear internal control 
systems should be the approach for boards. 
Within the private sector the literature shows the need for boards to be composed 
of a balance of external or outside and internal or executive directors. The NHS 
at first glance does not face this difficulty as all chairmen and non-executive 
directors were appointed by the Secretary of State for Health until 2002, and now 
by the newly created, independent Appointments Commission, chapter 9. 
However if the role of NHS boards is to steer the organisation, monitor 
performance and exercise accountability, it is imperative that non-executive 
directors are recruited with appropriate skills and experience, and then provided 
with ongoing training and support to deliver their role in large, complex 
organisations, this latter point is supported by Hampel, Vinten (1992 p. 5), 
Cadbury (1999 p. 19) and Harrison (1998 p. 145 -146). At the same time it is 
imperative that the Appointments Commission removes the impression that 
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political bias influences appointments of chairmen and non-executive directors. 
This accusation has been levelled at both the Conservative administrations of the 
1980s and 90s, and the present Labour Government. If boards are to work 
effectively they require the appointment of individuals who can discharge their 
functions which are underpinned by the Department of Health's Code of 
Conduct. Cadbury stressed the need for independence of judgement in all non- 
executive directors. Nolan made the point that merit should be the overriding 
principle. 
The other key issue for non-executive directors is the availability of accurate, 
timely information which allows them to take informed decisions and make 
informed judgements on performance; a matter emphasised by Cadbury and 
Hampel. The literature and case studies illustrate vividly how often executive 
directors, in particular chief executives, neuter non-executive directors through 
the control of information. Both Wessex and West Midlands has this issue at the 
heart of their difficulties which is caused by executive directors wishing to be left 
alone to get on with their work and often believing that non-executive directors 
are ill-informed part-timers who get in the way. The problem with this attitude 
was shown by John Hoare at Wessex as it assumes that executive directors know 
everything and are always right. Ultimately a poor flow of information raises the 
likelihood of a corporate governance mishap. 
NHS organisations are normally significant entities involving thousands of staff 
with budgets of many millions. On average most NHS trusts employ 2-3000 staff 
and direct budgets of at least 00-100m. No board is able to monitor effectively 
such bodies through monthly meetings without detailed work occurring at other 
times. The researched literature is clear that audit committees have a fundamental 
role to play. They are the link between the organisation and the external auditors 
but also, importantly, influence the work programme of both internal and external 
audit, and receive detailed reports on completed pieces of work. The case studies 
illustrate the need for a more proactive role in monitoring major strategic change 
and significant developments; Firstenberg and Malkiel (1994 p. 34) argue strongly 
that audit committees should take on this type of role in the private sector in the 
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US and there is no reason to see why the idea is not relevant for the UK. Both 
Wessex and West Midlands show a failure to provide detailed scrutiny of large 
change programmes. Within the NHS, chapter 9, the introduction of controls 
assurance has meant a focus on risk management with subsequent risk reduction 
and elimination plans. Auditors are required by the Audit Commission to audit 
this work and as such it means that audit committees have a legitimacy to 
examine an organisation's performance in this area. However there is a danger 
that this scrutiny is performed at the end of the process and not on a planned 
ongoing basis. The aim should be to prevent corporate governance failures not 
simply to detect them after they have happened. 
The start of the 21" century has seen the NHS embark on a programme of major 
change to implement the government's NHS Plan. This involves the creation of 
new bodies, mergers, disinvestment, and the development of public-private 
partnerships; all these areas have the potential for mishaps. In fact the public- 
private partnerships have echoes of Wessex if not handled correctly. The use of 
the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) to fund and build many new hospitals is a 
challenging new arena for most public sector managers. To prevent another 
Wessex there is an argument for enhancing the role of the audit committee to 
include an internal scrutiny mechanism. Non-executive directors have the ability 
to stand back from the hurly-burly of day-to-day activities and form an objective 
view of whether major projects are consistent with public sector values and in 
line with NHS corporate governance. If this role had been in place then it is more 
likely that Wessex and West Midlands would not have happened. Similarly if 
audit committees existed in local government there would have been a greater 
chance to avoid the Westminster debacle. 
Turnbull (1999) supports this argument by calling for audit committees to take on 
the overview of how boards discharge their responsibility to ensure internal 
control and risk management. Both Zaman (2001) and Jones and Carey (2001) 
raise concerns that audit committees will become immersed in detail and will not 
have enough tome to take on this expanded role. This view muddles principles 
with process and therefore does not negate the proposal to broaden the remit of 
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audit committees whilst it is acknowledged that the process would need careful 
construction. 
Allied to the issue of audit committees is that of the use of auditors, both internal 
and external. The Public Accounts Committee commented in the two NHS 
failures of Wessex, chapter 1, and West Midlands, chapter 5, that internal audit 
were noticeable by their absence. All NHS bodies have an internal audit service, 
often purchased from a regional consortium of NHS organisations. The issue 
must be to focus the work of this service. There is an ongoing need to undertake 
regular audits on financial probity but there is still time within the year to carry 
out specific work on key issues. Similarly external auditors have specified areas 
of activity that they must examine but also have discretionary time which the 
audit committee should direct. The case of BCCI, chapter 7, should not be 
repeated even though the auditors argued that they did nothing wrong. Morally it 
cannot be right that an organisation has major levels of maladministration and 
illegal activities over which the external auditors observed for many years, yet 
took no concrete action. Both types of auditors are a resource for audit 
committees to deploy to help reduce the risk of corporate governance failures 
The four case studies have one very evident common strand and that is conflict of 
interest. Without doubt each case had individuals who had personal agendas, 
such as monetary or political gain, which overrode the discharge of their duties 
and responsibilities. Interestingly, despite the many NHS publications on various 
corporate governance themes, there is no writing specifically on conflict of 
interest. Whilst the literature does not provide one commonly agreed definition of 
conflict of interest, it is possible to generalise. No individual should be swayed in 
the delivery of their work through the receipt of some form of inducement to 
favour a particular course of action. Carson's exacting definition, chapter 3, 
intuitively seems correct but poses real difficulties in every day life. It effectively 
asks all individuals to make every decision on an objective basis and to 
disassociate any personal implication from that decision-making process. The 
reality is that this approach asks too much of human beings. For example it 
implies that no person should initiate a course of action which may bring 
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personal recognition as part of an ambitious person's drive for promotion. In the 
practitioner's world the emphasis has to be to achieve the desirable and not some 
unrealistic, theoretical notion. Cadbury, Hampel and Nolan, chapter 8. stress the 
independence of judgement of the non-executive director and, in particular, their 
leadership where there is a danger of conflict of interest 
The four case studies, the four corporate governance reports and the NHS 
response to corporate governance demonstrate that the elements below whilst not 
exhaustive, are both central and consistent to good corporate governance: 
* Accountability - the accounting of the discharge of duties and 
responsibilities by the agent to principals whilst considering the 
expectations of stakeholders; 
0 Separation of executive from non-executive responsibility - clarity 
that executive directors manage the organisation on a day-to-day 
basis to a strategy and policies agreed by the board but have their 
performance monitored by non-executive directors to ensure 
compliance; 
e Management control of operations - the establishment of clear and 
explicit internal control mechanisms to ensure delivery of the 
board's objectives; 
* Management of conflict of interest - the establishment of a system 
and culture which ensures that individuals cannot influence the 
decisions of the organisation in the pursuit of personal gain; 
9 Independence of audit committees - the establishment of a non- 
executive controlled mechanism to provide independent scrutiny 
of key executive activity which impacts on the organisation. 
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10.4. Operation alisine the Framework 
One of the drivers behind this thesis, as stated on page 1, has been to identify 
advice for practitioners to help them realise corporate governance in NHS 
organisations. The aim of this section is to take the learning that has emerged 
from the theoretical investigations and provide practical suggestions which match 
the conceptual framework and therefore directors and management control, audit 
committees, conflicts of interest and accountability will be discussed in turn. 
10.4.1 Directors and Management Control - Role of the Board 
The board is the key decision making mechanism of any NHS organisation and 
as such, it has to be managed to ensure it is effective which includes the delivery 
of good corporate governance. The first set of reflections concern a number of 
issues which I have found useful in this task. 
There needs to be clarity about how often the board holds a formal meeting in 
public. Traditionally in the NHS, this has come to be seen as monthly. However 
it is important to understand how these meetings work. Normally there are a 
number of formal papers presented which address subjects that have been placed 
on the agenda. Sometimes they can be quite simple e. g. current waiting list 
numbers and times, or very complex e. g. a business case for a major 
development. In reality the board meeting is not the best place to examine an 
issue in depth. Time constraints involving the indicative length of the meeting 
and the press of business items on the agenda usually mean that no one issue can 
be given more than 30-45 minutes. At the same time there is no doubt that a 
proportion of all board directors feel uneasy about criticising complex matters as 
they are aware that they may be showing their ignorance, and/or if the media are 
present, they might be scoring a perceived own goal of bad publicity in the local 
newspaper or on the local radio/television. Board directors are expected to 
exercise a stewardship function and therefore appropriate time for complex issues 
is vital. A suggestion, that has been successful, is to hold public board meetings 
every two months but on alternate months hold board seminars/workshops. This 
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allows key issues and topics to be scrutinised in depth without time pressures. 
Involvement of external stakeholders will avoid the charge that the board is 
making decisions in private and any formal decision making must be done at a 
formal public board meeting. 
An important corporate governance decision is what matters appear in the public 
part of the formal board meeting and what is moved to the private section of the 
meeting which is out of the gaze of the public and media. Experience has shown 
me that NFIS organisations often place difficult issues in the private section 
simply because they do not want to have a public debate. A recent example that I 
came across was of a large NHS trust which never took a board report on 
complaints in public. This meant that local people had no idea of the level of 
complaints that organisation had received, what they were about, was the level 
rising, falling or static, what the trends were, and so on. This is a practical 
example of a failure of public accountability. The danger of a board making a key 
decision in private is that if an individual or group of individuals felt aggrieved 
and chose to use the judicial review process the NFIS organisation would find 
itself in a compromised position. A suggested simple rule is that every proposed 
agenda item should be placed in the public part of the meeting unless the matter 
concerned named members of staff or patients, or if a commercial in confidence 
issue could not be made anonymous and would lead to the identification of a 
potential business partner. This approach is usually supported by non-executive 
directors but disliked by executive directors who are uncomfortable in defending 
their positions on issues in public. The key is that public bodies need to be seen 
to make key decisions in public. 
Linking with this last point is the need to pay attention to the language used in 
public board meeting papers. Often loose use of language can cause unnecessary 
public concern or bad publicity. This is not about sanitising papers but ensuring 
that they are factual and unemotional. The chief executive should see all draft 
papers for the board as experience shows that loose language draws bad publicity 
which draws the attention of the press machinery of government of the day. The 
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outcome is normally the expenditure of large amounts of time and energy 
unnecessarily. 
There is a need to ensure that the board is clear on the decisions that it has kept 
for itself and those that it is happy to delegate to another forum e. g. the 
management team. This decision should be made at a formal board meeting. 
It is suggested that a programme of reports and information needs are agreed to 
allow the board to deliver one of its key purposes, the monitoring of the 
performance of the organisation. This will mean a mixture of monthly, quarterly, 
six monthly and annual reports and information presentations. Staggering of them 
throughout the year lessens the likelihood of overloading any particular agenda. 
The chief executive should agree with the chairman how the board meeting will 
be run. In particular identify how key stakeholders will or will not be allowed to 
participate. I would advocate the involvement of trade union/staff side 
representatives on staff issues, and patient representatives, e. g. the local 
community health council, on all other matters. To assist this process my current 
trust has divided the agenda into three headings; patient issues, staff issues, and 
performance. With regard to public involvement in board meetings there are a 
variety of choices which work. They include dedicated time for public comment 
at the start of the meeting, at the end of the agenda, or when each issue is 
discussed. It is possible to allow no voice at all but it is not a course of action that 
I would recommend as it would probably be interpreted as a lack of public 
accountability. At the same time the chairman should be encouraged to think 
about the use of voting as a board tool. On reflection of many years involvement 
with boards I am not a strong advocate for regular use of voting as where that has 
happened it has produced dysfunctional boards where individual directors do not 
trust each other. I would recommend that voting is kept for very serious issues 
e. g. the proposed closure of a major facility. This does not preclude any 
individual director from recording their support or objection in the minutes but in 
general if a routine matter looked like splitting a board my advice would be to 
withdraw the matter and work on it for representation at the next meeting. 
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Finally with regard to managing the board. a prudent chief executive should place 
any key external performance reports on the organisation on the agenda of a 
public board meeting. Each organisation has an external auditor, appointed by the 
Audit Commission, and in the autumn of every year the appointed auditor 
produces a Management Letter. This is a formal critique of the organisation for 
the preceding financial year and covers subjects such as financial probity, legality 
of key decisions, and adoption and implementation of individual audit reports on 
specific subjects. This document is a significant corporate governance document 
and forms part of an organisation's public accountability. Many NHS 
organisations do not place this document before its board but send it to the 
board's audit committee whose minutes go before the board but do not contain 
the detail of the Management Letter. This can lead to accusations of covering up 
problems and should be avoided. In the same category are a number of other 
reports and include the annual performance ratings, commonly known as Star 
Ratings, and controls assurance returns. 
The relationship between chairman and chief executive is key in any type of 
organisation but particularly so in the NHS where the chairman is part-time, non- 
executive and appointed by the Appointments Commission whereas the chief 
executive is a full-time professional manager. The relationship usually has an 
easier development where the chairman has recruited to a vacant chief executive 
post as both parties have the opportunity to see if the personal chemistry works as 
the recruitment process takes place over a number of weeks. It is more difficult 
when the vacant post is that of chairman as the successor simply turns up after 
appointment, often has little knowledge of the organisation and usually the two 
individuals have never met. In governance terms the new partnership needs to 
agree how it will operate. This will include frequency of meetings, preferred 
method of briefing, who will lead on which major issue, and how the board will 
be managed. Often it is thought that as the chairman is non-executive then he/she 
will not lead on any key topic other than the functioning of the board and an 
ambassadorial role for the organisation. Reality is somewhat different as different 
personalities bring a wide range of expectations from chairmen, at times this can 
lead to a more executive approach. One important area that requires early 
Chapter 10 270 
agreement is who is to take the main role in media handling. A definite chairman 
function is that of management of non-executive directors. Personal style of 
chairmen can vary from a democratic approach where non-executive directors are 
made to feel very involved through to total non-involvement other than at formal 
meetings. The findings of this thesis are reflected in practice in that these 
individuals have a significant role to play in the governance of the organisation 
and therefore their expertise and knowledge should be utilised. As a starting 
point the formal roles should be split amongst the group of non-executive 
directors and include audit committee chairman, clinical governance committee 
chairman, patient and public involvement lead, and complaints conveners. In 
addition there are different ways of involving non-executive directors to gain 
benefit from their experience and, at the same time, allow them to grow their 
understanding of the organisation. Twinning with an executive director is one 
method whilst another is to match an individual with a range of services. Use of 
this half of the board allows greater objectivity to brought to board discussions 
and can act as a counter-balance to the views of executive directors who can at 
times lose sight of key objectives. 
If the board is the key decision making body it is important that attention is paid 
to its development needs. Too often thirteen individuals are thrown together and 
expected to function effectively when there is a wide range of experience, 
knowledge and capability. A board development programme is recommended as 
over time it allows the individuals to be comfortable at operating as a board 
whilst not losing sight of the key non-executive function to challenge executive 
directors. This objective can be achieved by the chairman and chief executive 
devising a programme which meets the needs of the board at that point in time. It 
may be delivered by the employment of a development facilitator or by using an 
external development mechanism. On taking up my current appointment my 
chairman agreed to allow me to enrol the board in the NHS Modemisation 
Agency's Board Development Programme which has a focus on clinical 
governance. This meant that over the following twelve months the board 
focussed on the key topic effecting patient care but also learrit to work with each 
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other and utilise the strengths around the table. There is no doubt that a 
development programme can deliver a more effective board. 
A separate dimension of directors and management control is that highlighted by 
the Wessex case. The NHS has embarked on a variety of new ways of working 
with the private sector which invoke the potential dangers as indicated in chapter 
I of this thesis. Hospitals are now built through the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) where the private sector fund and design the new facility to a specification 
provided by the NHS. Such schemes vary in value from f 5-250 million and 
involve contracts whose life is normally 25-30 years. Currently I am undertaking 
my fifth PFI scheme and the goal-posts have never been the same and therefore 
there is always a learning curve. Also the NHS is involved in Public and Private 
Partnerships (PPP) which are a form of joint venture. My recent experience 
involves the provision of a private infertility facility with profit sharing for both 
partners. Other models involve the establishment of treatment facilities built and 
staffed by the private sector but for use by the NHS. These varying types of 
activity can be a corporate governance nightmare as NHS organisations have 
certain powers to act under statute but must ensure that they do not act ultra 
vires. To avoid another Wessex there are practical steps that can be taken. 
Firstly, ensure there is a business case which outlines the benefits and risks, and 
has been examined in depth by the board and approved formally. Secondly, use a 
recognised project management methodology, which includes regular reports on 
progress to the board, to manage the project. Thirdly, involve some non- 
executive directors on the project board and encourage them to adopt the role of 
critical friend because in the middle of an exciting scheme the same mistakes as 
made in Wessex can be made again. Finally, commission external legal advice to 
ensure that the organisation has an independent, professional opinion that the 
NHS organisation can legitimately do what it proposes. If there is any doubt, seek 
a view from the organisation's appointed external auditors because as part of 
their annual probity audit they will review the legality of all major decisions. 
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I have offered a large number of suggestions in this section, many of which 
require effective administrative processes. In the private sector which is governed 
by a variety of business laws, organisations the size of the average NFIS 
organisation generally employ a company secretary to undertake the lead role in 
ensuring corporate governance compliance. Within the NHS the demands of 
public accountability have grown significantly in the past ten years with the 
outcome that an equivalent role in the NHS to the company secretary is now 
essential. Where these posts exist they are often known as board secretary. Such 
posts should be accountable to the chief executive but be a resource for the whole 
board. The role has a major interfacing function with non-executive directors. 
This involves facilitating the work that they need to complete within the limited 
time that non-executive directors have available to undertake their duties, but 
also to be a focal point for effective communication with the organisation. The 
board secretary has the responsibility for drafting the formal agenda for board 
meetings which means that there must be compliance with board wishes on the 
programme of reports and information, and the presentation of subjects which 
require board approval. The role includes the complete organisation of formal 
meetings from public notification, to production of board papers to the drafting 
of the minutes of the meetings. The board secretary should organise and service 
all board sub-committees and thereby have a complete picture of the business of 
the board at any given time. The post should be a focus for all high level 
corporate governance activity which would include the organisation's work on 
controls assurance and the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act 
that takes effect on public bodies in November 2003. The postholder is not a 
minute clerk but an important senior manager who works closely with all of the 
board, but in particular the chairman and chief executive, to ensure that the 
organisation's corporate governance responsibilities are met. 
10.4.2. Audit Committees 
The audit committee in the NHS tends to be viewed by many managers as 
unnecessary and/or a distraction rather than an important resource for the 
organisation. Every NHS organisation is required to have an audit committee 
Chapter 10 273 
however the establishment of such a mechanism is no guarantee that it will be 
used effectively. The key is to have an enthusiastic non-executive director as 
chairman and have an expanded remit from that of probity alone. This can mean 
that the discretionary areas of both internal and external auditors' work 
programme is directed by the audit committee to help the organisation become 
more efficient and effective, and thereby extract added value from the audit fee. 
Separately, if the board chooses not to establish a risk management committee as 
a formal sub-committee of the board,, there is a need to have a board forum for 
the discussion of non-clinical risk. The audit committee can take on this role and 
would cover risk including financial, buildings, information technology, 
equipment, and overall business continuity. As discussed in the thesis , controls 
assurance in the NHS has at its heart the creation of board assurance about all the 
key risks and whilst clinical risk is covered by the clinical governance committee 
of the board, the audit committee can pick up all other risks. In effect the audit 
committee becomes an internal scrutiny mechanism and because it meets in 
private it can ask the awkward questions that sometimes do not arise in public 
settings. 
In the previous section I discussed the dangers of new ventures and advocated the 
involvement of non-executive directors and a project management methodology. 
In addition it might be appropriate to have the audit committee examine in detail 
some elements of a scheme, For example, the establishment of a private patient 
unit on a NHS hospital site may cause little concern with regard to the design and 
operation of the facility. However the financial risks and returns will be of major 
importance because business failure could well have an adverse effect on public 
money. Detailed scrutiny by the audit committee in such circumstances could 
reassure the board when it comes to approval of the business case and/or to sign 
off the contract. 
Finally the attitude of the chief executive to the audit committee sets an 
important marker for the organisation. My recommendation is to attend audit 
committee meetings only when necessary and do not attempt to control or 
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shackle its activities. The result will be that a strong message of the independence 
of the committee will be established. This ethos can be reinforced by ensuring 
that all staff understand that they must attend when requested to contribute to 
discussions, and emphasis the importance of the committee as part of the clinical 
governance system of the organisation. A key point is that guidance on audit 
committees advises that they meet once a year with the external auditors but 
without executive directors present. Directors of finance usually try to prevent 
these meetings as they wish to hear what is said. I suggest that such meetings take 
place as they are a backstop to ensure corporate governance own goals are not 
scored. 
10.4.3. Conflicts of Interest 
The reality of the NHS in governance terms conflicts of interest do not present a 
large risk as long as some practical steps are taken. The main risk is that 
identified in Wessex with a non-executive director who has or may wish to have 
a business relationship with the NHS organisation through their main occupation. 
There is a wide range of backgrounds where this may apply but can be split into 
two broad groups. Firstly, professional services which include solicitors, 
architects, management consultants, and auditors. Secondly, suppliers who 
include pharmaceutical companies, computer firms, construction companies, and 
medical equipment/consumable suppliers. It is key that a non-executive director 
from this background has no involvement in deciding where an order or contract 
is placed . All 
NHS organisations are required to hold a register of interests 
which is a record of declared activities, by all board directors, where there may 
be an impact on their NHS duties. A board secretary can ensure that the register 
is kept up-to-date and should request a formal verification annually of the 
information held for each individual. It should be made clear to all directors that 
they have a responsibility to notify the organisation of any change in 
circumstances which are applicable. Separately, at every board meeting a simple 
reminder can be made by the chairman at the start of the meeting to the fact that 
any potential conflict of interest that may arise from the published agenda should 
be declared at that time. 
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The other category of individuals where conflicts of interest can arise, is that of 
local politicians. A large proportion of NHS organisations have local councillors 
as non-executive directors. Often they have roles within local government where 
there are direct linkages to the NHS. For example a councillor can have a major 
influence on policy development and delivery of services within social service 
with whom the NHS has a close relationship. At times issues of funding will be 
discussed with regard to which agency should allocate resources. In such debates 
within the NHS organisation the councillor should declare an interest and take no 
further part in the discussions. 
Outside of the board the major conflicts of interest within the organisation arise 
in the areas highlighted in the West Midlands case. Predominantly this is around 
the awarding of orders and contracts and usually will concern the purchase of 
medical equipment/supplies, the procurement of computer hardware and systems, 
the use of management consultants, and the provision of building works. In all 
cases the processes must be compatible with the organisation's standing orders 
and standing financial instructions and, crucially, not left to the discretion of a 
single individual. Orders worth over f- 15,000 should go to tender unless there is a 
specific reason why a sole supplier is the only way forward, in which case the 
system should require the agreement of both the chief executive and director of 
finance. 
10.4.4. Accountabilit 
This thesis has explored to whom are NHS organisations accountable and there is 
no doubt that agency theory still applies and the answer is the government of the 
day. However the rhetoric at the present time is that the NHS must become more 
accountable to local stakeholders. Clearly this is not instead of the goverm-nent 
but in addition. There are two practical steps that can be taken to reconcile these 
two potentially conflicting directions. 
Firstly, the NHS organisation at board level must ensure that robust plans are in 
place to deliver the government's key targets. Within the lexicon of the NHS they 
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are known as 'the must do's' and are predominantly concerned with waiting 
times for access to services and financial control. There are many targets in 
addition and the board needs to exercise a judgement on those targets where it 
needs to focus the organisation's energies. Usually these are areas where the 
organisation is perceived to be an outlier when considered against other NHS 
organisations. 
Secondly, ensure that the systems which gather the data on key targets are robust 
and adhere to government policy. In 2002/03 the DoH commissioned a sample of 
inspections of NHS trusts to examine their waiting list systems. Of the randomly 
selected forty plus organisations only three received a clean bill of health. Several 
chief executives lost their jobs as a result and many organisations were left with 
the stigma of either incompetence or as organisations which were happy to fiddle 
the figures. As one of the three organisations with no problems I watched as huge 
amounts of time and energy were spent to rectify the positions that these 
organisations caused them-selves. 
Experience shows that if the two steps above are achieved the organisation can 
avoid the spotlight of attention from the DoH and allows the NHS organisation to 
spend time developing relationships with local stakeholders which this thesis has 
identified as the crux of the accountability wording as used by politicians.. In all 
cases the key resource is time which must be given to each of the stakeholders to 
explain what the organisation is trying to achieve, to listen to views that are 
expressed, and where possible to involve stakeholders in the work of the 
organisation. For local people and organisations such as the voluntary sector, it is 
the opportunity to participate and be involved that usually wins them round but it 
must not be tokenistic or a one-off exercise. I believe that this approach is at the 
heart of the Foundation Trust movement where despite the promise of local 
accountability comments from the DoH have indicated that boards of these 
organisations will be more like governors or trustees and they will not be able to 
interfere in the day-to-day running of the organisation. I believe this reinforces 
the accountability of NHS organisations to the government and practitioners 
would do well to remember that the creation of trusts in 1991 promised local 
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control but when history is considered there is now more central control than at 
any other time in the history of the NHS. 
It is suggested that if practitioners address these areas of activities then the risk of 
corporate governance failure would be dramatically reduced. 
10.5. Reflection of Thesis Methodology 
A particular approach has been adopted to generate this thesis because of the 
inability to disregard objectively the experience of the writer as a practitioner in 
the field of corporate governance. 
The case study method has been successful for identifying some common factors 
which contribute to corporate governance failure. The differing cultural and 
organisational backgrounds of the four cases did throw up discrete issues for each 
individual scenario and logically that could have been expected. The review of 
written material illustrated that whilst it is only in recent years that the term 
"corporate governance" has gained currency, numerous aspects of corporate 
governance have been studied individually and collectively for many years. The 
theoretical conclusions that have been drawn resonate with my daily work as a 
practitioner. At the same time the various corporate governance initiatives have 
shown that they support to differing degrees, because of their own centre of 
attention, the conclusions that this thesis makes. Greenbury was the least relevant 
report as its focus was executive remuneration. However the work emphasised 
the importance of the non-executive director in organisations, a key conclusion of 
this thesis. Cadbury, Hampel, Nolan, and the NHS review had much that was in 
common with the main themes that emerged from both the literature review and 
the case studies. 
Finally, there is no doubt that this research has significantly influenced my work 
as a chief executive in the NHS, in particular the way corporate governance is 
enacted which is underpinned by the findings of this thesis. Nevertheless the 
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reliance on cases informed by a practitioner's need to find an operational 1 sable 
framework may have limited the enquiry. Clearly there is a need for more 
empirical research to test the validity and reliability of the conclusions. 
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